The former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, once said that what is worse than being America’s enemy is to be America’s friend. After the September 11 attacks, the US and Pakistan once again became allies, this time to wage a war on terror. This renewed friendship has served Pakistan well over the years. Pakistan has got over $12 billion in direct military and economic aid from the US. Not only did the Pakistan army get the latest weaponry, there was also a windfall for the economy in the form of huge debt write-offs.

The Americans stopped treating Pakistan as a failed state and a rogue state and conferred on it the status of a major non-NATO ally. General Musharraf was no longer an untouchable and overnight he became the most sought after person in the international diplomatic circuit. So much so that the Americans, especially the Bush administration, were not willing to listen to anyone who raised doubts about the commitment of the Pakistanis in the war against Islamic terrorists.

But six years down the line, there are severe strains in a relationship that many people felt was based on  convenience rather than conviction. With the war effort in Afghanistan faltering on account of a resurgence in the activities of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the US is increasingly getting impatient with Pakistan. Pressure is mounting on the Bush administration from the American Congress, media, Pentagon and intelligence officials to ratchet up the pressure on what is believed to be the epicentre of terrorism – Pakistan.

As a result, there has been a flurry of statements from senior administration officials hinting at some sort of unilateral action against terrorist targets located inside the Pashtun-dominated tribal belt of Pakistan. According to reports in the American media, there are three possible options that the US could exercise: one, launch air strikes against known terrorist compounds; two, send in special forces to hunt down terrorists; and three; carry out a large scale ground offensive by sending in its regular troops across the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

It is not as if the Americans have not already done what they are now threatening to do. On a number of occasions the Americans have taken action against suspected terrorist sites inside Pakistan.

There are also reports of US intelligence operatives functioning from inside Pakistan. And much of this happened with the knowledge and concurrence of Pakistan. Only, it was never publicised, nor was it ever acknowledged. If anything, in order to limit the political fallout inside Pakistan, the Pakistanis always claimed that their forces had carried out an operation against terrorist bases even though the Americans had launched the attack.

Therefore the question: why has the US upped the ante by publicly threatening unilateral action at this point in time? Part of the answer lies in the domestic compulsions of the Bush administration, which is trying hard to dispel the impression gaining ground inside US that it was giving almost unconditional support to Musharraf.
But there is another reason. The Americans seem to have reached the conclusion that the Lal Masjid operation and the subsequent wave of suicide terror attacks on Pakistan security forces coupled with the political setback suffered after the Supreme Court reinstated the chief justice, have weakened Musharraf to a point where his dependence on US support has increased. Therefore, the Americans are trying to lean on him just that much more to ensure that he delivers on his promises to act forcefully against the jihadis. They also want to prevent Musharraf from entering into any Waziristan type agreement with the Taliban which gives the terrorists a safe haven inside Pakistan.

The Americans know that the very prospect of an overt US strike scares a tottering Musharraf so much that just to prevent this from happening he will take the sort of aggressive steps that the Americans want him to take. Already, there are reports that the Pakistanis are trying desperately to dissuade the Americans from taking any unilateral action and promising to launch operations against terrorist bases.

Clearly, with the US now breathing down his neck, Musharraf is caught between a rock and a hard place. By launching military operations against the Taliban he risks a civil war like situation in the country. Not only will the Pakistani public and political class oppose such operations, the army too might rebel against an operation in which they will not only lose lives but also alienate the Pashtun population of the country. But if Musharraf doesn’t move against the Islamic militants, then he faces the prospect of American action, which will also destabilise both his regime and his country.

India, which has faced the brunt of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, must now brace itself for the fallout of large scale unrest inside Pakistan. Because once the bullets start flying inside Pakistan, India will have 20 to 30 million refugees queuing up on its borders, and a measly fence will not be enough to hold these refugees back.
If this happens, India will have to ask itself if partition was such a bad thing after all.