The prime minister is not angry. He is in anguish. The nation has been informed the basic reason for his anguish is the Left parties’ critique on the Indo-US nuclear cooperation agreement. Much to the glee of sections of the mainstream media, and obviously the rightwing opinion in the country, the Prime Minister has been “firm” in dealing with the Left. To these sections, the Prime Minister has shown uncustomary boldness to “show” the Left – “their place”. So the nation has been told having thus dismissed the doomsday sayers, it is celebration time for having concluded this “historic” deal on nuclear cooperation. The “anguish”, therefore, was necessary for reviving the atmosphere of rejoicing and self-congratulation. 

On a more serious note, it is necessary to examine what was there in the Left parties response to the 123 text which had upset the Prime Minister. The basic argument of the Left critique points out that the nuclear cooperation agreement and the 123 text cannot be seen in an isolation. 123 text is a crucial and perhaps principal element in the larger process of the Indo-US relationship which is developing into a full-fledged strategic partnership. The basis of this argument is bourne out both by the chronological sequence which forms the background of the 123 text, as well as, provisions of the text itself.

The process of nuclear energy cooperation started with the joint statement of the Prime Minister with the US President in July 2005.  The joint statement, of course, covered a far wider ground of which the nuclear agreement a part. Subsequently, the military framework agreement was signed. India also conformed to many of the multilateral and bilateral agreements with the US which brought India closure on strategic questions.

India became part of the controversial proliferation security initiative and the Australian club, the missile technology control regime etc. Most importantly, India voted along with US twice in the IAEA for isolating Iran. All these are veritable proof of the growingly closer strategic ties that India is developing with US.

In fact, all these developments which  underline India’s strategic proximity has been noted in the Hyde Act, passed by the US legislature. These developments also make it abundantly clear that the nuclear cooperation agreement is not a development in isolation. Neither can anybody claim that the nuclear cooperation agreement will remain insulated from the implications of the Hyde Act.

The prime minister in his statement in both Houses of Parliament has pointed out that the annual “good conduct” certification which the US President has to submit before the US Congress is not part of the 123 text. It is implicitly suggested that this clause of the Hyde Act is, therefore, infractuous.

But the constitutional practice of the US suggest that the annual certification is an obligation which ought to be fulfiled by the US President. The issue here is that if the “good conduct certificate” is not furnished by the President or if it is not accepted by the US Congress, what would be the impact of such an eventuality on the 123 agreement? Clearly, the agreement can be terminated by the US with all its adverse consequences on our civilian nuclear energy programme.

Similarly, the commitments that India has entered into in perpetuity is on the assurance of a reciprocity for uninterrupted fuel supply for our civilian reactors. However, the provisions for a situation where termination or cessation of the agreement takes place, the provisions of the 123 text and the Hyde Act are contradictory. While the 123 text commits that in such an event, while the US will be unable to continue the supply, it will facilitate other NSG countries to continue the same.

The Hyde Act however is categorical that in the event of such a termination US will be obligated to work with NSG to stop all supplies. That the Hyde Act will prevail is legitimised in clause 2.1 in the 123 text through the assertion that each party will operate this agreement in accordance with its domestic laws. In the case of US, it will obviously be the Hyde Act.

Therefore, it is amply clear that the basic rationale of this nuclear cooperation agreement proceeding towards its successful conclusion is on strategic consideration with the rider that once the basis for such “strategic common ground” ceases to exist, the agreement itself will be annulled. And in such a situation, India will be back to nuclear isolation-additionally burdened by the magnitude of disruption which will arise from its vulnerability born out of an environment of dependence.

That the government’s claim that the agreement is not going to affect India’s independent foreign policy is not bourne out by the actual developments on the ground. The Military Framework Agreement of 2005, the Logistics Support Agreement which is being negotiated currently and the proposed joint naval exercise off the Andhra coast show a  marked shift in our foreign policy direction.

To discerning observers, the US, India, Australia, Japan quadrilateral involved in the naval exercise is conjuring up the image of an “Asian NATO.” All these developments do undermine the foreign policy choices that India wants to have. At least that is what is enshrined in the National Common Minimum Programme (CMP) where the government wants to pursue an independent foreign policy which is directed against unilateralism and unipolarity.

The anguish of the prime minister over such a critique, therefore, is understandable only if we see the Left puncturing the ground for a “manufactured consensus” which is a term used by Noam Chomsky in his seminal work on Impact of Globalisation on Media.

The government's position on the Left questioning of the strategic partnership is, however, not born out of the provisions of CMP.

Sensitivity for India’s ties with the US cannot wish away a prerequisite for the scrutiny of the nuclear agreement. Neither can Left-bashing substitute the need for meeting the arguments of a critique grounded in reality and content of the 123 text.

(The writer is a member of CPM’s Central Secretariat.)