JOIN USThe Indian government has begun to experiment with the coordinated use of non-military and sub-military options to deal with the Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism. However, it is too early to say if there is a sustainable structural change in India’s Pakistan policy and if the new policy will force Pakistan to reconsider its approach towards India.
Questioning Pakistan’s presence in Balochistan is part of this new policy. Two months ago, this catapulted Balochistan into our drawing rooms. Sections of the media rushed to predict Balochistan’s (impending) secession overlooking the barriers to a Bangla-desh-style stand alone secession.
This is not merely sensationalism or partisan rant. It betrays a lack of familiarity with Balochistan. Hardly any of Indian journalists, diplomats or academics have spent time in the Pakistani Balochistan. This is reflected in the dearth of depth in news coverage and commentary on Balochistan.
The feasibility of Baloch secession has to be assessed vis-à-vis the Pakistani state’s structure. There are two types of large countries (in terms of area or population). In Pakistan-type large countries, which include Saudi Arabia, China and Russia, ethno-linguistic/religious minority provinces account for a very large share of the country’s area. However, minority provinces account for a small share of area in the India-type large countries, which include Bangladesh.
Pakistan is divided into four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan) besides administrative units of Islamabad and Federally Administered Tribal Areas or FATA (in addition, it has occupied Gilgit-Baltistan and parts of Kashmir and Jammu).
The balance of power between these ethno-linguistic provinces is crucial for Pakistan’s integrity. No Pakistani government, noted a former Census Commissioner of Pakistan, is “prepared to face census results which sharply changed inter-provincial ratios.” Unsurprisingly, Pakistan has not conducted a census after 1998.
Pakistan is precariously held together by an imploding Islam, an imported language (Urdu that is the mother tongue of a minority), the supposedly existential threat posed by India, and the world community’s fear of balkanisation of a nuclear Pakistan. The USSR, which was structurally akin to Pakistan, collapsed after its core province Russia found the cost of maintaining the Union unbearable. Likewise, a sufficient condition for Pakistan’s disintegration is that the Union ceases to be beneficial for Punjab.
Punjab, the only province that suffered dismemberment in 1947 and whose main population centres are close to the Indian border, accounts for about a quarter of Pakistan’s area and more than half of its population. Union with other provinces provides Punjab with strategic depth vis-à-vis India and access to the outer world. Punjab will be landlocked without Sindh and Balochistan.
Punjab depends on Khyber Pakhtun-khwa, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Jammu (PoK) and Gilgit-Baltistan for water and on Sindh and Balochistan for minerals and energy. Without Sindh, it will be deprived of access to Pakistan’s commercial hub, Karachi. Similarly, without Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Islamabad will find it difficult to control Gilgit-Baltistan.
Pakistan’s military assets are distributed across provinces to evade India. This expands the reach of the Punjabi-dominated military. So, Punjab is the only province that has an abiding material, strategic and emotional interest in Pakistan’s integrity and also the means to protect its interest militarily.
The PoK is five times smaller and 10 times more densely populated than Gilgit-Baltistan. Contrary to popular perception, it is Gilgit-Baltistan that is part of J&K’s Ladakh region, which is far more important to Pakistan than the PoK. Gilgit-Baltistan connects Pakistan with China and insulates Pakistan’s Pashtun regions from India. Without Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan cannot credibly threaten India’s sovereignty in Jammu and Kashmir.
Gilgit-Baltistan’s rivers and glaciers are vital for Pakistan’s water, food and energy security. Building dams in Gilgit-Baltistan is not politically costly: it is sparsely populated; it is ethno-religiously different from Pakistan; it is not represented in the Pakistani Parliament; its citizens cannot approach the Supreme Court; and, it is beyond the reach of media. Pakistan’s dependence on Gilgit-Baltistan will only increase because of climate change and the continued dependence of the growing population upon agriculture.
Poorest province
Balochistan, which is the poorest pro-vin-ce, accounts for barely 5% of Pakistan’s population and about two-fifths of its area and two-thirds of its coast-line (Iran and Afghanistan’s Baloch provinces account for a small part of their area and population).
Mineral-rich Balochistan is a crucial site of Chinese investments, hosts Pakistan’s nuclear and missile test sites and provides naval depth vis-a-vis India.
Economic stagnation and military oppression have pushed many Balochs into Sindh and West Asia. The Baloch presence in Balochistan is being further eroded by Punjabi and Pashtun settlers. However, unlike most other parts of Pakistan, Balochistan is not landlocked and unlike Sindh, it does not depend on Punjab for water. The sentiment of the decades-old Baloch insurgency is best captured by the late Nawab Akbar Bugti’s observation:“I have been a Baloch for several centuries… a Muslim for 1,400 years… a Pakistani for just over 50.”
Dependence on Indus river, occasional access to power in Islamabad through the Pakistan People’s Party and dependence upon the Punjabi-dominated army to control Karachi etc tie the semi-arid Sindh to Punjab.
The Mohajir/Pashtun-dominated Karachi accounts for one-fifth of Pakistan’s GDP and half of its tax revenue and is the most important hub for international air and maritime transport. Sindh is a swing state because it is the largest minority province, the only province other than Punjab whose inclusion in Pakistan is not legally/historically questionable, and has close relations with both Punjab and Balochistan.
Given its small population and Punjab’s abiding material interest and military capability to contest secession, Balochistan can become independent only if Baloch insurgent and tribal factions unite and Sindh loses faith in Pakistan. India’s capacity to facilitate Baloch unity and unrest in Sindh and the response of Afghanistan, China, Iran, and the US to Indian manoeuvrings require a separate discussion.
(The writer teaches at Azim Premji University, Bengaluru)