Mr Karat’s latest assurance that there is no threat to the government following differences over the nuclear deal with America is, on the face of it, near identical to similar assurances in the past. Mr Yechuri is on record that he doesn’t see it as a crisis. Mr Basu has spoken of a “compromise” while fluctuating between accepting the inevitability of an election and ruling it out altogether. Off and on Bengal’s chief minister has subtly registered his opposition to the hard liners. Mr Karat has sometimes struck a softer note by referring to “narrowing the gap.” Yechuri was rather more explicit in rejecting reports of a plan to “pull down the UPA.”

Along the way, the Left has made clear its reluctance to precipitate an election at this time. At least on one occasion during this off-and-on dialogue, the Left declared that it would withdraw its support from the government if it started on the “operationalising” route. Perhaps the point to note in these statements and non-statements is that the no-threat denial is itself a not too oblique threat.

Left’s position at its face value
Yet the impression persists that Karat’s recent contribution to the dialogue is equalitatively different from the tactical assurances that preceded it. Anything the Left says on the nuclear deal can be assessed at its proper worth only by placing it in the context in which it is said. And it is this context rather than the words used that points, even if tentatively, to a relaxation in the stand-off between the government and its opponents.

Suddenly, as if by common consent, Ambassador Mulford, Henry Paulson and Kissinger not least have appeared on centre-stage, ostensibly discussing a wide range of issues but no doubt focussing on the nuclear deal.
This has been reinforced by such bodies as the US-India Business Council, bringing to bear on the dialogue a new and authoritative voice, addressed directly to various segments of the official and non-official opposition. There is here a psychological factor at work.

A government assurance or one from the ruling party or another by the experts who speak for it invites scepticism and almost automatic rejection, particularly in the politicised atmosphere in which the debate has been conducted. Assurances from heavy weight Americans, official and non-official, directly received from the country at the centre of the controversy have a persuasive force which Manmohan Singh has been unable to deploy. Partly because, though he has a case that deserves to be heard, it has not been presented coherently, forcefully and convincingly. This negative response has been strengthened by the wide  reluctance across all political barriers, to face the perils of another election.

In search of plausible exits
All of which does not mean that the Left and other like-minded allies can, given its declared commitments, afford to endorse the government’s stand or appear to accept the clarifications the recent US emissaries have given them. The BJP remains adamant, though conscious of and embarrassed by the distance it went along the road of a similar nuclear understanding with the United States.

A stage has seemingly been reached where the Opposition, right or left, is inclined to look for a plausible exit. That will not be easy to find. But meanwhile it can be safely assumed that the US emissaries had the following assurances to offer.

First, the Hyde Act reflects the “sense of Congress” and though it expects and anticipates New Delhi’s cooperation in various fields, it is not binding. Second, US officials including the negotiators deliberately underline its importance because, given the executive’s relationship with the Congress, they are obliged to do so. Third, there is irony in the thought that in America’s 123 pact with China which took thirteen years to negotiate, it is explicitly conceded that no bilateral agreement between sovereign states can he invalidated by the domestic law; and that this is “universal” and so, it can, be said that, by implication, it undermines the argument that the 123 agreesent is subject in any way to the Hyde Act. Fourth, the Bush administration’s position has been defined as follows: “A law is not binding when a President issued a separate statement saying he reserved the right to revise, interpret or disregard it on national security and constitutional grounds.”

That is an extension of Presidential authority that no one, American or non-American, can defend with any political conviction. But in the 123 case in which Bush’s stage is as vital as that of Manmohan Singh, and despite his lame-duck appearance, Bush’s ability to intervene in favour of the nuclear deal should not be underestimated. Manmohan Singh, being what he is, has admitted that the political investment he has made in the deal is an “act of faith”. He has also admitted that he is a politician “by accident”.

And it is for some of us to add that it is precisely this “accidental leadership” that has made possible an initiative that promises the extremes of unprecedented success on abject failure. U-turns in Indian politics are not unusual but the one that seems to be taking shape in a half U-turn and whether it will be completed is anyone’s guess.

To act here and now
A quote to remember: “I came to this office to solve problems and not pass them on to future Presidents and future generations” — President Bush. Another one to cherish: “We did not charge hundreds of miTo faceles through Iran and defeat a ruthless dictator only to re-treat before a band of thugs” — Bush again.