This book, by a former Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) senior officer, is an important first-person account.
The author served in the R&AW, or the country’s external intelligence, since its formation in 1968 until 1994— eventually rising to head the agency’s counter-terrorism desk. He is thus well placed to shed light on key events in India’s intelligence history.
He underlines important facts that have been overlooked by the Indian intelligentsia. First, the US State Department has generally been unfriendly towards India until very recently, even though both countries have long shared a commitment to democratic values.
His book contrasts the lukewarm attitude of American officials towards Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism, with their eagerness to restrain India from acting in legitimate self-defence.
Second, Raman asserts that Pakistani hostility to India pre-dates the break-up of United Pakistan in 1971, and stems from a pathological hatred of all that India stands for.
Hence, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) sponsored terrorists in the northeast from as early as 1956, and after the 1962 India-China war, found a willing ally in China.
Thirdly, notwithstanding the common joke about R&AW being ‘raw’, India’s external intelligence agency has played a significant and largely positive role in shaping the country’s future.
Legendary chief
Much of the credit for this success should go to Rameshwar Nath Kao, the agency’s legendary founder-chief. It was thanks to Kao’s foresight and the enormous trust that Indira Gandhi reposed in him, that the R&AW played a decisive role in the formation of Bangladesh— an event that made India the undisputed superpower in South Asia.
Kao’s reputation and easy personality also helped establish intelligence liaisons with foreign countries, particularly France. This in turn, generated goodwill for India overseas and enhanced the country’s profile in the international community.
Raman reveals an interesting fact— that the R&AW is plagued by poor man-management. By comparison, there is a stronger sense of camaraderie in the Intelligence Bureau. His anecdotes suggest that the organisation does not have an adequate system of quality control at the entry level, and is unwilling to discipline officers as frequently as is necessary.
One point which Raman regrettably does not explore is whether or not the R &AW’s training programs for new recruits need to emulate those of the CIA.
The American agency emphasises the need for commando training in order to encourage new officers to develop an esprit de corps, which thereafter lasts for many years. 
A key strength of Raman’s book is that it conveys a sense of the intelligence world as it really is— mostly shades of gray, instead of black and white. Although India has largely been abandoned by its Western allies with respect to combating Pakistan’s proxy war, intelligence co-operation in other fields has continued apace.
Even-handed analysis
Moreover, although the Indian political class has committed numerous blunders, by and large successive heads of government have tried to protect the nation’s interests.
Indira Gandhi, Morarji Desai, Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao are all subjected to a fair and even-handed analysis of their strengths and weaknesses.
Certain salient points emerge from the book. India needs a stronger counter-intelligence mechanism, in order to ensure that foreign agencies cannot penetrate the government under the guise of co-operating in counter-terrorism.
More effort needs to be made by other government agencies, particularly the Indian Foreign Service, to co-operate with R&AW and not blow the cover of its officers posted abroad.
Finally, the agency itself must strengthen its ability to gather human intelligence, instead of relying heavily on published information, foreign liaison and technical means to collect information.
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