Pradeep Kumar Saxena
The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) marks a watershed moment in South Asian geopolitics, ending six decades of water cooperation between India and Pakistan. Once hailed by former US President Dwight D. Eisenhower as "one bright spot in a very depressing world picture,” the IWT, which survived multiple wars and diplomatic crises, has finally succumbed to escalating tensions and Pakistan's weaponisation of water disputes with India.
The IWT was signed in the spirit of goodwill and friendship, wherein India accepted only 18% of the Indus waters despite 69% of the flow originating from its own catchments. However, India's accommodating stance often resulted in concessions that jeopardised its projects, like the Salal Dam, which now stands silted, and the Tulbul Project, which was indefinitely suspended and turned largely obsolete. On the other hand, Pakistan used the IWT as a political tool to systematically impede India's development in the J&K.
This continued intransigence culminated in India's notification last year about its intention to modify the treaty. Pakistan delayed the proceedings on various pretexts. The April 22 carnage at Pahalgam in J&K by terrorists from Pakistan ultimately became the flashpoint, prompting India's unilateral decision to suspend the treaty.
The suspension of the IWT doesn't create overnight changes in water management systems, but it removes significant constraints on India's water strategy.
The treaty's suspension removes design restrictions on dam construction on Western rivers – the Jhelum, Chenab and Indus. Previously, Pakistan objected to every Indian project irrespective of its size. These objections will no longer constrain future projects.
India can now also pursue unrestricted storage on Western rivers, particularly the Jhelum, enabling comprehensive flood control measures in Kashmir Valley. The focus will shift toward full-throttle development of hydropower on Western rivers, especially the Chenab.
Building on existing projects like Baglihar (900 MW) and Kishanganga (330 MW), India has accelerated planning and construction of several projects, including Pakal Dul (1000 MW), Ratle (850 MW), Sawalkote (1856 MW), Kiru (624 MW), Kwar (540 MW), Kirthai I (390 MW), Kirthai II ( 930 MW) and Dugar (500 MW) hydroelectric projects. Beginning from Pakal Dul, which is scheduled for completion next year, the other projects will be commissioned gradually until 2032. This will triple the present hydroelectric capacity on Western rivers.
Projects like expanding the Ranbir Canal and fully utilising the Pratap Canal could further impact water flows into Pakistan. The long-suspended Tulbul Navigation Project, halted since 1987 at Pakistan's request, deserves immediate revival to address Kashmir's development needs and help India gain control over approximately 430 million cubic meters of Jhelum waters.
Most significantly, the treaty's suspension eliminates prohibitions on inter-basin water transfers from Western rivers, creating unprecedented opportunities for India's water resource management.
The Western Rivers remain largely mountainous on the Indian side, providing limited opportunities for irrigation or construction of large dams within their own basins. India is currently conducting feasibility studies for a mega inter-basin water transfer plan that would potentially divert surplus flows from J&K to Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan through a proposed 113-kilometre canal system.
This scheme opens new vistas for transferring a sizeable fraction of the water of Western rivers currently flowing to Pakistan into Indian basins instead.
The proposed transfer promises significant benefits for water resource management, particularly in mitigating water scarcity and drought by enhancing water availability in water-deficient areas and securing supplies for agriculture, domestic consumption, and industrial use.
Within Kashmir, this transfer could help control seasonal flooding by redirecting surplus water, thereby preventing property damage and infrastructure destruction that regularly affect the region.
The integration of hydropower generation facilities with this system would create substantial additional energy resources, addressing India's growing power demands. The large canals and channels required for these transfers could facilitate inland navigation, improving transportation routes and potentially boosting trade and tourism across the beneficiary regions.
The proposed pre-feasibility report will address various engineering challenges inherent in this complex undertaking, and Indian engineers possess the technical capabilities necessary to handle these sophisticated infrastructure requirements.
However, these opportunities come with significant political challenges that require careful management. Inter-basin transfers are likely to intensify interstate water disputes between J&K and other beneficiary states, adding complexity to India's already intricate water-sharing arrangements.
The Indus basin already faces several ongoing disputes over the Ravi-Beas system between Haryana, Punjab, and Rajasthan, including the long-standing Satluj-Yamuna Link Canal controversy. Despite these challenges, the Bhakra Beas Satluj system demonstrates successful joint management by the partner states of Haryana, Punjab, and Rajasthan, providing a viable model for cooperative water resource management.
More recently, the governments of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh have collaborated to construct the Ken-Betwa Link Project with central government assistance, showcasing how interstate cooperation can be achieved through proper dialogue and incentive structures.
A proactive dialogue approach by the Centre, combined with adequate incentives to Jammu and Kashmir, could result in a similar collaborative model that creates a win-win situation for all participating states. This cooperative framework is crucial for managing these complex transfers effectively and sustainably while ensuring equitable benefit distribution among all stakeholders.
The suspension of the IWT represents India's shift from accommodating diplomacy to assertive water management. The challenge now lies in optimising the Indus system's utilisation within India while managing interstate complexities and potential regional tensions. This strategic pivot may well define South Asian water politics for decades to come.
(The writer is India’s former Indus Commissioner. He is presently Senior Consultant in the Ken-Betwa Link Project Authority, Bhopal and Expert Adviser to the Ministry of Jal Shakti on Indus Water Treaty matters.)