International Herald Tribune on Indo-US Nuke deal: President George W Bush is understandably desperate for some kind of foreign policy success. But that cannot justify sacrificing his principled stand against weapons proliferation to seal a nuclear cooperation deal with India. The accord could end up benefiting New Delhi’s weapons programme as much as its pursuit of nuclear power.

The deal was deeply flawed from the start. And it has been made even worse by a newly negotiated companion agreement that lays out the technical details for nuclear commerce.

The Congress should reject the agreement and demand that the administration, or its successor, negotiate a new one that does not undermine efforts to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons.

Any agreement needs to honour the principle Bush set forth in 2004: that countries do not need to make their own nuclear fuel, or reprocess their spent fuel, to operate effective nuclear energy programmes. The technology can be all too easily diverted to make fuel for a nuclear weapon.

Unfortunately, Bush’s accord with India jettisoned that essential principle. Washington capitulated to India’s nuclear establishment and endorsed continued reprocessing.

And while US law calls for nuclear cooperation to end if India detonates another weapon, the agreement makes no explicit mention of that requirement — while it promises that Washington will acquiesce, if not assist, in India’s efforts to find other fuel suppliers.

Bringing India — which never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty — in from the cold is not a bad idea. It is the world’s most populous democracy, with a dynamic economy. And its record on nonproliferation — aside from its own diversion of civilian technology to its once-secret weapons programme — is pretty good. The problem is that the United States got very little back. No promise to stop producing bomb-making material. No promise not to expand its arsenal.

And no promise not to resume nuclear testing.

The message of all this is unmistakable: When it comes to nuclear proliferation, Washington’s only real policy is to reward its friends and punish its enemies. Suspicion of America’s motives around the world are high enough. America cannot afford another such blow to its credibility, especially when it is trying to rally international pressure against nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea.

The administration will argue that altering this agreement now would be a slap at India. But there is no good in compounding a bad deal. And there are better ways to deepen political and economic ties.

Congress accepted the administration’s arguments far too uncritically when it approved the first India-related nuclear legislation last December.

It must now take a stand against the even more damaging companion agreement. At a time when far too many governments are re-examining their decision to forswear nuclear weapons, the United States should be shoring up the nuclear rules, not shredding them.