Though the nuclear deal, which is now being debated in the context of the 123 text, is supposed to be on Indo-US nuclear cooperation, it has its overtones on other spheres of our national interest which naturally are best left to be dealt with by foreign policy experts.

The Indian nuclear program is being steered over the years with the specific goal of achieving long-term energy security by tapping the potential of our meagre resources of uranium estimated to support 10000 MW electricity generation and multiply it to 350000 MW by harnessing vast resources of thorium abundantly available in the country. For this a three-stage program is drawn-up. The present status of this is, we have mastered all aspects of the first stage, viz. heavy water reactors(HWR), made a beginning with the second stage by starting construction of a prototype fast breeder Reactor (PFBR) and pursuing research and development on thorium related fuel cycle pertaining to the third stage. In the process, expertise spanning the entire nuclear fuel cycle is accumulated.

In view of stringent restrictions and embargoes by the world community, this program has been indigenous effort driven and the level of technological prowess achieved surpasses even many of the advanced countries. Uranium shortage and embargoes have been factored into the development program. As we have a lot to offer as a global player, we certainly deserve an honourable entry into the world community as a technologically advanced country on our own right denied for so long. Unfortunately, the agreement does not confer that honour adequately as it largely treats India as a recipient State.

The cooperation agreement as it has evolved concentrates broadly on two aspects. Firstly, supply of power reactors, fuel and aspects directly connected with them like safety. That means there is an overtone of commercial interests to the detriment of all other aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Secondly, a whole lot of prescriptions to bring India into the global main stream of non-proliferation, an obsession, US has been pursuing ever since the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into effect in 1970.

In operationalising the cooperation agreement, one document that is bound to have over bearing influence is the Henry Hyde Act passed into law by the US ignoring our concerns. It overtly limits the cooperation in the nuclear field to mainly to promoting commercial power reactor trade and practically nothing else. However, it exhaustively deals with non-proliferation and other extraneous issues.

Ever since the full text of the 123 agreement was made public, there has been a spate of clarifications issued by the two parties at the official level. The text has been an exercise of fixing the concerns with clever use of language, being vague at times, or circumventing by suggesting multi-layered bilateral consultations, or subject to amendments to applicable national laws, or avoid specific mention.

The Indian officials who negotiated the text are saying that it meets all our concerns but are evasive on specific issues by brushing aside as hypothetical. However, on the US side categorical statements are coming to the effect that the agreement is completely consistent and within bounds of the Hyde Act and the 123 text is left vague to allow interpretations as face saving measure! In the light of these clarifications, when there are serious problems with the Hyde Act, how can we feel safe with an agreement built on an unacceptable Act?

While the issues like assurances of fuel supply, exercise of right of return triggered by various events are important and covered by the media extensively, at least two issues are still cause for serious concern. Trade restrictions on access to international market for equipment and components are retained as before for most complex parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. No straight relaxation even for dual use items. Some may argue, since we have the technology in these areas, why bother? Then the same should apply to reactors.

We have the technology but still are we not seeking it? The question is, when we are entering into cooperation as “equal partners”, so it says in the joint statement, why this limitation? Should we accept selective partial lifting of embargo? We could accept end use verification by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) but trade access we must insist. Also there is no mention of cooperation in the fast reactor fuel cycle even in the future though we are expected to place our fast breeder reactors using foreign origin plutonium under perpetual safeguards.

The second issue is concerning reprocessing. This is at the core of our three-stage power program interfacing between stages. Though the reprocessing right has been conceded in principle after we offered to build a dedicated facility, there could be protracted highly intrusive discussions on procedures and arrangements.

What is agreed cannot be termed really consent upstream but we have to face lot of intrusive consultations which may stall giving effect to this consent. In view of the fact that we had a head start in reprocessing, being the fifth in the world, we should not have compromised but insisted on the consent right without any conditions.

A lot of problems may emerge in this area at various stages as the matter is cleverly kept wide open, not withstanding the artificial time frame agreed in the text. On the whole, this Agreement seems to benefit short term interest to the detriment of long term national interest by becoming a dependent country.
(The writer is former director, BARC, Mumbai.)