JOIN USIt appears that the BJP is likely to emerge as the single largest party in the Lok Sabha elections. The Congress is simply not putting up a credible fight, while the Aam Aadmi Party is losing momentum. In the light of this, people are asking whether coalition compulsions of NDA would check Narendra Modi’s prime ministerial ambition after the BJP emerges as the largest party and how a Modi-led government might affect the country.
There are at least four reasons why Modi cannot be sidelined after the election.
Firstly, the BJP’s cadre is solidly behind him in key states. Any attempt to marginalise him will trigger an unprecedented rebellion within the party.
Secondly, the RSS will not tolerate any belated attempt to sideline him.
Thirdly, the regional parties will prefer him because the BJP would have to yield more concessions to prospective allies that are ostensibly wary of hardline Hindutva.
Fourthly, regional parties would prefer Modi as PM because otherwise the stability of NDA government will be threatened by hardliners. Modi has anticipated the regional parties and has built bridges with them to render superfluous the possibility of a moderate leader replacing him afterwards. In short, Modi is safely placed within his party.
This brings us to the question of the potential impact of a Modi-led government. The impact needs to be assessed on three things: the mundane sphere of policies, the nature of the state, and the society (to be precise, the religious minorities).
There is a view that we should expect a policy status quo as the BJP has no vision and Modi’s facile slogans cannot substitute policy. This is supported by, for instance, a statement attributed to BJP president Rajnath Singh during his July 2013 visit to the United States, who told his audience that there would be ‘no major changes in foreign policy, only some adjustments’ if the BJP came to power. This view is also supported by the BJP’s mostly bland manifesto. But at the same time the media have been systematically flooded with contrary views.
Our attention is drawn toward Modi’s election rally in Pasighat in Arunachal Pradesh, where he condemned China’s ‘vistarwadi mansikta’ (expansionist mindset), and we are told that we should expect a tougher foreign policy
Yet, both these views are misplaced as they overlook the fundamental determinants of policies. In large federal democracies like India, policies are driven by the distribution of power within society rather than the whims and fancies of the ruling party.
Consider, for instance, FDI in the multi-brand retail sector, which is simultaneously an economic and a foreign policy problem. The current policy leaves the choice to state governments, requires substantial local sourcing and restricts investment to big cities. It represents the balance of power within the country between large businesses that need FDI on the one hand and petty traders and small entrepreneurs on the other.
The BJP’s victory will not automatically change this balance of power and to that extent the existing policy is stable. Unsurprisingly, despite noises to the contrary, the BJP’s manifesto does not clearly commit the party to scrap the existing policy.
India’s foreign policy
Now, consider India’s foreign policy that is driven by a longstanding consensus on the need to prioritise economic growth and development, and avoid open conflict as far as possible. The BJP cannot afford to pursue an adventurist foreign policy and upset the economy because of its heavy dependence on the urban middle class for support. Moreover, the large businesses, which are sympathetic to the BJP this time, favour deepening of India-China economic relations. So, it would make little sense to radically alter the policy approach to either Pakistan or China.
In short, with or without Modi, the NDA government’s policies cannot be divorced from ground realities. Only an upheaval, which redistributes power within the country, would necessitate major changes in existing policy approaches.
The BJP’s capacity to alter the foundations of the state is even more circumscribed. The next Lok Sabha will be sufficiently divided to deny the BJP the power to amend the Constitution, while the Rajya Sabha will continue to be dominated by regional parties and the Congress. Moreover, the BJP cannot browbeat the judiciary, which will subject any far-reaching amendment to the basic structure test.
This leaves us with the question about the fate of the minorities. There are reasons to believe that Modi will not repeat the post-Godhra experiment. Unlike the Congress and the SP, which enjoy the benefit of doubt by default, the BJP will be completely isolated after any attack on minorities.
Also, its corporate backers would want a peaceful market-friendly environment. But the RSS’ over-enthusiastic extremist affiliates could nevertheless precipitate a communal clash. The important question is whether Modi has an organisational incentive to check extremists. He has learnt from the post-Godhra experience that once unleashed, the lumpen right wing outfits are very difficult to check.
A major communal disturbance will simultaneously strengthen his moderate and extremist competitors within and outside the Sangh Parivar. So, Modi is likely to steer clear off extremists for instrumental reasons.
To conclude, while Modi cannot be sidelined after the BJP emerges as the largest party, circumstances will not allow him to corner the minorities or change the country’s broad orientation in any significant way. But will the influence of corporate business groups grow? Unfortunately, thanks to the growing importance of money in elections, no party can resist the corporate interest groups.
The writer is Assistant Professor of Economics, Azim Premji University, Bangalore