The Dalai Lama.
Credit: Reuters Photo
The 14th Dalai Lama realises that he is not getting any younger and yet when asked about his successor, he says he will live beyond 100 and a decision on the matter will be taken then. While one wishes the Dalai Lama a long life, that his institution and persona go beyond Tibetan Buddhism into the realm of geopolitics and more pertinently to India-China relations merits a relook at what India’s plans to safeguard its interests.
The lack of clarity over his succession creates challenges because China has already made plans. The Chinese set the precedent in the case of the Panchen Lama. The Dalai Lama had, in 2011, outlined his plans on how his successor would be chosen. But even today, he holds his cards close to his chest on this strategic issue. Furthermore, the lack of clarity within India on how this issue will be dealt with is disquieting as Tibet is central to India-China relations.
Recently, Sikyong Penpa Tsering, leader of the Central Tibetan Administration, argued in an interview that the Dalai Lama has taken different stances on the issue of succession, as “China cannot handle unpredictability”. He notes that the Dalai Lama talks about emanation, which means choosing somebody before one’s demise, and also about reincarnation. The Government of India has also been noncommittal about its take on the succession.
There is no doubt, as Sikyong states, “India is concerned” and “India has a stake in this”. This is because the Dalai Lama stays in India and his presence here irks the Chinese. Flowing from China’s increasing efforts to control religious life in Tibet, in 2007, Order No. 5 on “Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas of Tibetan Buddhism” was issued. Articles 5 and 9 of Order No. 5 make it clear that living Buddhas of high order will only be approved at the very top of the Communist Party of China.
In the case of the Dalai Lama, China has argued that the Golden Urn will decide his successor. Pertinently, this method was used only in the case of the 11th and 12th Dalai Lama. In Tibetan Buddhism, the process involves either emanation or reincarnation. China also has in place an aggressive global campaign via the World Buddhist Forum to claim its hold over Buddhism. Tagged to this is the strategy to use China’s economic heft to warn nations not to host the 14th Dalai Lama on their soil and follow Beijing’s lead on his successor.
Even if the next Dalai Lama is ‘born’ in China, India will still have a stake in the matter. Locating India’s Tibet policy is thus important. The existing policy is episodic and lacks consistency. Overcoming this lacuna will require high-level contact between the Dalai Lama and the Government of India, as well as with the Sikyong. The best course of action would be to have the External Affairs Minister on the job.
A policy review
Resetting India’s policy on China from the Tibet angle, however, has its challenges. For instance, there is a suggestion to rename India’s border with China, as the India-Tibet Border. This would certainly be in line with the 1914 Shimla Agreement. But post-1951 when China occupied Tibet and after the 1962 border war, a Line of Actual Control divides India and China. Thus, an entire review of India’s policy towards China must occur.
That a political will to move forward on ties with China exists was demonstrated with the October agreement on Demchok and Depsang. As the EAM noted in his speech in the Lok Sabha on December 3, non-alternation of the status quo unilaterally, respect and adherence of the LAC by both the sides, and the need to respect and adhere to the agreements that were arrived at earlier remain the key principles for India.
The boundary question is, therefore, at the forefront of the bilateral relationship between India and China. Other aspects that demand equal attention include the growing trade deficit and Chinese investments in India. While most of these are covered by different stakeholders in the government, the presence of the Dalai Lama and Tibetans in India has remained mostly the domain of the intelligence agencies, MHA and MEA. While the China Study Group and the Tibet Study Group regularly discuss policy options, it is time for a thorough political review at the highest level of the government on India’s stand on the Dalai Lama’s succession.
(The writer is a former director, National Security Council Secretariat)