Prior to the 1999 Kargil conflict, Pakistan's military would sporadically bomb Indian border towns. Their observation posts on hills overlooking the National Highway 1A near Kargil, in Jammu and Kashmir, gave them a clear line of sight to lay down indirect artillery fire, inflicting heavy casualties on the Indian side. Our forces too, returned the nonsense fire. The public soon learned to understand the undeclared state of war against a state enemy.

People would scramble to safety as soon as they heard the whistle-like sound of a missile in flight. The belief that “we’re hitting back” boosted morale. But shell fragments from the guns were causing as many casualties as the Pak bombs, though both sides scarcely hit targets. During one such bombing on Goma Kargil village, barely 40 km from the border, a young mother of five, who came out of her house to usher her little ones to safety, was hit by a shell fragment and died.

Gesture security may be a military necessity in porous border areas. In the rest of the country, however, the flurry of precautions that follow a terrorist attack or merely an al-Qaeda threat, represent mostly charades. It is possible to believe that our police possessed plausible intelligence that terrorists are preparing for an attack. But it is impossible to accept as either feasible or credible, the unending security checks at airports, the virtual “stripping” of guests of all their personal belongings before witnessing an Independence Day parade, or the “point defence” (protection of specific buildings and installations against attack).

The range of targets for terror attacks is almost unlimited. The Home Ministry, intelligence agencies and the police know that such gesture security can achieve little more than adding delay to a passenger’s flight and a loss of civil liberties. Yet, those in the security business have to be seen to be trying harder whenever there is an attack, or else they come under the public's critical attack.

Many of us have become reconciled to the steel gates at the Vidhana Soudha and the concrete barrier outside the High Court. Still, experience dictates that public buildings must take chances as it is not credible to fortify all our airport terminals, bus stands, railway stations and malls. Public safety could be threatened in the most erratic and unpredictable ways. Recall the 1993 Mumbai serial bombings, the 2001 twin tower attack in New York, the 2001 Parliament House attack in Delhi and the 2005 terror strike at Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bangalore. All the targets were as different as the modus operandi of the perpetrators.

The 9/11 plane crash into the US Trade Centre and the Parliament attack, both occurring just three months apart, represent serious intelligence failure – one on the part of a world Superpower and the other in the heart of a VVIP ring which enjoys a three-layered security cover. The Mumbai blasts represent a combination of terrorism and organised crime, but the meticulous planning and long-drawn-out execution is another case of intelligence breached.

It is evident that all serious counter-measures hinge on intelligence – identifying potential threats by surveillance and penetration. This holds good even for tackling the naxal threat. The security service deserves more sympathy than it usually receives for its difficulties in achieving this as terrorism today is a highly sophisticated, global industry. The range of Muslim terrorists, both homegrown and imported, is simply large. Surveillance requires commitment of massive manpower. It is difficult to distinguish between a terrorist who simply talks big and a sleeping cell, which after months or even years, suddenly carries out a suicide attack. Police assistance is woefully inadequate and a cause for dismay in intelligence circles.   

Intelligence gathering is one of the most important inputs for maintaining public order. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (SARC) headed by former Chief Minister M Veerappa Moily notes that after special branches were devoted to intelligence gathering in most states, the police stations, which are the basic source of all information but also under pressure of law and order duties, have slackened their efforts.

The Commission recommends strengthening intelligence gathering machinery and making it more accountable; combining human intelligence with information gathered from diverse sources with a focus on increased use of latest technology; equipping intelligence agencies to develop multidisciplinary capability by utilising the services of experts; making intelligence a tool in conflict management and prevention rather than merely reporting incidents; use of video cameras and close circuit television to monitor public places instead of wasting massive manpower; restoring beat police system, which gives a sense of security to citizens and is also the best source of information, and adequate rewards and protection for informants.

In case of a major breakdown of public order, the Commission recommends fixing responsibility on police officers for lapses.

Since the IISc attack, the anti-terrorism wing of  Karnataka Police is deluged with promises of funds and infrastructure upgradation. Until these promises are kept, gesture security will remain a charade and not the real protection needed to save people’s lives from fanatic terrorists.