Mayawati’s success in winning over a sizeable chunk of the Congress’ original Brahmin-Muslim-Dalit vote-bank must have made the Grand Old Party of Indian Independence wonder where it went wrong with its electoral tactics. Evidently, if the Congress had been able to retain its hold over these three groups, it wouldn’t have lost its dominant position in Indian politics. Nor would it have had to run after the OBC votes in a sad imitation of the RJD, the Samajwadi Party, the Janata Dal (United) and others. But after losing the upper castes to the BJP (and now to the BSP) and the Dalits to the BSP, while remaining uncertain about its own influence on the Muslims, the Congress is evidently at something of a loose end.
In trying to ascertain why the Congress lost its way, one has to remember that the party’s earlier Brahmin-Muslim-Dalit support base fell into its lap rather than something which it won for itself. For a start, because of its overwhelming influence in the 50s and 60s, the Congress had little difficulty in securing the allegiance of the upper castes, who were then seemingly its natural constituency. On the other hand, the Muslims, disoriented by the trauma of partition, had nowhere to go but to the secular party of Jawaharlal Nehru. It is open to question what would have happened if Vallabhbhai Patel didn’t die in 1950 considering that Lord Wavell described him as “entirely communal”, who “had no sense of compromise or generosity towards Moslems”. Like the Muslims, the Dalits, too, had nowhere to go since the efforts of their leaders, including B R Ambedkar, to set up parties of their own had failed.
It was only when the Congress’ decline began that these groups started drifting away in search of new pastures. The Muslims were the first to go when they felt victimised by Sanjay Gandhi’s sterilisation drive during the Emergency. So, when the Muslims supported the Janata Party in 1977, Indira Gandhi began leaning towards the Hindus. By this time, the OBCs, too, had begun coalescing around parties like the Lok Dal in north India. The early 90s were a fateful period for the Congress. Its signs of revival in 1980 and 1984 petered out, while the Muslim alienation reached its peak with the Babri masjid demolition and the OBCs became a powerful force under leaders like Lalu Yadav, Mulayam Singh Yadav and Nitish Kumar. The Dalits, too, found a new generation of leaders in Kanshi Ram and Mayawati.
But Mayawati’s latest experiment in social engineering suggests that the segmentation of politics of the 90s may have run its course and that the time for rainbow coalitions has come again. It isn’t only the BSP which has reached out to the Brahmins, the Janata Dal (United), too, has made peace with the Bhumihars and Rajputs in Bihar. The BJP, too, after its drubbing in UP, may wonder whether its anti-minority stance is advisable. Not surprisingly, it has now condemned the virulent anti-Muslim CD, which it had refused to do earlier.
Theoretically, therefore, the Congress, which had always claimed to be a party above religion and caste, can now reclaim its heritage. It can derive inspiration from the fact that when Indira Gandhi swept the polls in 1971 and 1980, and Rajiv Gandhi repeated the feat in 1984, the Congress’ campaign was not based on appeals to castes and communities, but on its old formula of working for the betterment of each and every Indian.
Unfortunately, the Congress has been so focussed on disowning its own earlier broad tent approach that it will be extremely difficult for it to recover the lost ground. Its most notable failures in this respect were under Rajiv Gandhi when he first succumbed to pressure from the Muslim fundamentalists to overturn the Supreme Court’s judgment on alimony to divorced Muslim women in the Shah Bano case. And, then, to deflect criticism from the Right-wing Hindus on this score, he acquiesced in the opening of the gates of the Babri masjid.
Since the rise of the BJP can be traced to these fateful events, the Congress is now desperately trying to please all and sundry. Its sops to the Muslims include the setting up of the Rajinder Sachar Committee while it is trying to beat the BJP in its own communal game by enacting an anti-conversion law in Himachal Pradesh, which is ruled by the Congress, and seeking to ban a controversial biography of Shivaji in Maharashtra, where it is also in power. The promptness with which the police in Mumbai reacted to a Haridwar court’s order on attaching M F Husain’s property is also noteworthy. While engaged in these measures of appeasement relating to the Hindus and Muslims, the Congress is also seeking to placate the OBCs with its promises of quotas in institutes of higher learning and in the private sector.
However, in its keenness in trying to don the clothes of its opponents, the Congress is in danger of losing its own identity. In fact, it may have already done so, for if the party now tries to return to its old slogan that it stands for everyone, irrespective of caste or creed, then the chances are that it will be laughed out of court. There is another reason why such an attempt is likely to fail. In 1971, 1980 and 1984, the Congress had the advantage of having a charismatic leader at the helm, whose personal magnetism transcended the social and religious divisions. The party has no one now — not even in the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty — who can match up to the popularity of the earlier generation of leaders.
