Maoists pose a huge challenge

The abduction of two Italian nationals in Orissa has once again brought to the forefront the fragility of the situation along the maoist belt in central and eastern India and the inability of the state police forces to deal with it, even as a debate is raging about the structure and powers of the proposed National Counter-terrorism Centre.

In May 2006, prime minister Manmohan Singh described the maoist/ naxalite insurgency as India’s most serious internal security challenge. Maoist incidents, which have accounted for almost 60 per cent of terrorism-related violence in India over the last decade, include intimidation, killing of innocent civilians, reprisal killings, kidnappings, extortion, IED blasts and the destruction of government and private property, and that of grassroots level political institutions. In many of the areas of their influence, the maoists have been collecting taxes and dispensing instant and brutal justice through kangaroo courts.

Maoist attacks on the security forces and the symbols of state power are characterised by meticulous planning, systematic preparation, near surgical execution and a high degree of coordination. For the maoists, besides waging a protracted people’s war with the ultimate objective of capturing or seizing political power, participating in a peace process and talks is a ‘tactic’, and is considered ‘war by other means’.

Reactive response

The response of various state governments and the Centre has often, if not always, been reactive and has been found to be lagging behind the maoists.  While they have been expanding to newer areas, gaining ground, consolidating themselves and have steadily been enhancing their military capabilities, the approach of the state governments has often been to ignore the maoist movement.

The reasons for this apathetic approach were, firstly, that naxal terrorism is not an emotive issue at the national level like the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K); secondly, there has been some confusion whether the naxalites are terrorists or not as they have a ‘social justice’ tag attached to them; and, lastly, am impression has gained currency that the naxal menace is not “as bad as the media makes it out to be.”

Coordination between the police and intelligence agencies of various affected states has been generally unsatisfactory. The acquisition, compilation, collation, analysis, synthesis and dissemination of intelligence are still a grey area. The naxalites are continuing to spread their tentacles and it is crucial that intelligence about their activities, arms and equipment, training, sources of funding and future operations is shared on a daily basis so that it trickles down in near real-time to the functional level. A great deal more needs to be done if the states are to coordinate anti-maoist operations across their borders.

State police forces as well as the Central police and paramilitary forces (CPMFs) need to be better equipped and better trained to successfully combat the serious threat posed by the naxalites. At present they lack the army’s organisational structure and cohesiveness, the army’s institutionalised operational experience and ethos and its outstanding junior leadership, qualities that are mandatory if the naxalites have to be defeated on their own turf. Calling in the army to tackle the rising tide of maoist violence will be a grave mistake for a number of reasons.

The army is already managing the border along the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan and parts of the border on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China and is deployed in large numbers for counter-insurgency and internal security duties in J&K and the north-eastern states. These prolonged commitments are hampering the army’s preparedness for conventional conflict, gradually but perceptibly affecting morale and wearing down its equipment and transport fleet. Calling on the army to commit additional troops for anti-naxalite operations would be a retrograde step.

What the army can do and has been doing for some time now is to provide advanced training to the state police forces and the CPMFs to enable them to acquire the necessary skills.
The maoist threat presents a clear and present danger. It can be ignored or neglected only at great peril to India’s national security interests. So far the national response has been inadequate, both at the policy formulation and execution levels.

To cope with this serious threat, India needs a well-deliberated and finely calibrated response strategy with matching operational doctrines and the necessary civil and military resources. Only a skillfully coordinated response between the Centre and the states, with all concerned pooling in their resources to achieve synergy in execution, will achieve the desired results. Above all else, a comprehensive socio-economic strategy must be evolved to treat the root causes of this malaise that is gnawing away at the nation’s innards, along with a skillfully drawn up plan for perception management.

(The author is director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi)