A Line of Caution on the LoC ceasefire

A line of caution is essential while following the latest development along the Line of Control between India and Pakistan.

During the last week of February, the DGsMO of India and Pakistan issued a statement, after having discussions over the hotline. According to the statement, after reviewing the situation, in “a free, frank and cordial atmosphere” and “in the interest of achieving mutually beneficial and sustainable peace along the borders,” both sides “agreed for strict observance of all agreements, understandings and cease firing along the Line of Control and all other sectors with effect from midnight 24/25 Feb 2021.”

The statement, though surprising as it came out of nowhere, is a welcome one. But the discussions that followed in the public domain on the reasons behind the statement, and what needs to be done, are equally surprising, if not bizarre. While optimism is essential, one also has to be cautious. We can’t be building castles in the air. What does the ground situation look like?

First, the nature of the ceasefire. Is it political between the two countries at an Indo-Pak level, or is it military, between the two security forces at the LoC level? Based on the statement and who is involved, it appears more like a ceasefire between the two militaries, at the LoC level. Of course, the ceasefire agreement would not have come at the DGsMO level without reference to the top level on both sides. However, it is not a political ceasefire between the two countries; else, the statement would have come at the foreign ministry level or somewhere in the political plane. It’s therefore an extrapolation when one begins to read a larger peace process at the political level into the ceasefire agreement.

Also read: Fatigue or desire for peace?

Also, the ceasefire only goes back to what was agreed earlier in 2003. There is no new breakthrough, unless one considers returning to the old pact and observing it as one!

Second, the reasons attributed to the military ceasefire. If one looks at the many speculations over the reasons during the last one week, they are: India’s agreement with China, challenges of a two-front war, new administration in the US, and back channel negotiations. Why would the India-China agreement to disengage from the border standoff follow necessarily to the ceasefire agreement with Pakistan? Given the statements from the Indian military leadership on the ability (and the need to prepare) to fight a two-front war, offering the same as the reason for India agreeing to a ceasefire with Pakistan – a two-front peace, so to speak -- does not make sense.

Even if it is the case, why would Pakistan agree to it, and ease the situation for India? Is Pakistan also tired of fighting a two-front war – one with India and one internally? In the last few years, Pakistan has succeeded in addressing the issue of domestic terrorism. Though Pakistan Taliban continues to operate and carry out attacks, terrorism is no more an “existential threat” as the case was a few years earlier. The “two-front challenge” hypothesis as a reason for both the countries agreeing to a ceasefire does not add up.

Next, did the pact happen because of the new administration in the US? President Joe Biden’s immediate priority is addressing the Covid-19 challenge and dealing with the rise of extremism within. His second priority is Europe and the Middle East. From his administration’s statements, it does not appear that, minus Afghanistan, South Asia is anywhere on its radar. Not yet. Even if it is because of Afghanistan that Biden wants an Indo-Pak peace, it is the desired outcome, not a deliberate strategy as of now. Moreover, when it comes to nuclear weapons and Kashmir, both India and Pakistan are beyond any international pressure.

Military fatigue

So, what else could be the reason behind the ceasefire? It appears more related to the situation on the LoC and the engagement of two militaries, without any political endgame. How long can two militaries face each other in a standoff, without a political objective? And what have India and Pakistan achieved by keeping their militaries in standoff mode over the last few years?

It is two years since the Pulwama attack. According to India, there were more than 5,000 ceasefire violations in 2020 and 3,000 in 2019. According to Pakistan, India was responsible for more than 3,000 ceasefire violations in 2020. Data relating to loss of human lives, local economy and related issues due to these ceasefire violations across the LoC would indicate the violent nature of the LoC. It appears that the lack of a clear political goal or the failure to achieve one through the military standoff is a primary reason for the two militaries to return to ceasefire mode.

Imran on a different trip

Third, what would be Pakistan’s game plan in agreeing to a military ceasefire, and beyond? Though Pakistan has been repeatedly talking about a dialogue with India, during recent years, especially since August 2019, it has succeeded in building a new Kashmir narrative at the global level. There is a predominant sense within Pakistan that they have finally placed India on the backfoot in Kashmir, and at the international level. When Imran Khan became Prime Minister, there was a strong belief that since Musharraf, Pakistan had lost its bargaining position and a political pivot in Kashmir. Imran has been repeatedly emphasizing to the domestic audience how successive governments gave up Pakistan’s principled position on Kashmir.

Besides working on an international Kashmir narrative, the State has also been working on creating a Kashmir schizophrenia within Pakistan. There has been a State push to build this domestic narrative and support and placing the PTI as the saviour of Pakistan’s principled position on Kashmir. Renaming Kashmir (now they refer to it as Indian Illegally-occupied Jammu and Kashmir – IIOJK) and with a new map, the PTI government has been pumping up passions. Imran also has stated that there would no dialogue unless New Delhi reinstated Article 370.

Even if one has to take the public rhetoric of peace and dialogue by Imran Khan and Gen. Bajwa have been talking about, what would be Islamabad’s dialogue position? Also, was Imran aware of what is happening on the LoC? When the two DGsMO issued the ceasefire note in February, Imran Khan was on a state visit to Sri Lanka. His statements on India and dialogue with India did not hint that something was afoot on the LoC.

Nonetheless, the ceasefire is a welcome development and can be built on. The low-hanging fruits are resuming cross-LoC interactions – the bus and trade services; they should also be made substantial. Started with much fanfare, both the interactions – the movement of people and goods across the two parts of Kashmir – had declined. Now that the ceasefire has resumed, let the cross-LoC interactions resume. Let us talk about a larger Indo-Pak peace process once we strengthen these interactions.

(The writer is Professor & Dean, School of Conflict and Security Studies, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru)