Supreme Court of India.
Credit: PTI Photo
New Delhi: The Supreme Court has said a trial court must act to issue summons against an accused in exercise of the power Section 319 of the CrPC, once live evidence evinces a prima-facie case stronger than mere suspicion. Although this power is extraordinary and has to be exercised with circumspection, yet it is neither illusory nor deferential to investigative conclusions, it emphasised.
A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and K V Vishwanathan pointed out Section 319 CrPC enabled a criminal court, once seized of the matter, to bring before it any individual whose complicity becomes apparent from the evidence that emerges in court.
"It is an exception to the general rule that an accused stands trial only upon charge-sheet and committal; its object is to ensure that the trial does not proceed without a participant who, on the material now available, appears to share criminal liability," the bench said.
The court allowed an appeal by Harjinder Singh, complainant-father of the deceased Dharminder Singh against November 21, 2023 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The HC quashed summons issued against Varinder Singh for abetment to suicide of the appellant's son.
It was alleged that the deceased faced an acid attack on March 13, 2016 and the proposed accused on May 10, 2016 taunted the deceased, stating that he and his family “should die of shame” for not having taken action against the acid-attack assailants.
The deceased, thereafter, became distressed and allegedly ended his life.
Having examined the matter, the bench said, "We believe that the High Court placed decisive reliance on the investigation dossier and characterised the May 10, 2016 episode as mere “teasing”. Such a description underplays both the content and the effect of the words spoken."
The court pointed out, if the allegations is true, telling a physically challenged man that he and his family should die, and doing so in the immediate aftermath of a grievous acid attack, is not banter.
"Sensitivity to the social context, where honour and shame weigh heavily, was called for. The offence, no doubt, will have to be established at the trial. The trial court will also decide whether on facts the offence is established," the bench said.
Having regard to the purpose of Section 319 CrPC, the bench said, "We see no infirmity in the order of the Trial Court. On the contrary, non-summoning of the proposed accused would have risked a truncated trial and a possible failure of justice."
The High Court, by elevating unproved defence documents above sworn testimony, adopted an approach that was neither consistent with the text of Section 319 CrPC nor consonant with the realities of a case involving a vulnerable victim. The court’s intervention, in effect, foreclosed the prosecution from testing the alibi and deprived the trial court of jurisdiction expressly conferred upon it, the bench said.
The proposed accused put forth alibi that he was present elsewhere on the fateful date and produced CCTV footages, parking slip etc. The police also found him "innocent".
In a 17-page judgment on May 6, 2025, Justice Nath on behalf of the bench, noted, on the fateful date, the proposed accused, with others, stopped a car, confronted the deceased and, in the Punjabi vernacular, told him that he and his family ought to drown themselves for failing to retaliate.
The appellant-complainant described the immediate impact of those words: the deceased broke down, secluded himself, and a few hours later left home never to return alive.
The bench said the alibi, which is in the nature of a defence; the burden to establish it rests squarely on the accused.
"The abetment to suicide is not an offence committed at a single moment. It may consist of a build-up of psychological pressure culminating in self-destruction, and the law punishes that build-up wherever and whenever it occurs," it said.
The proposed accused contended that the police, having once accepted the alibi, were the best judges of its authenticity and that their conclusion should not be lightly brushed aside.
Rejecting the argument, the bench said, "This submission overlooks the scheme of the CrPC. Once cognizance is taken and trial commences, the investigating agency’s view yields to the court’s independent assessment. If, in the midst of that trial, evidence implicating a new participant surfaces, the court is duty-bound to act on it. Section 319 CrPC would be rendered otiose if an investigating officer’s earlier opinion could freeze the array of accused for all time."
In the case, the bench opined indeed, it is difficult to conceive of what stronger material could be demanded at the summoning stage short of a confession.
"The threshold is not proof beyond reasonable doubt; it is the appearance of involvement which is apparent from evidence adduced in the proceeding. That threshold was satisfied here," the bench said.