They were seized near the restive city of Falluja on July 21st, 2004, by the Black Banners Brigade of the Islamic Secret Army. The group threatened to behead one of seven captives— the Indians, three Kenyans and an Egyptian— every 72 hours if their native countries did not evacuate their citizens from Iraq. The Brigade later demanded $1-1.2 million in compensation for the families of Iraqis killed in US assaults on Falluja and for the Kuwaiti firm to halt all operations in Iraq.
But Sudarshan lets his readers down. His effort to set the scene is so poorly organised it confuses and is filled with factual errors. He projects the impression that Iraq plunged into violence immediately after the occupation. This was not the case.
I visited Iraq five times after the war and circulated in Baghdad freely without guards. I met Indian Ambassador B B Tyagi on a number of occasions and attended a large reception at the residence before kidnappings, assassinations and car bombings became the norm. There was a gradual slide towards violent anarchy. The kidnapping of the lorry drivers marked a downward turn in the country’s descent to chaos. It is important to make this point.
Delhi’s dilemma
Sudarshan describes Delhi’s dilemma. Unable to negotiate directly with the kidnappers, India sent a high-powered team to Baghdad to deal with the situation. The team, led by the Ambassador to Oman, Talmiz Ahmad, included Zikrur Rehman, a senior official in External Affairs, and Alok Sharma from intelligence. Rehman, a fluent Arabic speaker who was compelled to negotiate with intermediaries, is Sudarshan’s hero.
The first intermediary was Shaikh Hisham Dulaimi, a member of a committee established by tribal leaders to free Iraqis held by US forces. I met and interviewed him for Deccan Herald on the day he ended his effort, under threat from the kidnappers. Abu Walid, a mysterious Egyptian member of the resistance took over and produced a deal involving payment by the Kuwaiti company of a ransom of $500,000 and a declaration that the firm was no longer operating in Iraq.
The seven were freed on September 1st, the day after another group slew 12 Nepalese.
This book should have been a rivetting read. It has all the elements of a political thriller: a hero, three innocent victims and a shadowy gang of kidnappers. But only the final chapters attain momentum.
Focused too closely on the negotiations, Sudarshan also fails to provide human interest by drawing portraits of the Indian hostages and descriptions of their ordeal even though he took the trouble to visit them once they had returned home.
English usage, particularly in the Foreword by terrorism expert A S Dulat, is faulty and should have been corrected by Penguin’s editors.
Anatomy of an Abduction— How the Indian Hostages in Iraq were Freed; V Sudarshan (Penguin Books, 2008, pp 219, Rs 295) review by michael jansen
