Military bases will remain vulnerable to terrorist threats

Today, frequent terrorist attacks on Indian Army and Air Force units, in the border states of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir are on the rise with Pathankot and Uri and now Samba in the enemy’s cross hairs. Clearly, the specific causes for such security breaches lack clarity to prevent the recurrence of these threats.

In the aftermath of these attacks, various organs of the security and intelligence bureaucracy blame each other. Today, the armed forces, Central armed police forces and intelligence agencies are all involved with border security and counter-terror operations, but have different organisational structures and national security priorities.

The military as the largest component in terms of manpower, expenditure and armament is considered the ultima ratio of state power to wage conventional war against an adversary. Counter-terror operation is a secondary role for the armed forces which is confined to quick reaction teams (QRTs) that are well-trained but not regularly exercised because manpower is often stretched thin for administrative support duties.

Globally, the Indian Army has the highest teeth-to-tail ratio wherein for every combatant solider, the support manpower is large which makes a combat force less agile.

While the Border Security Force (BSF) and police stations in small rural hamlets form the first two tiers along the India-Pakistan border, the army technically is the second or third tier along the International Border (IB) or Line of Control (LoC). The topography, terrain, riverine country, elephant grass and winter fog create low visibility along the IB or LoC which affects the surveillance grid to detect terrorist intruders.

Pakistani jihadi terrorist groups armed to the teeth either on foot or on vehicles always take the correct route to reach their designated target area.

How do these terrorists know the exact date/time when there is a turnaround of fighting units and their guard is lowered? For an enemy to figure out such specific details is possible only if sleeper agents provide them not only vital information but also food, transit shelter, daily updates and undetected guidance to their target destinations.

Often, separatists aid and abet the mehman mujahideen/fidayeen elements to strike the security forces which comprise the army and Central armed police forces. 

The absence of effective inter-agency channels among various intelligence agencies which operate along the border is another challenge. The Incident Reporting System along the border districts has to adopt a real time model to disseminate hostile intrusions to the different units deployed there. These include the Central intelligence agencies, the army’s liaison units/intelligence and field security companies besides the state police intelligence which are partly under Central and state governments, operate in silos with no seamless arrangement to share intelligence among themselves in a cohesive manner. Moreover, each intelligence agency has its own focus and interpretation of information to be processed into intelligence which poses serious limitations.

Also, each intelligence organisation reports to its respective headquarters and disseminated in a top-down model which is not real time. Such intelligence has to answer the three ‘Ts’ — Time, Target and Technique — of an attack in order to make it meaningful, but invariably, time lags in intelligence dissemination defeats the purpose. Eventually, the security forces engage terrorists either in mountainous forests or on the periphery of garrisons/ cantonment areas where they take cover in buildings.

To be able to engage terrorists in thick forests with undergrowth and tree cover takes time where it is a cat-and-mouse exercise between the two sides. The security forces also have to be concerned that their soldiers/constabulary fights cautiously without loss of life or limb and therefore cannot afford to be reckless and risk-prone.

For instance, the protracted struggle to neutralise forest brigand Veerapan because he operated in mountainous forests is well known. When terrorists hide in buildings, then the security forces are concerned about collateral damage because some of its own personnel or their families are also likely to be there.

Collateral damage
Moreover, the security forces cannot afford to deploy its heavy weapons like rocket launchers or artillery guns for fear of collateral damage and only has to restrict its use only to small arms like rifles and machine guns which explains why a fire-fight or shooting between both sides take time.

The terrorists too have similar small arms like the security forces so the advantage of superior firepower or heavy weapons is negated automatically. Also the ‘live’ contact phase in counter-terror operations lasts for only a few hours but its culmination involves sanitisation of an area which takes far more time.

Today, the terrorists have started to choose ‘soft’ targets in military towns like Pathankot, Uri or Samba where the army cantonment abuts a civil area. Even in the attack on Air Force Station Pathankot, only security of the domestic area of the Station was breached and not that of the ‘technical area’ which houses the aircraft and armament.

The security of military garrisons/ cantonments is a challenge because an element of civilian traffic passes through these areas and therefore makes them vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

The fact that India did not adopt a military response or wage war against Pakistan post 26/11 sea-borne terrorist attack on Mumbai has emboldened the Pakistani jihadi terrorists to continue to launch pinprick raids against Indian security forces with impunity time and again.

Former Vice Chief of Army Staff Lt General (rtd) Phillip Campose, who headed a committee to examine the security of military bases after the Pathankot attack, has punched holes in the security system. It recommends installation of modern access-control, perimeter security-cum-intrusion detection systems, besides better procedures among many other requirements which will take time due to the prolonged defence procurement process.
Therefore, military bases along the IB/LoC continue to remain vulnerable to terrorist threats till such time that the armed forces’ strengthens security systems.

(Monappa was with the Intelligence Corps, and Chengappa is Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies, Christ University, Bengaluru)