The Great Indian Bustard.
Credit: iStock Photo
The Supreme Court’s judgment in M K Ranjitsinh & Others vs. Union of India & Others, 2025, on the protection of the great Indian bustard (GIB), is an important environmental ruling in recent years, primarily for its adoption of an ecocentric approach.
The GIB’s decline is not attributable to a single factor but to a combination of threats: human intrusion into grassland ecosystems, unplanned infrastructure expansion, habitat loss and fragmentation, and fatal collisions with overhead power lines.
Classified as Critically Endangered on the IUCN Red List, current estimates suggest that only about 50–249 mature individuals remain in the wild, with recent observations indicating that the number may be even lower. This makes the GIB one of the rarest birds in the world.
A key aspect of the judgment lies in the Court’s interpretation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) under the Companies Act, 2013.
The ruling clarifies that CSR must necessarily include corporate environmental responsibility, thereby broadening the notion of ‘community’ under CSR to include the natural environment. Schedule VII of the Act lists activities that qualify as CSR, including environmental sustainability, ecological balance, protection of flora and fauna, animal welfare, agroforestry, and conservation of natural resources. By placing these activities within the scope of “social responsibility”, the law implicitly recognises that human beings neither own the environment nor possess an unrestricted right to exploit it.
This interpretation finds constitutional support in Article 51A(g), which casts a fundamental duty on every citizen to protect and improve the natural environment and to show compassion for living creatures. In this context, corporate spending on environmental protection cannot be viewed merely as charity or benevolence; it is a constitutional obligation. Social responsibility and environmental responsibility are, therefore, inseparable.
The judgment also reflects a significant shift in judicial approach. Moving away from a purely prohibitory approach, the Court has adopted a more scientific and targeted strategy. In April 2021, interim directions were issued restricting overhead transmission lines and advocating underground cabling to safeguard bird populations. The Union government opposed these directions, contending that their blanket application would adversely affect energy development in regions with high solar and wind potential.
In a subsequent order in March 2024, the Court observed that “while balancing two equally crucial goals—the conservation of the GIB on one hand, with the conservation of the environment as a whole on the other—it is necessary to adopt a holistic approach which does not sacrifice either of the two goals at the altar of the other.” It cautioned against issuing sweeping directions and, in view of the far-reaching implications of a blanket prohibition on overhead transmission lines, held that the earlier direction needed to be recalled. Accordingly, the Court directed the constitution of an expert committee to balance the non-negotiable need to protect the GIB with the equally pressing need of sustainable development, mainly in light of India’s commitment under international conventions.
This ruling reveals a noticeable change in judicial oversight. Rather than direct and extensive intervention, the Court has assumed a restrained and supervisory role, relying on expert committee findings. Environmental constitutionalism does not require courts to replace administrators; it requires them to ensure that executive action remains within constitutional limits and is not arbitrary. In this case, the Court has recognised the limits of judicial power while reaffirming its role as the guardian of the Constitution.
Another dimension of the ruling is its interpretation of Article 21. While courts have long held that the right to life includes the right to a healthy environment, the Supreme Court has gone a step further by recognising the right to be free from the adverse effects of climate change as integral to the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21.
Importantly, the judgment does not elevate renewable energy above biodiversity, nor does it prioritise biodiversity at the cost of renewable energy. Instead, it creates space for their competing coexistence. Yet, concerns regarding enforcement remain. Indian environmental jurisprudence is often ambitious in issuing directions but noticeably weak in implementation. Unlike courts in some developed countries, Indian courts lack robust institutional mechanisms for continuous monitoring beyond periodic compliance reports.
There are broader policy concerns as well. The Court’s intervention to mediate between wildlife protection and renewable energy development points to systemic failures in environmental governance and regulatory mechanisms. Ideally, environmental impact assessments under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, should identify ecological risks at the planning stage itself, rather than after projects have already been proposed. The GIB’s decline did not happen overnight; it is the outcome of poor planning and the failure to recognise grasslands as important ecosystems.
Beyond judicial oversight, India must integrate ecological data and scientific findings more effectively into infrastructure planning from the outset. EIAs need to be strengthened and treated not as a procedural formality or mere paperwork, but as an effective planning strategy for conservation. The underlying problem remains unsolved if expert committees function only as post-facto mechanisms to justify flawed planning decisions. For the Great Indian Bustard, the judgment aims to improve the species’ chances of survival – provided its implementation is carried out with seriousness, effectively and efficiently.
(The writer is an advocate)