A treaty in troubled waters

Should Indus Waters Treaty, a great example of cooperation on trans-boundary rivers, become a military tool?

Not many would have known that there exists a treaty between India and Pakistan, till it surfaced in the public domain following the Uri terror attack on September 18, 2016. 

Why did a treaty on sharing rivers that flow between two neighbours stand on shaky grounds after the terror strike of a much lesser intensity when it had remained undeterred during the three major wars in1965, 1971 and 1999? Blood and water have flown together in the past, but doubts were cast on the treaty by Prime Minister Narendra Modi when he remarked, “Blood and water cannot flow together.”

Pakistan’s political leadership has warned that any attempt by India to scuttle the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) unilaterally will be treated as an ‘act of aggression’. India, however, considers itself within its legal rights to restrict river flows to teach the recalcitrant neighbour a befitting lesson. 

Amid these wars of words between New Delhi and Islamabad, the current threat to the river truce has seemingly been sidestepped as India has taken recourse to pulling out of the Saarc Summit to be held in Islamabad during November 2016, to press home the issue of cross-border terrorism.

But given the nature of consistent cross-border engagement, any change in intensity will bring the time-tested treaty under serious scrutiny. Whatever the future might hold for the Indus waters, it is clear that the treaty has worked more in favour of the lower riparian, and hence remains a potent weapon in the hands of the upper riparian. In this light, it is worth asking if putting an imaginary tap on the flow of Indus waters will douse the cross-border fire or prove a proverbial fuel to ignite a war instead.

Brokered by the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty has been rated the most durable water-sharing treaty in the world, despite three major wars between the two countries. Signed on Sept 19, 1960, by then Pakistan President Ayub Khan and Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the treaty allows India to use the three eastern tributaries of the Indus – the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej – and lets the western flowing rivers – the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab – flow freely into Pakistan, with consumptive rights for people living on their banks in India. 

It is the only treaty of its kind where the rivers of a large basin have been partitioned between two countries, three each for either side. Negotiated over a period of seven years, partitioning three rivers each was the most practical solution at that time. 

In terms of the quantum of shared water, it presents a skew-ed picture though. Some 80% of the aggregate water in the basin flows to Pakistan through the west-flowing rivers while the remaining 20% flows in the east-flowing rivers in India. 

Generous IndiaDespite being an upper riparian, India has been generous with its lower riparian neighbours – drawing the 1960 IWT with Pakistan and the 1996 Ganges Treaty with Bangladesh. Both the treaties have been in reasonably good nick, although our track record on resolving inter-state river water disputes has been pathetic. The Cauvery river dispute between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu is one among several water-triggered mutinies brewing in the country.   

In this context, should a treaty that has stood as a sterling example of cooperation on trans-boundary rivers be used as a military tool? For India to embark on a possible military strategy, it would need massive hydrologic infrastructure on the west flowing rivers in Jammu & Kashmir, which can be used as a virtual tap to shut river flows in the event of any hostility with Pakistan. It would take, at least, a decade of planning backed by sustained flow of funds to create gigantic dams in the mountains, while discounting the ecological peril that comes tagged with it.  

The memories of 2013 Uttarakhand disaster and 2014 Kashmir floods are grim reminders of the impacts of unexpected weather amplified by geo-engineering in the Himalayas. With extreme weather conditions more likely now and in the future on account of climate change, the add-on factor of climate risk reduction has emerged as a formidable new challenge. It is in this regard that there is a need to develop new terms of engagement through supplementary protocols to the treaty to address water and power demand of growing population on both sides. 

Had Articles VI-VIII of the IWT been invoked, both India and Pakistan could have initiated joint projects within the purview of the treaty to harness the estimated 20,000 MW hydropower potential in the basin. 

But that was not to be; hence each new run-of-the-river project by India had to face the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), as has been the case with Baglihar and Kishenganga projects. Despite diminishing returns to India, it is in the interest of both the countries to uphold the treaty in the context of the region’s unique geography. 

On top of it, both countries have a moral obligation to uphold the IWT which was inherently meant to reduce hostilities between India and Pakistan, and not escalate tensions leading to a potential war. 

(The writer is an expert on water issues)