In a surge of realism, the US Senate has voted 75-23 to acknowledge that Iraq has broken up and cannot be put back together. The measure, co-sponsored by Joe Biden, a Democratic presidential candidate, and Sam Brownback, Republican of Kansas, supports a plan for Iraq to become a loose confederation of three regions — a Kurdish area in the north, a Shiite region in the south and a Sunni enclave in the centre — with the national government in Baghdad having few powers other than to manage the equitable distribution of oil revenues.
While the nonbinding measure provoked strong reactions in Iraq and from the Bush administration, it actually called for exactly what Iraq’s Constitution already provides — and what is irrevocably becoming the reality on the ground.

The Kurdish-dominated provinces in the north are recognised in the Constitution as an existing federal region, while other parts of Iraq can also opt to form their own regions. Iraq’s regions are allowed their own Parliament and president, and may establish their own army. Kurdistan’s army, the peshmerga, is nearly as large as the national army and far more capable. While the central government has exclusive control over the national army and foreign affairs, regional law is superior to national law on almost everything else. The central government cannot even impose a tax.

Iraq’s minimalist Constitution is a reflection of a country without a common identity. The Shiites believe their majority entitles them to rule, and a vast majority of them support religious parties that would define Iraq as a Shiite state. Iraq’s Sunni Arabs cannot accept their country being defined by a rival branch of Islam and ruled by parties they see as aligned with Iran. And the Kurdish vision of Iraq is of a country that does not include them.

The Americans should stop arguing over whether they want “partition” or “federalism” and start thinking about how they can mitigate the consequences of Iraq’s unavoidable breakup. Referendums will need to be held, as required by Iraq’s Constitution, to determine the final borders of the three regions. There has to be a deal on sharing oil money that satisfies Shiites and Kurds but also guarantees the Sunnis a revenue stream, at least until the untapped oil resources of Sunni areas are developed.

The good news is that partition will have the practical effect of limiting Iran’s influence to southern Iraq and parts of Baghdad. Turkey, understandably angry over terrorist attacks by a Turkish Kurdish rebel group, the Kurdistan Workers Party, has in recent days threatened to strike at the group’s sanctuaries on the Iraqi side of the mountainous border.

Those who still favour a centralised state like to insist that partition would further destabilise the country. But current events suggest otherwise. Iraq’s most stable and democratic region is Kurdistan. In Sunni-dominated Anbar Province, the Americans abandoned a military strategy that entailed working with the Shiite-dominated Iraqi army and instead moved to set up a Sunni militia. The result has been gains against al-Qaida and a substantial improvement in local security.

Partition is a better outcome than a Sunni-Shiite civil war. There is, in any event, little alternative to partition. Iraq cannot be reconstructed as a unitary state, and the sooner we face up to this reality, the better.
(The writer is a former United States ambassador to Croatia)
NYT