The Pak-American relationship has deteriorated because of US exasperation with General Musharraf.
The 60th birthday of Pakistan was celebrated just a while ago. Memories flood in and many have recounted the past events. What emerges strongly is that the Americans had virtually bought this country lock, stock and barrel, when they agreed in October 1953 that Pakistan would now be a part of the American power system and America would give military and economic aid to it.
It transpires that America’s relations with Pakistan’s military rulers was a relationship that is not commented upon. However, their chief pillars in Pakistan’s earliest years were Col. Iskandar Mirza who later became President of Pakistan and General Ayub Khan, who was to rule the country for 11 years. It is now possible to be emphatic, unfashionable though it is: No ruler has ruled Pakistan without American approval.
Tha basic fact in America’s relationship with Pakistan is not the people: it is the Army. The original reason why Pakistan made the bargain was to finance the upkeep and expansion of the Pakistan Army and the auxiliary naval and air forces. The Americans are hard bargainers and if they give money apparently freely, they must have struck a good bargain.
Pakistan is not important to America for any economic reason; but it is situated where it is: at the tri-junction of three major regions of Asia, i.e. West Asia, including the vast Arabian peninsula, populous South Asia and Central Asia, rich in minerals including oil and gas and pregnant with possibilities for making a fast buck. The utility of Pakistan Army was directly related to the strategic location of the country. That position has acquired greater salience in recent years as intimations of a new cold war accumulate about America and the west being tactfully resisted by China and Russia. What makes Pakistan important to America is its ongoing geo-strategic drive in Asia eventually to corner and counter Russia and China. That had necessitated it to consolidate its position in West Asia so as to make a strong thrust into Central Asia and beyond.
But somehow in the process its wrapping became different. It became an open-ended War on Terror first and later a war against Islamofascists, equally open-ended. That required regime changes all over West Asia and Americans chose Afghanistan first and then Iraq. For America all these are parts of the aim of ensuring America’s position remaining as Number One.
Pakistan has been basking in the sunshine of American favours because of this aim, although there have been intervals of relative darkness and distance between the two. But the urgency of Pakistan’s cooperation has continued to grow in recent years with Americans facing troubles in Iraq and more in Afghanistan. The Pak-American relationship, instead of improving, has deteriorated unexpectedly because of Americans’ exasperation with General Musharraf who is perceived not to be as gung-ho as they would like him to be in the NWFP. The Americans want to destroy the sanctuaries of Taliban in Pakistan. This involves a cost that Musharraf is not willing to pay.
But one thing has happened in the meantime: American propaganda’s decibels have increased. Some Pakistanis think that the Americans would somehow support democratisation of Pakistan. Some have suddenly discovered that Americans have more than one option in Pakistan. And this tallies with the record. The position has now become clear that the succeeding regime must have the same social and economic characteristics as the previous one. For most of the time, Pakistan’s finance ministers have been those who have been drawing pensions from the World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank or others of the ilk.
Pakistan stands today at the crossroads that can lead it to another martial law, as many ministers have suddenly started threatening or it can take the democratic road, if only the Americans would ensure that martial law is not imposed yet again or any of its versions. Any kind of martial law or its new surrogates would cripple the courts and suspend fundamental rights.
As per the present situation, the courts are likely to prevent Musharraf prolonging his rule by getting himself elected from the soon-to-die assemblies in uniform. The deal with Benazir is under strain: Musharraf has to deliver constitutional and legal changes to enable Benazir to return safely to campaign for the national polls, hopefully to win and become the PM a third time. Musharraf has also to indicate when he will resign from the Army. He is reluctant to do any of these things, particularly to make foolproof arrangements for the polls.
The people seem already to have denied Musharraf the benefit of the doubt: they simply want him out. Some cynics say the Americans would gladly approve another martial law, if it promises to do what they say. But this time martial law would probably be very tough and maybe bloody. Which way would the Americans choose is the question.