Russia setting agenda in Syria

Damascus, which has agreed to attend talks, is certain to go with whatever Moscow decides on ceasefire.

Russia is the power broker in Syria, for the time being. Early this month, the Syrian army with Russian air cover contained an offensive by a jihadi coalition which had broken through the besieged eastern districts of Aleppo held by insurgents. The jihadis from Jaish al-Fatah (Army of Conquest), based in the northwestern Idlib province, were repul-sed and the siege was reinstated.

Consequently, the four year standoff over Aleppo continues, trapping 2,50,000 civilians with little food and medicine in the insurgent-held east while the government has opened a new route into the west and has delivered food, fuel and medical supplies to the 1.2 million who dwell there.

Before the jihadi offensive, Russia had opened humanitarian corridors from east Aleppo to allow civilians to leave but only 300 availed themselves of the opportunity. After the siege was re-imposed, Russia offered three-hour ceasefires on a daily basis to allow supplies to be delivered to the eastern quarters.

When the UN demanded a 48-hour ceasefire, Russia said it was prepared to consider the proposal. The UN argues that this would enable humanitarian agencies to evacuate the wounded and  distribute aid to Aleppo. The UN has called for such ceasefires for all besieged cities and towns in Syria.

The US and France pressed Russia to accept the UN demand as a condition for resumption of peace talks between the Syrian government and Saudi-sponsored opposition, suspended since April, but UN envoy Staffan de Mistura has said the talks should be unconditional. 

Damascus, which has said it would attend talks, is certain to go along with whatever Moscow decides on the ceasefire issue. Russia has intervened directly and decisively in the Syrian conflict since last October. At that time, the overstretched and undermanned Syrian army was suffering strategic losses.

These reverses followed the supply of advanced weaponry by Saudi Arabia and Qatar to jihadi forces, including IS and al-Qaeda’s Jabhat al-Nusra, recently rebranded as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (Front for the Liberation of Greater Syria). The Jabhat, which formally cut ties to al-Qaeda central, is the dominant faction in Jaish al-Fatah.

Syria is Russia’s sole West Asian politico-military asset. West Asia is also Russia’s backyard, a region where Moscow cannot tolerate the rise of extremist Muslim groups affiliated with radical separatists in the North Caucasus.

This being the case, it is hardly surprising that Russia has announced its intention to transform its temporary air base at Hmeimin near the port of Latakia into a permanent military facility. This will be Russia’s second in Syria. The first is a naval service base at the coastal city of Tartous. 

Clearly, Moscow plans to keep its forces in Syria indefinitely and remains committed to its alliance with the government of president Bashar al-Assad. Russia rightly recognises the dangers to Syria, the region, and the world posed by a jihadi power struggle that would follow the collapse of the secular Syrian regime.

With the aim of trying to convince Ankara to change its anti-Assad stance, Russian President  Vladimir Putin invited his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan to a summit in St Pete-rsburg. Angered over Western criticisms of his authoritarian policies, Erdogan sought to me-nd the rift caused by the shooting down last November by Tur-key of a Russian war plane flying missions over northern Syria.

With this out of the way, Moscow and Ankara could proceed with a project to build a pipeline across Turkey to carry Russian natural gas to Europe while Russian tourists would be encouraged to return to Turkish resorts they shunned after the aircraft was downed.

Battle against IS
Putin wants Turkey to take part in the battle against Islamic State, support the resumption by the end of August of UN-brokered talks between the government and opposition, and close its border with Syria. Turkey could oblige on the first two demands but not the third and most important.

Russia is determined to interdict the flow of reinforcements and supplies through Turkey to  insurgents. Without fresh fighters, arms and money, Jaish al-Fatah could not maintain its occupation of Syria’s northwestern Idlib province and could not have mounted its Aleppo offensive. Furthermore, without a corridor to transport supplies and men from the Turkish border to its capital at Raqqa, Islamic State will not survive in Syria. 

Even under Russian pressure, Turkey will find it difficult, if not impossible, to close its border to insurgents and jihadis. Ankara was the initial sponsor of the 2011 rebellion against Assad which Erdogan hoped would propel the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood into power in Damascus. Once in charge, the Brotherhood would align with Erdogan who advocates the transformation of secular Turkey and Syria into conservative,  religion-based states.

Since the Assad government has, with the Russian help, fought its enemies to a standstill, Turkey has cooperated with Saudi Arabia and Qatar to provide men, money and arms to radical jihadi factions which have sidelined the diverse collection of Syrian rebel groups and raised  across Syria and Iraq black banners proclaiming “jihad,” their warped version of “holy war” against the world.