Two issues have particularly perturbed the Indian opponents of the Indo-US nuclear agreement. The first relates to the assurances on reliable and lifetime supplies of nuclear fuel for the uninterrupted operation of the reactors.
Fearing that uranium supply could be terminated by the supplier nation, critics highlight that this assurance in the 123 Agreement is in contradiction with the Hyde Act that provides only for nuclear fuel supplies enough for “reasonable reactor operating requirements”.
This argument, however, overlooks that this provision falls under the non-binding section of the Hyde Act and that in the 123 Agreement, the US government has committed to creating the necessary conditions, including through amendment of domestic laws and working with other nations to enable India to have assured and full access to fuel. While it would be naïve for India to expect an amendment of the Hyde Act to this effect, Presidential waivers are perfectly possible to realise the US commitment.
Moreover, if India’s second and third stage of the envisaged nuclear power programme proceed as per expectation, then India would steadily transcend need to import nuclear fuel as nuclear power generation shifts to large scale use of thorium domestically available. Though this will not happen in a hurry, is it not the duty of governments to undertake long term planning? Should a sustainable, viable and environmentally friendly energy source be ignored even when we know energy deficits are going to grow?
Nuclear test
The other linked concern is about India’s right to conduct a future nuclear test, because of the fear that fuel supplies could be disrupted or that the US could revoke its “right of return.”
This argument, however, misses the point that when India accepted the voluntary moratorium upon itself in May 1998, it was in the understanding that unprovoked nuclear testing would be unnecessary. If at all India needed to test, it would be in response to a perceptible change in threat perceptions because of similar activity by others.
And, this contingency is adequately addressed in the 123 Agreement. It allows both sides to “consider carefully the circumstances” and see whether these resulted from “a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other states which could impact national security.” 
Secondly, the 123 Agreement stipulates payment of compensation in case of return of nuclear imports. Besides the huge logistic and legal complexities involved in such an exercise, surely the American business lobby, whose stakes in the Indian economy would only grow over time, would find this most unwelcome. If anything, while drafting its nuclear contracts with foreign investors, India must seek to tie nuclear companies into these terms and thus make them a powerful lobby in favour of continued cooperation.
Nuclear deterrence
The other essential point to consider is the very nature of India’s nuclear deterrence as outlined in its nuclear doctrine. Committing India to the political, deterrent use of the nuclear weapon, it presupposes the construction of a robust counter-strike capability that is survivable. It does not require India to indulge in a foolhardy exercise of a bigger and more modern warhead construction through more and more testing.
The credibility of India’s nuclear deterrence, therefore, must rest on the reliability, accuracy, penetrability and survivability of its nuclear arsenal, primarily its delivery capability, rather than mindlessly harping on having traded away the right to test. India retains the option of testing, but at any time it takes such a step, with or without the deal, it will have to be prepared for the consequences. But, it would be natural to assume that an economically stronger country, with a large American stake in the Indian economy should be able to handle the costs.