JOIN USAgnipath: Risking national security
On June 14, the Defence Minister, flanked by the Service chiefs, launched the new recruitment policy for the military services known as ‘Tour of Duty’ or ‘Agnipath’ recruitment. As soon as it was launched, military aspirants came out in protest across India. ‘Agnipath’ became an unintended blaze of fire from north to south as protesters torched trains and buses and damaged public property. Senior military officiers were paraded on news channels to defend a scheme which is essentially a brainwave of the government. But why the military aspirants are so restive even after the government relaxed the age limit for ‘Agniveer’ recruitment in the current year and ministries announced reservations in jobs is something that needs serious examination.
Though the Agnipath system had been under consideration for two years, it has not been analysed in detail to gauge its impact. Does it really make the military more attractive for young men? The term of engagement is four years, including six months’ training. After training, they will be posted to units where they will be exposed to the vagaries of weather which may cause disabilities; they may face insurgency on internal security duty, enemy action, etc., and if any of it costs them their life, there is no pension to support their dependents.
Nor do the six months’ training and 3.5 years of service enhance their eligibility for new employment thereafter as they would not have undergone any specialised training as longer-serving regular soldiers would have. The Rs 11 lakh they get on discharge will not last long for most. Why should a young man risk his life, suffer disabilities, and be left in the lurch at such a young age? Though the government has said that Agniveers would be given priority for jobs in paramilitary and police forces, the promise has to be taken with a pinch of salt as the country has seen how it has implemented OROP.
It would have been different if the rejection/absorption percentages were 50-50. The youth would have seen a fighting chance of making a long-term career in the armed forces and developed a competitive spirit to prove themselves for it in these four years. In all likelihood, most Agniveers will be left jobless after discharge. Weapons-trained and jobless young blood may easily fall prey to the recruitment efforts of terrorist and anti-national organisations. Unlike regular soldiers who have matured while serving for long and have a family to take care of as well as the means – the military pension – to do so, these youngsters will be out to grab anything that comes their way. The government cannot satisfy the needs of Agniveers overlooking the larger interest of the mainstream population, no matter what it promises today. In effect, we would be pumping thousands of disgruntled army men into society.
The integration of Agniveers with trained soldiers will also be a difficult task. They will be seen as ‘tourists’ who would leave after four years. They cannot match the skill or efficiency of trained soldiers and will always be treated as second-class soldiers, which will affect their morale. A fully trained soldier looks to career advancement, promotions and takes the Service seriously; Agniveers, knowing fully well that they have to serve only four years, will be more casual in approach and outlook. Cases of disciplinary action may rise.
The army top brass say they need to maintain a young army for better fighting capability. But how well will these Agniveers, with minimum basic training, fight a war? It takes 5-6 years’ exposure in the units and formations, after two years of rigorous training at regimental centres, to make a good soldier. Agniveers will have six months’ training and inadequate exposure. Will they be able to enhance the battle efficiency of their units? One should not forget that the man behind the weapon is more important than the weapon, and every unit commander needs well trained soldiers in the use of weapons, maintenance and deployment. In four years, one-fifth of the army will be Agniveers. Can we afford that while our disputed borders remain hot?
We have two sworn enemies on our western and northern borders, not to forget that they are also “all-weather allies” against us. The western neighbour has forever been looking for an opportunity to avenge its 1971 defeat. And we have been in a stand-off with China in Ladakh for over two years now, with no solution in sight and China building infrastructure into disputed territory relentlessly and ignoring our protests. With changing global equations, and Russia beholden to China, we cannot rule out the possibility of China trying to take parts of Arunachal Pradesh. In this situation, is it wise to weaken our military capabilities by inducting ill-trained Agniveers? Can this be regarded as modernising or strengthening the armed forces?
The mounting military pension burden has been a concern for government, but the fact remains that 25% of it goes to the civilian employees of Defence, a burden that should not be put on the soldiers. It is not only military pension but civilian pension burden also goes up every year. In the case of military personnel, the pension starts early because they are discharged from service at a young age of 32 to 35 as per service rules to maintain the young profile of the forces. Having given the best part of their lives in the service of the nation, under the most trying situations, most inclement weather, risking their lives, and being cut-off from families for long durations, do they not deserve the pension? And why should only Defence pension cause concern to the government?
While the economy is a priority for government, the security of the nation is an even bigger priority, and no compromise can be made on that. The government may achieve the dual objectives of reducing pension outgo and have more younger people in the armed forces with this scheme, but it will achieve them by ignoring end results, economising on the Defence budget by reducing pension outgo at a time when China’s military budget is 3-5 times that of India and rising, excluding the new acquisitions and modernisation of their forces.
Whatever happens, the Indian Army will fight with the men and weapons they have, whether modern or obsolete, as they are under oath. It is for the government to maintain a fighting-fit army without tinkering with time-tested doctrines, traditions, ethos and regimental structures to ensure that we do not suffer a 1962-like debacle again.