Scepticism over the Delhi summits

The 17th Group of 20 (G-20) summit will take place in October 2022 in Indonesia and the 18th in September 2023 in India, prompting reflection on the value of multilateralism, especially when much scepticism was voiced in Indian circles about Prime Minister Modi’s presence at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) at Samarkand this month. India will also host the SCO summit of 21 members, observers and partners next year.

It is true that global government is highly unlikely to eventuate in this or perhaps any other century. However, various layers of international governance exist, with multiple agreements and institutions governing human activity in telecommunications, labour, international trade, human rights, maritime law, civil aviation, weapons of mass destruction, and much else besides. But it is obvious that codes of behaviour are insufficient; they require the dedication of the world’s great powers of the time.

As the power of Asian nations like China and India increases to join the US and Europe, it may be noted that each of these is passionately protective of its own sovereignty, which militates against it becoming a responsible stakeholder of the world order, because each wishes to impose on others its own version of international society, commensurate with its power.

The countries of the European Union have experimented with limiting State sovereignty but are the least likely to inspire any innovations of the kind that led to the creation of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions in the early 1940s.

The size itself of the UN has proved a handicap for many of its basic functions, while the Bretton Woods system lacks democratic principles. Meetings with 193 participants – the present size of the UN - are unwieldy, subject to bloc politics by inconsequential players, and lack the ability to operate functionally. The main dilemma of multilateralism is how to appear universal, and yet be able to act. The answer might lie in ‘variable geometry’, multilateralism and minilateralism, which will vary depending on the issue and available resources.

The IMF was created in 1944 and now numbers 190 nations. After the weakening of the dollar in 1975, France convened five nations to discuss monetary affairs, which became expanded to the G-7. This group started the practice of inviting guests, and following the financial crisis of 2008, this framework evolved into the G-20, although the G-7 continues to meet, and bilateral negotiations between the two world’s largest economies, the US and China, are acknowledged to play the most critical role.

In logic, the larger the number of participants, the harder it is to arrive at any agreement. With three countries, there are three bilateral relations, with 10, there are 45; with 100, there are nearly 5,000. This is why on issues like climate change, the meaningful discussions take place only between small groups, especially since less than a dozen countries cause 80% of the world’s greenhouse gases.

Global governance will ultimately depend on both formal and informal networks. Formal ones like the G-20 and SCO are ideally used for establishing agendas, building consensus, coordinating policies, and establishing norms. A network provides the opportunity to supplement the efforts of the UN and achieve the desired outcomes with the relevant participants rather than over their heads.

In our current world “shaped by raw power politics, where everything is weaponised”, as European foreign policy chief Josep Borrell puts it, where major countries are divided, the international community severely polarised, and protectionism rampant as a result of the Ukraine war, it is most improbable that networking bodies like the G-20 or the SCO can find sufficient traction to set any agenda for the UN or the Bretton Woods institutions.

The prospects for the summits in Indonesia and India must therefore be considered exceptionally unpropitious. The decision of the President of Indonesia to compromise by inviting non-member Ukraine in order to avoid criticism about Russia’s attendance will probably prove ill-advised.

As for our local nay-sayers about Samarkand, they would do well to heed the diplomatic adage that it is always more useful to talk to one’s enemies than to one’s friends. Sun Tzu is credited with the phrase “Keep your friends close, your enemies closer.” This is sound advice. New Delhi has yet to enlighten us as to what benefit accrues to India by its PM not engaging his Chinese and Pakistani counterparts in dialogue.

(The writer is a former foreign secretary.)