How Pakistan evolves a coherent strategy to fight Islamist fundamentalists like the Taliban is not clear.
Although President Pervez Musharraf had warned the US that its unilateral military intervention in any of the tribal areas in Pakistan would be treated as an invasion, if Pakistan had not been consulted and US replied with the assurance that it had no such intention, the subject stays in public discourse. The only agreed possibility remains joint Pak-American operations that are previously agreed. The Americans, however speak with many voices, including some showing alienation with Musharraf.
The situation remains ambiguous. Pakistan’s war effort against al-Qaeda, Taliban and Islamic extremists in its own areas and in Afghanistan is now an issue in American politics. There seems to be an open season on Musharraf in America where everyone, media and area experts, are making all kinds of attacks on Musharraf’s policies. Not that there are not enough domestic critics of him.
In terms of domestic politics what is of vital importance is that American war aims against al-Qaeda are not clear. Indeed, America’s war on Afghanistan for capturing or killing Osama bin Laden never made much sense. At any rate, Osama is claimed to be hiding in Pakistan but Afghanistan war goes on unendingly. The US continues fighting the Taliban, allies of al-Qaeda, who do not look like being eliminated soon because they are being recruited all the time by America’s own actions.
In fact Taliban have become a threat to Pakistan that is growing all the time. For Americans the Taliban and al-Qaeda are closely linked, indeed much the same phenomenon. They seem to think they have acquired the right to intervene on this side of the Afghan border; and have not enough confidence in Musharraf that he will, or can, do the needful.
Musharraf cannot politically afford to let the Americans operate independently on what is Pakistan territory. He appears to have given permission to let them come in and fight so long as they associate Pakistan Army with them. No non-official Pakistani knows the limits of that cooperation. Even the admission of such a permission has become politically controversial. Which is where the matters stand. The question of questions is will this remain a spat that is compoundable? Or will it grow into a breach?
The possibilities of a breach between Musharraf and American government are however slim. The Americans have more than one option; Most Pakistanis believe that the US has the clout to ensure the removal of Musharraf and his replacement by the Army Chief nominated by himself who seems to have been well-admired by the Americans. Still the question recurs: would Musharraf’s military successor let Americans do what their experts think is necessary.
Would he agree to let the American Special Forces, CIA and others operate freely in tribal territories of NWFP? There would be the same uncertainties and for exactly the same reasons. The issue is also unresolvable because no one is sure of what precisely are the American war aims in Afghanistan or in tribal areas. And Pakistanis’ stakes are naturally very high.
If the Americans are out to win an outright victory over all militants and stability of the satellite regime of Hamid Karzai, the outlook is bleak. The Taliban are not likely to be defeated anytime soon. A US victory is just not on the cards. The Americans have frequently indicated that they are not averse to talking with Taliban and Karzai and Nato commanders have been negotiating with them. But nothing seems to come out of these efforts simply because no one really knows what are the Americans really after in Afghanistan. The cynics in Pakistan believe that America simply wants to remain in Afghanistan and the war is merely providing it with an excuse.
Pakistanis have a different problem on their hands as a result of the American war in Afghanistan. The Taliban and other Islamic extremists, with or without al-Qaeda’s help, are posing a serious threat to Pakistan as a state. Taliban are rising as an alternative state in parts of tribal areas and some of the settled areas in Pakistan. While common people do not actually love them, respect for, and fear of, them makes tribals obey them. Hence their sway is growing.
Taliban are seen as harbingers of a true Islamic State since they claim they would establish an Islamic Caliphate. This appeals to the orthodox sections of the majority sect in Pakistan. Threat from various Islamic extremist groups that are associated with Taliban is mounting because they say they are working to displace the Pakistan state.
How Pakistan evolves a coherent strategy to fight such Islamists is not clear. The government controlled by the Pakistan military stays in control despite the so-called mounting challenges and virtual loss of control in many tribal areas, especially after dark.
Islamabad has no concept other than to shoot and chase the elusive targets that simply vanish into the population. People are told a few known names whom the state is somehow never able to arrest. It is actually a big and open question for Pakistan and for other Muslim states. It also concerns India because of its sizeable Muslim minority.