Indian Navy personnel watch a demonstration during Navy Day celebrations in Mumbai, India,.
Credit: Reuters photo
Even as we contemplate current developments along our unsettled northern boundary with China, and the political turbulence afflicting our close neighbourhood, it is important to retain focus on India’s historically neglected maritime domain, which is destined to play a critical role in future regional outcomes. There could be no better occasion for “maritime musings” than the ongoing Navy Week 2024.
It was on December 4, 1971, that a squadron of the navy’s missile boats undertook an audacious missile attack on Karachi harbour, sinking Pakistani warships, setting alight fuel tanks, and blockading the port. Thereafter no Pakistani warship dared venture out, nor could merchant ships approach the harbour. In eastern waters, the aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, and her escorts choked off seaward entry/egress from East Pakistan, and attacked airfields, harbours, shipping, and riverine traffic, expediting the surrender of the Pakistani army.
This is also an appropriate occasion to recall our maritime heritage. From the South Indian Emperor Rajendra Chola to the Zamorins of Calicut, and their sea captains of the Kunjali Marakkar clan, to the 17th century Maratha ‘Sarkhel’ or admiral, Kanhoji Angre, India has produced some outstanding maritime figures. This mention of the past is necessary to highlight the subsequent, collective lapse of memory, which led our rulers to believe that India was a “continental power”, and that a navy was of little importance.
India’s Maritime Awakening
India’s “maritime awakening” was triggered, not by a sudden epiphany, but by a series of events, starting with the Bangladesh War and continuing with the globalization of India’s economy in the 1990s, the drama of rampant piracy, the trauma of the 2008 sea-borne terror attack on Mumbai, and the spectre of a fast-growing and belligerent Chinese navy. These disruptive developments brought home, to our decision-makers, the significance of the navy as an instrument of state policy.
Today, the navy’s stature as well as operational capability owe much to the fact that its ships are largely designed and built at home. Six state-owned shipyards have, over the past five decades, built over 100 modern warships, ranging from patrol boats and diesel submarines to aircraft carriers, and from tankers to nuclear submarines.
China’s Maritime Ambitions
China’s political leadership has resolutely backed the steady growth of the PLA Navy, and having grasped the reality that “maritime power” is much more than just a navy, has sought to acquire all its essential constituents. Consequently, not only does the PLAN numerically outnumber the US Navy, but China’s vast ship-building industry has also become the world leader, and its merchant marine ranks No. 1 worldwide. China also fields the largest coast guard and the world’s biggest fishing fleet or maritime militia. India, regrettably, lags in most of these aspects, so far.
China also has heavy stakes in the maritime domain. As the world’s “largest manufacturing nation” and “largest trading partner” of 120 nations, China’s industry and economy are totally dependent on shipping, for energy, raw material, and delivery of finished products. Moreover, China has also cast a worldwide net with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These are liabilities that demand PLAN presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the ubiquitous Chinese “research vessels” in these waters, are an ominous precursor.
The Future Indian Navy
The past few years have seen the Indian Navy realize many of its long-cherished objectives, in all three dimensions of maritime capability. As far as surface-warfare and anti-submarine warfare capabilities are concerned, the deliveries of a series of indigenously designed and built, modern destroyers, frigates and corvettes, equipped with advanced sensors and guided weapons have added considerable heft to the fleets. A major shipbuilding achievement was the delivery of the indigenously designed and built aircraft carrier, Vikrant, in 2019.
The alarming decline in underwater capability has been, temporarily, arrested by the addition of half a dozen modern diesel submarines of French design, delivered by Mazagon Docks over the past 3-4 years. Construction of another series of diesel submarines, equipped with “air-independent propulsion” is under active consideration, and should help in preventing further denudation of our conventional submarine force, due to obsolescence. In the nuclear domain, two nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines (SSBNs) are at sea with more to follow. Also on the anvil are several nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), which will provide a major boost to the navy’s anti-ship and land-attack capabilities.
The navy’s aviation wing has been considerably strengthened, by the induction of modern fixed-wing and helicopter platforms, which have significantly enhanced the navy’s long-range patrol, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-ship strike capabilities. Overall, the IN, despite fiscal stringency, has built itself into a modern and capable three-dimensional force, rated as professionally “up to NATO standards”.
By 2047, the centenary of its independence, India may reduce the large economic and technological gaps, but it cannot afford to enter an arms race with China. While the Indian Navy has brought sharp focus on the pursuit of innovation in emerging warfare domains like cyber and space warfare, robotics, and Artificial Intelligence, China has a head start, having made heavy financial and human resource investments in all these fields.
As and when the PLAN has an aircraft carrier to spare, it will establish a quasi-permanent presence in the Indian Ocean, relying for support on client nations. Here, proactive regional “maritime diplomacy” would play an important role in checkmating China’s designs.
As a democracy, a nuclear weapon state, and a significant economic, military, and maritime power, India must stand firm against attempts at hegemony. In its navy, India has a potent deterrent, capable of safeguarding vital national interests. In this context, India’s fortuitous maritime geography bestows distinct advantages that can tilt the strategic balance. Firstly, the Indian Navy is well-placed to dominate the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, as well as the “choke points”, like Hormuz and Malacca, and to threaten shipping. Secondly, while the Indian Navy units will be deployed in home waters, the PLAN will be operating on “exterior lines” that stretch 8000-10,000 km from China.
Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd).
(The writer is a former Chief of the Naval Staff)