N Korea: Limits of Economic Sanctions

As one contemplates the current threats to global peace, the developments on the Korean peninsula loom large. The United States has adopted economic sanctions as a coercive tool to counter the challenge posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. However, past experiences, especially the case of Iran, also part of the “Axis of Evil” for similar reasons, highlight the limitations of sanctions as a solo tactic. The rationale for such an argument in this case is both strategic and geopolitical.

In an interview in 2010, Harvard professor Meghan O’Sullivan had expressed the inability of economic sanctions to meet the strategic ends when employed unaccompanied by other tools of foreign policy like military and diplomacy. According to O’Sullivan, before deciding the tools of coercion, the desired outcome should be articulated. The strategy should either aim for behavioural change, containment or regime change. Accordingly, sanctions need to be applied with the support of military or diplomatic tactics.

In the case of the ongoing tussle between the US and DPRK, the fundamental communication of intentions is yet to take place effectively. ‘Supreme leader’ Kim Jong-Un has shown interest in negotiating with the US, while President Trump, like his predecessor, has sought a complete reversal towards denuclearisation before any negotiations can begin. What has ensued is Trump terming Kim a “madman” and Kim threatening the US with a thermonuclear bomb test and missile launches in the Pacific. The economic sanctions against DPRK -- mainly oil and textile embargoes -- have had minimal effect on the North Korean regime.

Geopolitically, unlike the Iran case, where the country is surrounded by unfriendly states, with the exception of Lebanon and Syria, the DPRK is in a relatively advantageous position. The impact that the oil embargo was intended to achieve has been offset by China’s oil trade with DPRK. North Koreans have also found economic opportunities in Russia, thereby diluting the repercussions of economic sanctions. In addition, the US should understand the shortcomings of sanctions in influencing leadership decisions in dictatorial regimes. With press censorship and Kim’s own internal propaganda machinery, the effect of the sanctions seems ominous.

China has also criticised the US for its position on using coercive tactics against North Korea. China has vocally supported DPRK’s stance that negotiations can indeed take place subject to the latter’s conditions, not America’s. US-South Korean joint military exercises have also been identified by China and Russia as potential irritants in any opportunities for negotiation with the DPRK. Such assertions have made the US look like an intransigent superpower concentrating merely on arm-twisting rather than seeking peace. With Chinese support and Kim’s strong will, the popular message from Pyongyang is that “sanctions might hurt us, but they won’t stop us.”

An ‘intelligence’ way out

For a start, the US could benefit from closely studying the Iran case. During 2010, Iran had in former president Ahmadinejad a leader with an outlook similar to Kim’s, racing towards nuclearisation and disregarding the effects of economic sanctions levied by the US. With limited diplomatic and military options, the US and Israel adopted covert means to sabotage the Iranian nuclear programme. A malware named “Stuxnet” was injected into Iranian computers which significantly damaged Iranian pursuits. Even the Iranians have accepted the damage Stuxnet had in crippling the country, not just its nuclear programme but also economically. On the other hand, intelligence-led actions by the US and its allies are insignificant currently on the Korean peninsula.

Although the US intelligence community has been effective in using tools to track DPRK’s progress in nuclear and missile technology, and have shown analytical rigour in assessing the status of the threat, covert actions to contain it has been limited. On the contrary, North Korean subversive activities in South Korea and Japan — US allies — have been alarming. However, the fact that DPRK’s agents are being unmasked provides ample space to develop sources. Covert action is best suited for Trump to maximise the gains of sanctions and also in the long run to gain sufficient insight into decision-making in Pyongyang.

To break the deadlock that the two countries have reached, intelligence operations have to supersede military operations. The US intelligence agencies have to play a central role in first stating the problem and allowing the president to articulate the policy goals clearly. This essentially forms the first step in perception management of the Koreans who are increasingly anti-US, owing greatly to the lunatic rhetoric being exchanged between the leaders. Economic sanctions can have the desired effect only when the target regime and population feel their adverse effects, not if they are absorbed by a wave of nationalist feeling.

Once sufficient penetration has been achieved into the inner circles of decision-making in Pyongyang and the US President’s statements have sobered down enough to correctly communicate US policy goals in the region, avenues for negotiations can be explored. If the US views DPRK as an independent threat, seeking negotiations make sense. However, if DPRK’s actions are being fuelled by Beijing’s ambitions, then the solution lies far away from Pyongyang. In any case, as O’Sullivan had stated then, solitary economic sanctions are ineffective even today. Strategic goal-setting and diversification of tactics are inevitable.

(The writer is a PhD scholar in Intelligence Studies and International Security at the University of Leicester, UK)