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India and China in a strategic thawOn its conclusion, the summit adopted the Tianjin Declaration, which strongly condemned the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack and emphasised coordinated action against terrorism, alongside outlining a series of cooperative initiatives among SCO members.
Imran Khurshid
Last Updated IST
DH ILLUSTRATION
DH ILLUSTRATION

The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, marked a notable moment in Sino-Indian relations. On its conclusion, the summit adopted the Tianjin Declaration, which strongly condemned the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack and emphasised coordinated action against terrorism, alongside outlining a series of cooperative initiatives among SCO members. What captured the attention of international observers, however, was the grand reception accorded to Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the unusually cordial body language exhibited by the Chinese leadership towards India.

Given the lingering mistrust in India stemming from the Galwan Valley clashes and China’s recent support for Pakistan during Operation Sindoor, expectations were initially cautious. Yet, the SCO summit demonstrated a clear effort by Beijing to improve ties with New Delhi. Chinese state media highlighted the importance of focusing on long-term cooperation, trade, and mutual development rather than border disputes. Modi’s engagement with Xi Jinping included discussions on four guiding principles proposed by Xi to enhance bilateral ties: strengthening strategic communication and deepening mutual trust, expanding exchanges and cooperation to achieve mutual benefit, accommodating each other’s concerns to uphold peaceful coexistence, and strengthening multilateral cooperation to safeguard common interests.

These principles were positively received by India and represented a significant step towards restoring confidence in the bilateral relationship. China’s approach was markedly different from previous interactions, when disagreements over statements and other issues often led to friction. In June, New Delhi refused to endorse the joint declaration at the SCO defence ministers’ meeting in Qingdao, China, because it omitted any reference to the Pahalgam terror attack, claimed by TRF operatives linked to Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba. In contrast, at Tianjin, Beijing ensured that Pakistan did not raise contentious issues directed at India and that the Pahalgam attack was explicitly condemned in the joint declaration, signalling a willingness to recalibrate its approach towards New Delhi.

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Strategic reasons underpin China’s outreach. As highlighted by former Indian foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale in his book The Long Game: How the Chinese Negotiate with India, “China rarely perceives India independently; it always sees India through the prism of its rivalry with the United States.” China’s outreach, therefore, can be seen as part of a broader effort to recalibrate influence in South Asia while countering American strategic leverage, especially since the outreach occurred only after India’s US ties deteriorated following the imposition of the 50% tariffs on Indian goods.

China continues to use international forums like the SCO as platforms for power projection and global signalling. Similar to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, these summits are leveraged to showcase China as a stable, predictable, and influential actor in this disruptive era. Given India’s status as a consequential SCO member and its increasing geopolitical significance, outreach to India becomes even more essential for a successful SCO summit and broader strategic messaging.

Recent Chinese support to Pakistan, particularly during Operation Sindoor, generated significant criticism in the Indian media and public discourse. Reports of real-time military assistance and other forms of support were widely condemned. Moreover, China also faced backlash from its own population when it announced that it would provide Pakistan with fifth-generation fighter jets at a discounted rate. Its strategic outreach at Tianjin represents an effort to rebuild its image in India by emphasising cooperative rhetoric and signalling a willingness to focus on mutually beneficial aspects of the bilateral relationship. By doing so, China aims to present itself as a pragmatic, responsible, and constructive power.

China’s outreach also reflects a strategic desire to cool tensions along its western borders. By reducing friction with India, Beijing can prioritise other pressing challenges such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and global trade dynamics. Positive engagement with India ensures a more stable neighbourhood and allows China to redirect attention and resources to areas of higher strategic concern.

A wary embrace

From India’s standpoint, China’s motives are secondary. What matters is tangible improvement in relations – respect for India’s core national security concerns, recognition of India as an equal partner, and concrete actions rather than rhetorical gestures. As neighbouring countries sharing extensive land borders, China and India have an added strategic imperative to maintain stable and constructive engagement. India, as a regional power with economic and strategic interests, remains committed to engaging China. At the same time, it will continue to assess whether China’s actions align with its professed intentions.

A cost-benefit analysis suggests that China gains more from constructive engagement with India than by using Pakistan as a proxy. Supporting Pakistan against India may provide short-term leverage, but it undermines China’s long-term strategic and economic interests in the region. Pragmatic cooperation with India – through trade, investment, and diplomatic engagement – offers greater dividends for Beijing. If China seeks to turn its words into action, it must align behaviour with rhetoric.

The SCO summit provided a rare window of opportunity for Sino-Indian rapprochement. Both nations, with ancient civilisations, shared histories, and regional influence, have the potential to reshape the political and economic landscape of Asia. China’s outreach, if genuine, could mark a turning point towards a relationship based on mutual respect, equality, and pragmatic cooperation.

However, the true test lies in implementation. Diplomatic gestures, statements in the media, and summit declarations must be followed by real, measurable actions. Only then will India-China relations move beyond a diplomatic theatre to become a constructive partnership that benefits both countries and contributes to regional stability and global prosperity.

(The writer is an associate research fellow at the International Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi)

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(Published 06 September 2025, 06:02 IST)