Seshadri Chari reads between the lines on big national and international developments from his vantage point in the BJP and the RSS.
Credit: DH Illustration
Bilateral relations between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were established in 1950, when Pakistan was among the first few countries to sever diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and recognise the PRC as official China.
Beijing needed every small and big country in Asia to support its existence. This relationship between an Islamic republic and an atheist Communist state, as different as chalk and cheese as far as culture, civilisation, and religion were concerned, strengthened gradually as they both saw the need to unite against a common enemy – India.
A year after the Chinese aggression on India in 1962, Beijing decided to resolve all border disputes with Pakistan through the Sino-Pakistan Agreement of 1963, and provide military assistance to Pakistan, which began in early 1966, a year after the 1965 misadventure of Pakistan’s war with India. But Beijing realised the military asymmetry between India and Pakistan and refused to be drawn into the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War foisted on India by Islamabad. Nevertheless, the Beijing-Islamabad Strategic Alliance agreed upon in 1972 paved the way for economic cooperation and civil nuclear cooperation in the power sector.
But the strategic partnership turned into a relationship between ‘Iron Brothers’ after Xi Jinping’s visit in 2015, when he rolled out the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as part of his flagship Belt & Road Initiative global outreach project. The CPEC connects Pakistan and China through a highway that links Kashgar to Khunjerab and Gwadar Port in Balochistan. CPEC is not a favour extended to Balochistan but largely serves China – most of its trade, especially that of oil, will be done through Gwadar.
Beijing has turned towards the Pakistani army for the protection of its men and assets in the region, but in vain. It has been seen as coordinating efforts to establish a China-Pakistan-Afghanistan alliance for regional stability. But the real agenda is for a counter-terrorism base in Afghanistan to weaken the Turkistan Islamic Party, which has been spearheading a movement to free the Xinjiang province from China.
Meanwhile, Pakistan has moved closer to the US after Operation Sindoor, which broke the back of its homegrown terror outfits and exposed the limitations of China’s military technology support. China will also be wary because Pakistan may trade these defence technologies with American agencies and expose China’s defence systems. After all, according to unconfirmed reports, after the 2011 Abbottabad raid, Chinese engineers were allowed to examine the remnants of a downed US stealth-modified Black Hawk helicopter. Hence, it is likely that the Iron Brothers may downscale defence trade and limit their engagement to economic and anti-terrorism activities.
But even in these areas, the two countries don’t seem to be seeing eye to eye. As concerns rise over Pakistan’s inability to protect the lives of Chinese engineers and assets, Beijing has stepped back from financing the Main Line-1 railway project, which connects Karachi to Peshawar. It is also pressuring Islamabad to allow Chinese security personnel to be deployed in CPEC project areas in Balochistan as protection from terrorist attacks. This will pitch the Baloch Liberation Army in confrontation with Chinese military personnel. Besides, the US is already eyeing rare earth and other natural resources, including the much-publicised oil, in Balochistan.
Reports said China’s plans to deploy its navy in Gwadar, as part of its ‘String of Pearls’ strategy in the Indian Ocean Region, were resisted by Pakistan, as Islamabad’s counter-demand to Beijing, to share second-strike nuclear capabilities, was rejected by China. Pakistan also denied the Chinese navy from making a port call at Gwadar during a joint naval Sea Guardians III exercise, probably due to American pressure.
Recent geopolitical developments – India, Russia, and China coming closer on regional and trade issues, Pakistan moving closer to the US at the cost of its security and financial dependence on China, India and Afghanistan joining hands to fight terrorism and improve trade relations, and a likely escalation of the military conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the wake of Islamabad’s military action against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan – will have a profound impact on China’s foreign policy, compelling Beijing to review its relations with its Iron Brother.
Guided by transactional interests, China’s CPEC and other defence and commercial initiatives with Pakistan add the element of a deal-making approach to its foreign policy. Beijing feels, and perhaps rightly so, that Pakistan’s utility for China’s security and strategy in Asia and the Indian Ocean Region is long over.
The writer reads between the lines on big national and international developments from his vantage point in the BJP and the RSS.
Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.