A year ago, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test, a small explosion that established it as the newest member of the world’s nuclear club. Strangely, since then, the prospects for peace and stability in northeastern Asia have never been better. North Korea’s agreement, recently, to disable all its nuclear facilities by year's end is the biggest step so far in the right direction.

The nuclear test seemed to give President Bush focus. He took control of his administration’s policy towards North Korea, ending a six-year feud between hard-line conservatives who favour the collapse of Kim Jong Il’s regime and others who favour negotiation. Eager for a foreign policy success before leaving office, Bush granted substantial negotiating power to Christopher R Hill, the State Department’s point person on North Korea, and instructed him to reach a deal.

Outline of an accord
By January, Hill had met in Berlin with his North Korean counterpart and worked out the broad outline of an accord under which the North would end its nuclear programme in exchange for economic, energy and humanitarian aid and better relations with Washington.
By February, talks in Beijing that included the US, China, North and South Korea, Japan and Russia formalised the agreement. The North would shut down its nuclear programme within 60 days and then, on a timeline to be determined, disable it.

Almost immediately, the deal ran into trouble over the agreed-upon transfer of $25 million that had been frozen in North Korean bank accounts in Macau. North Korea wanted the funds transferred through a process that would in effect readmit it to the global banking system. The US did not.

The issue was creatively resolved in June through a web of international transfers, and the next month North Korea shut down its nuclear facilities, with the International Atomic Energy Agency watching.
The speed of progress over the past year has surprised almost all North Korea watchers. Whether by necessity or desire, the North seems more genuine about wanting to improve its relations with the global community today than at any time since fighting in the Korean War that ended in 1953.

In addition to shutting down its nuclear programme, North Korea agreed to last week’s summit meeting between Kim Jong Il and South Korean president, Roh Moo-hyun, during which they discussed further economic cooperation and the prospects of a peace treaty.

Still, the nuclear accord is ambiguous on one issue that threatens to derail it: The question of what will happen to North Korea’s existing stockpile of fissile material. The country has reprocessed approximately 50 kilos of weapons-grade plutonium and this stockpile will soon be Kim’s last remaining card. Were he to give it up he would find himself seriously weakened and, quite possibly, at the mercy of those who seek to bring down his regime.

To break the impasse, one possible option could be for China, North Korea’s closest remaining ally, to assume physical custody in North Korea of the fissile material. This would ensure that the North does not use it to make additional bombs, send it to another country for safekeeping or sell some of it to a terrorist organisation for much-needed cash.

Compromise
China, on the other hand, offers some significant advantages. Kim Jong Il may tussle with Beijing’s leaders from time to time, but he knows they do not seek the collapse of his regime. And if the North fails to abide by its commitments, China could use its huge fuel and food subsidies to bring added pressure to bear, which is something the IAEA could not do.

To be sure, allowing weapons-grade plutonium to remain in the country for any period of time is less than ideal. But no agreement that is practical will be ideal for all parties. Compromise is essential to the accord’s success.

- NYT