JOIN USIndia-Russia ties appear strong, but appearances are deceptive
Earlier this month, a Russian cargo ship was forced to set sail towards China after the Indian government refused to let it dock at Haldia port in West Bengal to offload its goods. Here’s the back story to it: In mid-December, the ship had, after unloading some cargo at the Kochi port in Kerala, set sail for Bangladesh’s Mongla port to offload some equipment for the construction of the Rooppur nuclear plant, which is being built by Russia’s State-owned Rosatom. But when the US embassy in Dhaka told Bangladesh that the Russian ship was on its sanctions list, the Sheikh Hasina government did not allow it to dock.
Reports then suggested that India had no issues with letting the Russian ship dock. In end-December, foreign ministry spokesperson Arindam Bagchi told the BBC that he had no information about the Russian ship being denied permission to port at Mongla but that it would not be an issue if the ship arrived in India. The ship was to unload the cargo at Haldia, from where it would be transported to Bangladesh. But by January 20, the Modi government had developed cold feet and the ship was returning with the cargo on board.
As the Indian decision came immediately after the visit of David Lu, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, to Bangladesh and India, Bangladeshi media reports suggest that the US official compelled New Delhi to adhere to American sanctions, which the Modi government couldn’t resist. This is, of course, not the only instance of western sanctions impacting India-Russia ties.
Sergey Chemezov, CEO of Russia’s military-industrial group Rostek, was in New Delhi last month to discuss the vexed issue of pending Indian payments for Russian defence supplies. He reportedly told his Indian interlocutors that the payments problem could affect future supplies of Russian military equipment, including the highly coveted S-400 air defence system. The Indian Air Force has received one S-400 system from Russia so far but the delivery of other systems has been delayed after the Ukraine war.
The S-400 deal was signed in 2018. Because of the threat of US CAATSA sanctions, India had got Russia to agree to receive the payment in rupees. But after the Ukraine war, as Indian crude imports from Moscow have shot up by 400 per cent , the widening trade imbalance in Russia’s favour has further complicated the payment issue. The Modi government was keen on conducting the trade in rupees through Vostro accounts in certain banks, but the Russian side is not keen on collecting rupees. It prefers the Chinese yuan, with which it can pay for its imports from China.
Army Chief Gen Manoj Pande recently conceded that one of the major lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war was “We realised that there were sustenance issues”. In his annual press conference, he said that “there has been an impact” on Soviet- and Russian-origin equipment and the army is trying to identify alternative sources for spares and ammunition. While the army has 40 such cases, the situation is likely to be more critical for the IAF and Indian Navy. The serviceability of the Mig29K, the Russian naval fighter jets flown from the aircraft carrier, has been poor even before the recent crisis. Similar questions have been raised about the serviceability of the Russian Su30MkI fighters that form the bulk of IAF’s combat fleet.
The US officials are aware of the opportunity, and they want to seize it. Speaking at Indo-Pacific Forecast 2023, the White House coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs, Kurt Campbell said, “We have stated clearly our interest to help India diversify away from its reliance largely on Russian military supplies. We work closely with a number of other nations, like-minded nations, that also seek that goal.”
That is at odds with Indian public opinion. A recent survey of 1,000 Indians by Morning Consult showed that 48 per cent of them see Russia as the preferred source of military equipment, compared to 44 per cent for the US. Public opinion places Russia as a stronger ally than the US. In the same survey, while 38 per cent believed that Russia is to blame for the war in Ukraine, 26 per cent blamed the US, 18 per cent the NATO and 10 per cent blamed Ukraine. More worryingly, 22 per cent Indians said the US represents the greatest military threat to India after China (43 per cent ). Russia and Pakistan shared the next spot at 13 per cent each.
This public opinion of friendly and strong ties with Russia is also reflected in the narrative propagated by foreign minister S Jaishankar in his acerbic retorts in western capitals. Often couched in self-interest, he portrays India as pursuing a principled policy of multilateralism. The Modi government also confirms a lot of western biases when it sends a military contingent to Russia for an exercise or grants the visiting Russian foreign minister audience with PM Modi. A joint production facility to make AK203 rifles in India or a deal to lease a nuclear submarine is bound to give further credence to many American prejudices about India’s undying love for Russia.
The narrative of this rhetoric is stronger than the reality. Of course, India does not wish to antagonise Russia, but the thin strand of Delhi’s ties with Moscow is becoming thinner by the day. Russia’s attractiveness as a military supplier has been on a downward curve, a process likely to be accelerated in the future. With France keen to step in, Moscow’s strategic importance at diplomatic forums has diminished in Delhi’s eyes. Modi cancelled his trip to Moscow for the annual summit with Putin last year.
India still needs Russia for military supplies, fuel and fertiliser and to prevent Moscow from allying fully with Beijing. Delhi is not working to fulfil the West’s desired state of Russia-India ties, but the future of the relationship doesn’t look bright. Let no one mistake the superficial for the real.