India’s transformation into an economic power merits a redefinition of national security and foreign policy in the region. How will the lAF contribute?

The recent changes in the global strategic security environment have brought about greater convergence in security perceptions among nations. The interaction has taken the form of an expanding web of economic, strategic and diplomatic exchanges. Even though India is emerging as an economic power in the region, there will be no paradigm shift as we have never nurtured regional or colonial aspirations. The IAF would, however, be expected to play an important role in the defence of economic gains. Also it would be expected to project the regional status of the country through engagement and cooperation with countries of the region and beyond. These have been, and would remain, the important objectives of our overall defence and foreign policies.

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The IAF has acquired an international benchmark image. What steps are needed to bring about qualitative changes in the combat organisation to measure up to this image?

The IAF has performed well in exercises conducted with foreign air forces. This proves that the IAF now possess an effective reach and capability to operate out of any location with a smaller footprint which requires less support and fewer lives put in danger – but lethal enough to accomplish the mission effectively with minimum resources. This is possible with the enabling technologies available today. Like most other air forces, we cannot afford mission specific aircraft. The IAF would slowly equip itself with multi-role aircraft like Mirage and Sukhoi-30, force multipliers like air-to-air refuellers, AWACS and precision munitions to cater to the modern battlefield and air power strategies.



The recent acquisition of Sukhoi 30 MKI aircraft, and proposals for 126 Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) suggest a paradigm shift from a defensive posture to an offensive one...

The IAF is authorised a specific number of combat squadrons with government approval keeping in mind the geo-political scenario. These new purchases are planned as a replacement for the ageing fleets of MiG-21s and MiG-23s which will be gradually phased out over the next two five-year plans. The present aircraft are by and large all MRCA. This purchase does not represent a paradigm shift, but is merely representative of the IAF attempt to maintain a force balance.



What kind of role does the IAF perceive in future war vis-a-vis operations of the army and navy?

The primary role of IAF is to neutralise the enemy air element and provide a favourable air situation for unrestricted operation by surface forces. Concurrently, the IAF would support and further army and navy operations. Battlefield interdiction, battlefield air strikes and reconnaissance are the most likely missions envisaged in support of ground operations. The navy would be primarily provided air defence cover for its flotilla and anti-shipping strikes will be conducted whenever called for by the navy. Along with the navy, the IAF would be engaged in protection of offshore assets, exclusive economic zone and sea lanes of communications.



Was the Indian hype about the proposed sale of US built F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan justified in pure military terms?

The F-16 is a contemporary fighter aircraft, which will have a pronounced impact on the offensive capability of PAF. It will signify a tremendous jump in the war fighting potential of Pakistan.



Though heralding a significant enhancement in PAF capabilities, the induction of F-16 will still not signify a change in the balance of power, which will still remain in favour of the IAF. The IAF has tremendous strength in depth to take care of any challenge thrown up by PAF whether before or after the induction of F-16s into PAF.



What is the current perception about the ideal size of the IAF in terms of not only combat squadrons but also helicopter and transport squadrons?

Historically, the IAF was formed with a tactical role and the concept continued till the early 1980s. The larger role of the air force has now been comprehended and is shaping up accordingly. As per the security perception, we also need to enhance our strategic air-lift capability through the acquisition of transport aircraft.



We have acquired flight refuelling aircraft that are multi-role and can, therefore, be utilised for strategic airlift. As the IAF grows in size to meet its larger role, it is but obvious that this fleet too will increase in size. Whilst I visualise a strength of 55 combat squadrons adequately supported by strategic and tactical airlift capability, it is difficult for me to specify a number that we would finally reach due to many constraints. We have to recognise and accept this fact.



Is the IAF serious about the LCA programme or is the HF-24 route seen only in terms of mandatory induction, whether requirements are met or not, to play a peripheral role?

Yes, the IAF is definitely serious about the LCA programme and will be a replacement for the ageing MiG-21 fleet in the lower weight category aircraft.



It is a very important cog in the wheel as far as IAF requirements in the next 30 years are concerned. As a contemporary weapon platform with very advanced technologies it is being inducted due to its ability to meet IAF requirements fully. The success of the LCA programme is a demonstration of the country's technological prowess. The spin-offs will be many.



Can the display of enthusiasm for the LCA jeopardise other induction programmes?

The IAF induction programmes are based on operational requirements.

All projects are taken towards their desired fructification, as the failure to do so will have a direct bearing on the operational capability of the IAF. The enthusiasm for LCA will not affect any other induction programme, as the proposed purchase of 126 MRCA is to cater for a different weight category.



Do you accept that the frequent aircraft crashes have dented the IAF image?

The accident rate (per 10,000 hrs of flying) has been on the decline over the years. The accident rate over the last three years has reduced from 1.03 (1999-2000) to 0.62 (2003-04). For this year it is currently 0.72. Therefore, it is incorrect to state that the IAF has frequent crashes.

Military aviation has its inherent risks and the IAF operates a wide variety of aircraft in vastly different geographical and weather conditions.

While we have been successful in managing this risk and reducing accident rates, there is scope of further improvement.



We continuously keep taking steps to reduce accidents in the IAF.