Beijing too is worried over how to deal with Taliban

The jolt from the blast at the Dasu hydroelectricity dam in north-western Pakistan, in which nine Chinese were killed, has sent Beijing into a tizzy to protect its interests and further its regional ambitions. However, the going is set to get tough. The blast comes amidst the heightened violence in Afghanistan-Pakistan as the Taliban steps up its campaign to take all of Afghanistan under its control following the sudden flight of the last of the American troops from Bagram airbase on July 4.

China’s interests are related to protecting its citizens in Afghanistan, stabilising its border areas in the Wakhan corridor in Badakhshan province, which witnessed a resurgence of the Taliban there earlier this month, curbing the drugs and small arms trade from Afghanistan, containing the spill-over of Uighurs trained by the Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State-Khorasan and its effect on stability in Xinjiang province. Of course, there is also the matter of protecting its investments in Afghanistan -- the Aynak copper mine, energy interests in the Amu Darya basin, resources at Bamiyan and ongoing infrastructure projects. China’s ambitions include pursuing the “five connectivities” of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects.

China had tied down the Kabul government in the last decade with “comprehensive cooperative relationship” in 2006 that was elevated to “strategic partnership” in 2013. The first memorandum with Afghanistan on China’s BRI was signed in 2016. Two years later, it was decided that a cross-border railway would be built -- from Peshawar to Kabul and Quetta to Kandahar. Beijing had also organised trilaterals with Afghanistan and Pakistan. All of these are now to be passed on to the Taliban for approval and support, if it marches on into Kabul.

Although China claims a policy of “non-interference”, it has propped up political groups in other troubled places — Libya, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, etc. China is no stranger to the Taliban, either, having provided military training to the Mujahideen in the 1980s against the Soviets, and international protection to the Taliban prior to 9/11. More recently, Beijing supported and hosted the ‘Istanbul Process’ in 2014, invited Taliban officials at Doha to Beijing and Urumqi. The Taliban, too, sent friendly gestures to Beijing, but it has to factor in local commanders’ will, too.

China’s immediate response has been to send advisories to its citizens to leave Afghanistan following news of violence spiralling out of control in various parts of the country. It had earlier evacuated its citizens from Kabul.

China is also striving for a political solution with “united front” tactics to address the Afghan situation and minimise the damage to its national interests. In May, China brought together the five Central Asian foreign ministers in Xian to strategize on the Afghan situation. Under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Beijing is pushing its version of “three evils” (separatism, extremism and splittism) and the Regional Anti-Terror Structure on counter-terror exercises and intelligence sharing.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited three countries in Central Asia, besides attending the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group foreign ministers’ meeting at Dushanbe last week. The Dushanbe meeting on July 15 advocated for an “independent, neutral, united, peaceful, democratic and prosperous state” of Afghanistan and condemned the ongoing terror attacks.

However, Wang Yi’s comments that the Taliban should “make a clean break with all terrorist forces and return to the mainstream of Afghan politics with a responsible attitude toward the country and people” appears to be wishful thinking, given what’s unfolding in Afghanistan. On May 17, Wang even suggested external effort to “facilitate internal negotiations among various parties in Afghanistan,” but found few takers for the idea.

The crux of the problem for Beijing is the possible spread of political violence into Xinjiang, which it claimed had not witnessed a single terror incident since 2016. While the Taliban made certain comments disassociating from the Turkistan Islamic Party (East Turkestan Islamic Movement) and others trained in Afghanistan, Beijing knows that the ground reality is complex.

China even tried to infiltrate the Uighur militant groups but its spy ring was busted by Kabul and 10 Chinese were briefly arrested and had to leave Afghanistan in December last.

More significantly, if the Islamic State-Khorasan Province provides concrete assistance to the Uighur militants and connects them to the training bases in north-eastern Syria, that would be beyond Beijing’s control as its counter-terrorism cooperation with the Syrian government has not yielded results.

China’s Afghanistan policy is then faced with a conundrum, caught as it is between protecting its interests, promoting its regional ambitions and the resurgence of the Taliban. The “united front” with the SCO or those bordering Afghanistan provides only a temporary relief for Beijing as Xinjiang could become restive in the coming days and months.