On July 25, 2007, the Cabinet Committees on Security and Political Affairs approved the draft 123 agreement which will operationalise the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement, after the last round of negotiations.

External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee has assured the country that the text had addressed all concerns expressed by the Opposition and the Left parties on the deal. On July 20, 2007, the high-powered official delegations from the US and India had concluded their session of extended negotiations on the 123 agreement. However, the Indo-US joint statement issued did not mention anything about the text of the 123 agreement.

In fact, the wordings of the statement – “constructive and positive discussions,” “the substantial progress made on the outstanding issues in the 123 agreement” and “now refer the issue to our governments for a final review”– do not appear to be more than diplomatic niceties. We do not get a clear picture even by reading the last line of the statement – “Both the United States and India look forward to the completion of these remaining steps and to the conclusion of this historic initiative.”

That a breakthrough had been achieved was initially disseminated through informal press briefings, mainly in India. News media reports informed the country that the final text had been drafted. It is therefore important to analyse the significance of the approval by the Cabinet, and later the announcement was made by a senior cabinet minister. The announcement of this “historic” work was formalised by the cabinet or government  and through them disseminated  to the political parties.

In recent years, the Indian decision making elite normally prefers to have a political consensus on foreign and security policy formulation. If it was not possible then it strived for a broad political support in significant policy decisions. The Hyde Act and the legislations passed in both the houses of the Congress had seriously divided the Indian polity. As any civil nuclear cooperation agreement would take years to get implemented, any partisan impression could jeopardize or adversely affect implementation of the agreement. Moreover, a section of the Indian intelligentsia demanded the involvement of Parliament in the  deal. Someone even moved to the Court pleading it to give direction to the Indian executive to take the Parliament on board.

In the US, too, the July 18, 2005 joint statement that provided the framework of intent witnessed some dissent among Congressmen. They growled at the US administration for ignoring them before taking a decision on such an important and sensitive issue. The administration worked hard to assuage the hurt feelings of these Congressmen. The US administration must be consulting Congressmen, as the 123 agreement would have to get approval of  Congress.

Evidently the Indian and the US governments attempted to package the announcement of the deal so as  to enhance its appeal to their political parties. The Indian government is executing an incremental elevation first by acquiring cabinet approval for the agreement, and making the text of the agreement public in Parliament. It is also using the interim period to build a political consensus or broaden the support base for the deal among the political class.

According to news  reports available, the government is briefing all political parties, which appears to have softened the Left parties objections. A supportive Left may be used to get China's support in Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The next natural step for the US would be to get a consensus support in the NSG apart from getting Congressional approval for the 123 agreement.

This nuclear deal is between two democracies, and debate, a basic element of democracy, was in foreplay. An enduring debate was a great feature of the deal. The governments in both countries allowed all the concerned sections to dissect the deal and highlight its negative and positive aspects.

Certainly, the process of reaching the 123 agreement after the dramatic announcement of July 18, 2005 was far more transparent. It was even more transparent than some of the earlier agreement India had with the US.

Though we may get a clearer picture only after the text is made public in Parliament, we may believe the Indian foreign minister’s assurance, and conclude that the 123 text may have met all the benchmarks Indian Prime Minister set in the Indian Parliament in August 2006. It means all the issues considered goal post shifts are removed. The breakthrough heralds a big set back to saboteurs in India as in the US. In the US, it was a section of the non-proliferation lobby, and in India, it was the deal pushers who were not only against a healthy debate but also harming India’s national interests by discouraging others from asking to remove additional conditionalities and destabilising irritants.

If statements of the External Affairs Minister are correct, prior consent for reprocessing rights and damage containment after India’s genuine strategic need for a future nuclear test are really jewels of the current negotiators crown. Challenges for civil nuclear cooperation are still ahead, and the Indian political class will have to handle these issues more dexterously.

(The writer is a research officer, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.)