Srikanth Kondapalli The JNU Prof has been Peking behind the Bamboo Curtain for 30 years  @Sri_Kondapalli
A storm is brewing around a race for leadership in Asia, with China rising further as a global force, at the Centre of it. The immediate trigger was Japan’s “iron lady” Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s recent statement in Parliament that China’s military invasion of Taiwan would be an “existential crisis” to Japan. This is possible as any invasion of Taiwan could disturb the Indo-Pacific sea lanes of communications that now converge on Taiwan. Japan, in the 1930s, assiduously protected these trade routes.
Xue Jian, the Chinese consul general at Osaka, said “that filthy neck be cut off”. While this comment was removed from X, the damage was done to bilateral relations. Like other “wolf warriors” before, who advocated aggressive nationalist sentiments, Xue’s comments prevailed in China, as seen in the continuing wrangling. Hectic diplomatic activities followed, and calls were made for a ban on Japanese products and tourist flows.
It was only a week ago that the leaders of China and Japan met at the APEC summit in South Korea, where they reiterated a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests”. This edifice is falling. The Japan-China spat draws on domestic political turmoil that could also affect regional security, global power equations, and economic development. China’s orchestrated campaign against Japan is a reflection of domestic political distractions. Last month, China held its delayed Fourth Plenum meeting, which witnessed a formal dismissal of large numbers of high-level military officials, an indication of the brewing discontent, both in the communist party factions as well as in the armed forces. This needs to be stemmed, and an external distraction like Japan is necessary.
To drum up nationalism, China has been conducting massive anti-Japanese military parades in Beijing, as in 2015 and 2025. China’s social media had hyped up demands to seize the Ryukyu Islands, as with territories in Russia, India, and others. Its naval and air forces have been mobilising might to dominate the Bashi Channel and Miyako Straits. The weaponising of sea lanes of communications is intensifying.
At the economic level, the latest frictions could impact bilateral trade, investment, and markets. Over 31,000 cutting-edge Japanese companies are operating in China, the largest number globally for Japan. They have elevated China’s technological prowess. Japan’s aid to China is more than $40 billion, while direct investments surpassed $100 billion and bilateral trade $292 billion in 2024. Despite such interdependence, China does not appear satisfied. In 2010, it banned the export of rare earth metals to Japan over the Senkaku Islands controversy.
Globally, United States President Donald Trump exerted pressure on Japan to scale down on Taiwan. This was in the aftermath of the October 31 US-China deal with President Xi Jinping at Busan, where Beijing assured the US to resume rare earth metal exports, thus increasing the US dependence on China. If the Busan deal signified a global power transition between the US and China, the Japan-China row is an assertion of China’s hold over the region.
The current US position on its military ally in East Asia is way farther than it had articulated under the Obama Administration. Obama, at that time, clarified to Yomiuri Shimbun that the Senkaku Islands come under Article 5 of the bilateral treaty and that the US opposes any unilateral attempts to change Japan’s administration of these islands. While the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan are different issues, the previous US security signals avoided strategic ambiguity, while Trump is putting the brakes on Japan.
China is also said to be miffed with Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong’s statement on Japan as a trusted great power and that historical issues have been put aside. While Southeast Asia has come to terms with Japan, China refuses to do so.
Japan defeated China in 1895 and thus questioned the Middle Kingdom. More significantly, China fears that, despite its recent phenomenal rise in economy, technology, and military, the Japanese bushido style could constrain China’s ambitions to dominate. Taiwan is a blip in this scheme of things. Like the UK-France rivalry in the 19th century, the China-Japan rivalry is acute in Asia.
With India, despite recent efforts at normalisation, a local “wolf warrior” stirred up the pot by detaining an Arunachal Pradesh resident, Pema Wang Thongdok, who was transiting through Shanghai. China had not explained why it broke international conventions on the right of passage.
The emerging tensions in East Asia are likely to impact India. In any future trouble with China on the border dispute, Beijing’s behaviour would be aggressive – weaponising tourism, banning rare earth metals for Indian automobiles and electronics, providing critical support to South Asian countries, and deploying naval fleets in the Indian Ocean. The 2020 Galwan clashes resulted in a washout of bilateral relations for nearly five years. India needs to be prepared for such contingencies.