China’s Beidou and security challenges for India

Other than Pakistan, China has also been promoting the adoption of its satellite navigation system in Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh

The April 22 Pahalgam terror attack has brought the spotlight on new and evolving security challenges confronting India; those stemming from the use of emerging technologies, especially spatial infrastructure.

Particularly concerning have been reports indicating that militants involved in the attack may have used China’s Beidou satellite navigation system (BDS) to co-ordinate and evade detection by Indian security forces. In the past, Indian agencies have found several militants killed in encounters to be in possession of devices connected to the BDS — this points to a disturbing new trend in the region’s security environment.

The BDS, China’s equivalent of the United States’ GPS, is the country’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) providing positioning, navigation, and timing services to both civilian and military users. It has reportedly achieved superior accuracy and performance compared to the GPS in the Asia-Pacific region. Further, one of BDS’ unique features is its short message communication (SMS) service, allowing its users to send text data via satellites independent of conventional mobile networks, holding particular significance in terms of enabling secure communications in remote and high surveillance areas.

Beidou in South Asia

With the expansion of BDS’ coverage to the Asia-Pacific in 2012, Pakistan emerged as one of its earliest beneficiaries, owing to its long-standing strategic partnership with China. In 2013, it signed an agreement with China to install ground augmentation stations and a processing centre to enhance BDS’ accuracy. In 2018, it became the first foreign nation to gain access to military-grade Beidou services, and has since integrated the system into its defence architecture. This has not only bolstered Islamabad’s military capabilities, but also reduced its reliance on the GPS for much more reliable Chinese strategic infrastructure, resulting in greater security challenges, with implications for India’s military preparedness and deterrence along its western frontier.

Further, its potential utility for non-State actors reflects the emergence of newer kinds of security threats, whereby such assets might get increasingly interwoven into proxy and asymmetric warfare. The Pahalgam attack points to the complex security implications of the system given its attractiveness to terrorist groups operating with tacit or direct support. Beidou’s availability in restive border areas like Jammu & Kashmir could increasingly be exploited in the future, potentially diminishing the effectiveness of India’s surveillance and counter-infiltration efforts.

China has also been promoting the adoption of its BDS in other South Asian states —  Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh. Such expansion could potentially increase China’s strategic influence in the region at the expense of India’s regional influence. It might undercut Indian technological leadership, and position China as the primary provider of public goods in the region. Further, it also risks creating long-term technological dependence on China among India’s neighbours, particularly in light of their heavy reliance on the import of military equipment from China.

What should India do?

India needs to take cognizance of the strategic threats posed by emerging technologies in the region, particularly the expansion of the Beidou system, and take appropriate measures to address them.

First, it should prioritise the advancement of NavIC (Navigation with Indian Constellation), India’s indigenous regional navigation satellite system. Despite progress, NaVIC considerably lags Beidou. Thus, it needs to fast-track its plans for NavIC upgrades and coverage expansion and promote its use and adoption in the neighbourhood as a viable alternative to Beidou.

Second, India must focus on the enhancement of its Space-based surveillance capabilities, especially in the border regions, to bolster its ability to deal with cross-border threats. The May 18 launch of the EOS-09 (RISAT -1B) might have been a failure, but the focus on boosting surveillance capabilities along border regions with Pakistan and China is a step in the right direction.

Third, it needs to develop and deploy advanced jamming, spoofing, and signal disruption technologies, especially in sensitive regions. While India does possess such capabilities as evident from their deployment in the recent conflict with Pakistan, these can best be deployed as a pre-emptive measure, with experts suggesting that their real-time deployment remains challenging as it can take several days and requires international co-operation and co-ordination.

Finally, it should raise concerns regarding the hostile use of civilian GNSS platforms by non-State actors, and their role in enabling proxy warfare at appropriate international forums like the United Nations, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), and the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG).

(Aastha Binzani is Research Scholar, Centre for East Asian Studies (China Division), Jawaharlal Nehru University.)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.