The fallout of India's policy involves economic and diplomatic dimensions, writes Bidanda M Chengappa.
India-Sri Lanka ties recently hit a low point with Colombo’s decision to ink an arms deal with Beijing. National Security Adviser (NSA) M K Narayanan was quoted in the media saying “… We are a big power in the region. We do not want the Sri Lankan government to go to Pakistan or China. Whatever be their requirements they should come to us.” He added that India would determine the needs and supply only defensive weapons.
Evidently, India cooperated with Sri Lanka only after the Pakistan connection to Colombo became clear. However New Delhi never responded with artillery, tanks or aircraft but continued to do so with diplomatic support. The island nation therefore had no option but to turn to China or Pakistan for arms procurements.
India plans to provide Sri Lanka another advanced off shore patrol vessel (AOPV) to fight the Sea Tigers. New Delhi provided Colombo a similar AOPV in 2000 following heightened LTTE threat perceptions. Colombo's requirements from New Delhi include mine proof vehicles for use against the LTTE's Claymore mines and high technology 3-D radars for sharper surveillance of its airspace owing to the guerillas' nascent aerial power capabilities. India had provided Sri Lanka with two Indra-II radars in 2005 manufactured by Bharat Electronics Ltd, Ghaziabad which are only 2-D radars and cannot indicate the altitude of a hostile aircraft approaching a military base.
Sri Lanka desperately sought armaments from India since 2000 and assured New Delhi that these weapons would not be used against the non LTTE Tamil people. Not only is New Delhi reluctant to provide Colombo the required arms to fight the LTTE, but it is also putting pressure on it to go slow with the war effort. Instead India wants Sri Lanka to pursue the political process with the guerillas.
The history
India's national security and foreign policy towards Sri Lanka suffers from a contradiction between its national interests vis a vis partisan considerations of Tamil Nadu politics. For instance, Tamil Nadu politicians make out the civil war between the Sri Lankan military and the LTTE as “Sinhala army killing Tamils”.
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi, earlier articulated against India’s involvement in the island neighbour because it would imply India is “part of the war effort leading to the death of Tamils” in Sri Lanka. While Tamil Nadu politicians masquerade as guardians of the “interests of the Tamil people” they continue to covertly support the LTTE who have ruthlessly eliminated the Tamil moderate political leadership. Therefore the guerilla leadership is not the product of a democratic process and not truly representative of Lankan Tamils. New Delhi would like Colombo to accept the principles of federal autonomy in order to help the Rajapakse regime defeat the LTTE.
The fall out
The fallout of India's policy not to supply arms to Sri Lanka involves economic and diplomatic dimensions. India has 39 ordnance factories and eight defence public sector undertakings that manufacture an array of military weaponry ranging from low-end land based armaments to high-end aerospace and naval products. The limited volume and range of weapons systems that Sri Lanka requires are well within India's defence production sector. Yet New Delhi owing to moralistic and pragmatic considerations, has decided not to export offensive arms to Sri Lanka.
The principles of defence economics clearly dictate the need for arms industries to have an inherent export orientation in order to produce full capacity that ensures economies of scale. This explains why western armaments manufacturers always emphasise exports. In anticipation of war, any armament industry to remain self-reliant, builds “spurt capacity” for “surge production” to suddenly meet the escalating requirement for ammunition or other armament systems.
Apart from this, the diplomatic fallout is that India is perceived as a regional bully when Narayanan criticised Colombo for entering into an arms deal with Beijing. It would only antagonise the Lankan leadership rather than endear them to India. The problem arises because Mr Narayanan has an intelligence background and not one in the diplomatic corps which makes all the difference in such matters of statecraft.