Reform or perish

Faced with problems across all realms, including the possibility of disintegration, the Iraqi government has unleashed a raft of reforms.

It is that moment in Iraq. The ‘cradle of civilisation’ – which descended into a brutal dictatorship and became a theatre of extremism, war and bloodletting even after switching back to democracy – is on the brink. It is time to reform or perish.

Faced with problems galore across all realms, including the possibility of disintegration, Prime Minister Haider Al Abadi unleashed a raft of reforms in the second week of August to stem the tide. Coming in the wake of political deadlocks, a struggling economy (hurt further by low oil prices), rampant corruption, lack of basic amenities and the scourge of the Islamic State (IS), public anger – involving all denominations of the Iraqi society – has spilled on to the streets.

Waking up to the reality, Abadi abolished the sectarian quota scheme in Iraq’s political system introduced after the US-led war ousted Saddam Hussein in 2003. The plan removes the positions of three vice-presidents and three deputy prime ministers that were distributed among the majority Shiite and minority Sunni and Kurdish factions in most governments after Saddam. Together, it involves trimming the cabinet by a third.

Linking this to administrative mismanagement, which has resulted in unprecedented power cuts, Abadi also promised to crack down on corruption, involving officials across all sectarian components of the past and present governments.

These moves are the most comprehensive shake-up in Iraq’s political system since 2003 – bigger than Abadi replacing Nouri Maliki as prime minister last year.

The pertinence of these reforms was underscored by Iraq’s most prominent Shiite cleric. Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani urged implementation of real reform or Iraq could be “dragged to... partition and the like...” Though primarily political in content, the reforms are multi-dimensional in spirit, with potential ramifications in the economic and social realms too. Yet, the burning question is: What is the real motive and can these tough measures be implemented?

In a system that has thrived on nepotism, the last straw in the camel’s back appears to have been the ease with which the ‘ragtag’ IS militia defeated the ‘US-refurbished’ Iraqi army in Mosul last year and Ramadi this year. An Iraqi parliamentary panel held former premier Maliki guilty for the fall of Mosul.

Earlier, in a first reform step to counter the IS, a concerted international effort ensured Abadi’s takeover from Maliki. The latter was considered to be fanning sectarianism, leading to discontent among Iraqi Sunnis and the genesis-empowerment of the IS, which now controls almost a third of the country.

Since Abadi’s reforms target two former prime ministers – Maliki and Ayad Allawi, both vice presidents in the current dispensation – his intentions are suspect. Is he now doing what most new Iraqi leaders have been expertly doing in recent decades – consolidating power by neutralising opponents?

And, though the parliament has approved the reforms, will opponents – both political and sectarian – fall in line as easily as they have pronounced publicly? From an economic perspective, the reform plan comes amid decline in global oil prices, which is hurting Iraq’s main source of revenue. This is bound to test the government’s capacity to ensure basic necessities to an already restive citizenry and hurt the war against the IS.

Reports suggest that while Iraq was expecting to receive $39.5 billion in oil revenues during the first seven months of 2015, it received only $31.5 billion. This could decline further if prices remain in the sub-$40 a barrel band. Revenues are expected to fall by 40 per cent by the year end, leaving a deficit of about $20 billion – equivalent to one-fifth of the spending budget.

In December 2014, the Cabinet approved the 2015 federal budget after months of study to reduce the deficit of $40 billion and a determined effort to enact austerity measures (The reduction in cabinet berths is partly in line with this plan).
Turning point
Administratively too, Abadi’s reforms have been billed as the potential turning point. Expenditure of about $350 billion is reportedly unaccounted for from the government exchequer since 2003 due to corruption. As a result, Transparency International’s corrupt index ranks Iraq 170 on a 175-country list.

Abadi now has the authority to dismiss corrupt or ineffective provincial governors and dissolve provincial and local councils. However, cracking down on corruption risks putting Abadi in direct confrontation with officials who have benefitted from mismanagement for personal gain.

Socially, the reform plan could help in healing sectarian wounds. The country is yet to come to terms with more than half a million Iraqi deaths since 2003. It has divided the predominantly Shiite country on sectarian grounds and popularised the Sunni IS. Apart from territorial losses, the government is grappling with IS’ targeted massacre of Shiites – like the killing of 800 unarmed young military recruits near Takrit last year, mostly Shiites.

But there are plenty of grey areas in the reform plan – lack of specific details about timeframe, means to implement the political changes, need to augment revenues, improvements in the delivery of public services and measures to tackle IS and encourage national reconciliation.

All these mean that Iraq is in a ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’ situation. The reform plan has the trappings of a political suicide written all over it, at least initially. But if it were to hold its line and get past the first stage effectively, it will certainly find support from the people who are sick of having had “one Saddam, but now face a thousand.” That it may just about succeed in saving the country from disintegrating along Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish lines is a huge bonus.

(The writer is a Dubai-based political analyst, author and Honorary Fellow of the University of Exeter, UK)