Rekindled flame
A majority of Iranians are poor, observant Muslims who hope that the ideals of the revolution can still be revived.
To borrow Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin’s famous words, staging a revolution is not like breaking an egg. Clearly, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is on the driving seat and street protests are petering out.
Tuesday’s decision by the Guardian Council upholding the June 12 election results is a defining moment. With it, all principal organs of the regime – Assembly of Experts which selects or dismisses the Supreme Leader and supervises his work, Guardian Council which supervises elections and the Majlis and the judiciary – are all backing Khamenei.
The opposition candidate, Mir-Mohammed Mousavi leading the agitation for a repoll, is neither a modernist nor a reformer. His appeal is confined to the urban middle class, who wish the revolution would just fade away. The so-called ‘Iran experts’ did not realise that Mousavi was a balloon that a section of the Iranian middle class inflated to show its anger at the entire Khomeinist regime. He acted, in effect, as the front man for the conservative clergy who have a great deal to lose if Ahmedinejad’s programme of social justice and anti-corruption drive move forward.
Indeed, schisms have come to surface that existed for years within the Iranian regime. The regime’s base has benefited from the four-year term of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s largesse, and the rest of Iranian society is not sure anyone could do better.
Ahmedinejad’s principal weakness is his failure to bring the rich and corrupt mullahs to justice, as he had promised. His supporters say that would be the priority in his second term. But today, he is the authentic leader of the Khomeinist movement. Ahmedinejad restored the connectivity of the regime with the radical populist discourse. The image of the regime was one of a clique of mid-ranking mullahs and the masses felt the victims of a great historic swindle. But under Ahmedinejad, a new generation of revolutionaries has come to the fore, projecting an image of piety and probity, reassuring the ‘downtrodden’ that all is not lost.
Of course, Ahmedinejad’s populism is a double-edged sword. If carried too far, it may undermine the legitimacy of the regime, which includes corrupt sections of the clerical establishment. But Ahmedinejad is a clever politician. He knew where to stop and when to glance over his shoulders. Thus, he hit at many corrupt practices and threatened to bring key figures to justice, but stopped short of landing the big catch. The big question is whether Ahmedinejad will cast his net wide in his second term.
However, behind the happenings, there is a proxy war between Khamenei and the grey cardinal of Iranian politics, former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Last week’s power play showed Rafsanjani’s strategem to rally the conservative clerical establishment in Qom floundered.
Khamenei made clear his support for Ahmedinejad. Rafsanjani’s family members who have allegedly amassed huge wealth through corrupt practices face the prospect of government crackdown.
The struggle between corrupt mullahs (in alliance with the bazaar) and republicans is as old as the 1979 Iranian revolution, where the “fedayeen” of Tudeh party (communist cadres) were the original foot soldiers of the revolution but the clerics usurped the leadership. What is at stake today is a concerted attempt by the conservative clerical establishment to rollback the four-year old painful, zigzag process toward republicanism.
Khomeinist revolution
Ahmedinejad has been marginalising the corrupt clergy from the sinecures of power and the honey pots of the Iranian economy, especially oil industry. In ideological terms, the current struggle is about the restoration of the Khomeinist revolution to its ideological moorings of social and economic justice, social control over national resources, and national independence and dignity.
There is an external dimension, inevitably, as US-Iran direct engagement is almost imminent. The “pro-West” Arab regimes, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt, are nervous about any consequent shift in the regional power balance once Iran enters the mainstream of Middle Eastern politics.
The Saudis hoped that the political turmoil in Tehran would postpone or at least complicate US-Iran dialogue. But Barack Obama responded profound understanding of the eddies and undercurrents of Iranian politics. So has Israel, which has a fair idea of the strong power base of the Iranian regime.
Nonetheless, traces of covert attempts to trigger a ‘colour’ revolution appeared. But in the annals of revolutions, there is no precedent of a middle class staging one successfully on its own. Clearly, the well-heeled, English-speaking protestors from north Tehran who use Twitter do not represent Iran. The protests failed to strike a chord among the masses.
The majority of Iranians are poor, observant Muslims who expected the 1979 revolution to deliver justice and dignity to their common lives. They see in Ahmedinejad a ray of hope that the ideals of the revolution can still be revived. That alone explains the massive mandate they gave him.
(The writer is a former diplomat)
To borrow Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin’s famous words, staging a revolution is not like breaking an egg. Clearly, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is on the driving seat and street protests are petering out.
Tuesday’s decision by the Guardian Council upholding the June 12 election results is a defining moment. With it, all principal organs of the regime – Assembly of Experts which selects or dismisses the Supreme Leader and supervises his work, Guardian Council which supervises elections and the Majlis and the judiciary – are all backing Khamenei.
The opposition candidate, Mir-Mohammed Mousavi leading the agitation for a repoll, is neither a modernist nor a reformer. His appeal is confined to the urban middle class, who wish the revolution would just fade away. The so-called ‘Iran experts’ did not realise that Mousavi was a balloon that a section of the Iranian middle class inflated to show its anger at the entire Khomeinist regime. He acted, in effect, as the front man for the conservative clergy who have a great deal to lose if Ahmedinejad’s programme of social justice and anti-corruption drive move forward.
Indeed, schisms have come to surface that existed for years within the Iranian regime. The regime’s base has benefited from the four-year term of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s largesse, and the rest of Iranian society is not sure anyone could do better.
Ahmedinejad’s principal weakness is his failure to bring the rich and corrupt mullahs to justice, as he had promised. His supporters say that would be the priority in his second term. But today, he is the authentic leader of the Khomeinist movement. Ahmedinejad restored the connectivity of the regime with the radical populist discourse. The image of the regime was one of a clique of mid-ranking mullahs and the masses felt the victims of a great historic swindle. But under Ahmedinejad, a new generation of revolutionaries has come to the fore, projecting an image of piety and probity, reassuring the ‘downtrodden’ that all is not lost.
Of course, Ahmedinejad’s populism is a double-edged sword. If carried too far, it may undermine the legitimacy of the regime, which includes corrupt sections of the clerical establishment. But Ahmedinejad is a clever politician. He knew where to stop and when to glance over his shoulders. Thus, he hit at many corrupt practices and threatened to bring key figures to justice, but stopped short of landing the big catch. The big question is whether Ahmedinejad will cast his net wide in his second term.
However, behind the happenings, there is a proxy war between Khamenei and the grey cardinal of Iranian politics, former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Last week’s power play showed Rafsanjani’s strategem to rally the conservative clerical establishment in Qom floundered.
Khamenei made clear his support for Ahmedinejad. Rafsanjani’s family members who have allegedly amassed huge wealth through corrupt practices face the prospect of government crackdown.
The struggle between corrupt mullahs (in alliance with the bazaar) and republicans is as old as the 1979 Iranian revolution, where the “fedayeen” of Tudeh party (communist cadres) were the original foot soldiers of the revolution but the clerics usurped the leadership. What is at stake today is a concerted attempt by the conservative clerical establishment to rollback the four-year old painful, zigzag process toward republicanism.
Khomeinist revolution
Ahmedinejad has been marginalising the corrupt clergy from the sinecures of power and the honey pots of the Iranian economy, especially oil industry. In ideological terms, the current struggle is about the restoration of the Khomeinist revolution to its ideological moorings of social and economic justice, social control over national resources, and national independence and dignity.
There is an external dimension, inevitably, as US-Iran direct engagement is almost imminent. The “pro-West” Arab regimes, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt, are nervous about any consequent shift in the regional power balance once Iran enters the mainstream of Middle Eastern politics.
The Saudis hoped that the political turmoil in Tehran would postpone or at least complicate US-Iran dialogue. But Barack Obama responded profound understanding of the eddies and undercurrents of Iranian politics. So has Israel, which has a fair idea of the strong power base of the Iranian regime.
Nonetheless, traces of covert attempts to trigger a ‘colour’ revolution appeared. But in the annals of revolutions, there is no precedent of a middle class staging one successfully on its own. Clearly, the well-heeled, English-speaking protestors from north Tehran who use Twitter do not represent Iran. The protests failed to strike a chord among the masses.
The majority of Iranians are poor, observant Muslims who expected the 1979 revolution to deliver justice and dignity to their common lives. They see in Ahmedinejad a ray of hope that the ideals of the revolution can still be revived. That alone explains the massive mandate they gave him.
