In the wake of the decolonisation process in the erstwhile third world, the post-colonial State started with a great promise. This promise consisted of lifting millions out of poverty, ignorance, illiteracy and bigotry.
Even Marxists argued that the post-colonial State stood above social structures without bending to the pressures of any one social class. The State was seen as ‘relatively autonomous’ from social structures to begin with.
Such a State was imbued with enthusiasm and energy to carry out the mission of development, poverty alleviation and spreading values of Enlightenment among people.
This was true not only in India or South Asia but also across Africa and even Latin America. The State initially stood in favour of all that was progressive and was a beacon of Enlightenment. This is, however, gradually being hollowed out.
What we are witnessing today is either a gradually evolving crisis of the post-colonial State or a movement towards an authoritarian East Asian-type of ‘developmental State’ or a fundamentalist, bigoted State.
The State was to provide not only economic development but also social and political enlightenment. The State began its journey, except in some cases, such as Pakistan, as a secular State. The post-colonial State was not a theocratic State by any imagination.
First, the relative autonomy of the State from social structures, that is, the social basis of the State, has gradually eroded. The balance of social forces undergirding the State has changed increasingly towards big business in States where the development process progressed.
While economic growth and development certainly percolated downward to some extent, it flowed upwards more disproportionately. This is true particularly in countries such as India, which have been more or less stable over the period since decolonisation.
However, even in countries such as ours, the promises of the State shifted. The State now promises development but not Enlightenment; it promises
better standards of living but not secular values.
There is a qualitative shift in the orientation of the State. And where the State was not stable, for instance in Africa, there was a precipitous decline into civil wars and fundamentalist conflicts, which proved calamitous to the people. Here, the State provides neither development nor Enlightenment values nor basic security to its citizens.
The post-colonial State, where it survived, not only lost its relative autonomy from social structures, but also got hollowed out internally, that is, as an organisation, owing to new reforms that advocated private management practices in public administration.
These advocated a thinner, effective and efficient State, but in the process gave up much of the public spirit of the public organisation that is the State, owing to private sector orientation.
The reforms in the State, following governance overhaul, have not succeeded in Africa, where they initially originated, and continue to face resistance in Latin America and Asia. Therefore, the State not only lost its relative autonomy from social structures but also lost its internal drive as a public-spirited organisation oriented to public good.
The more important problem with the post-colonial State currently is with the values of Enlightenment and secularism that it upheld in the initial years. There has been a devastating shift across the developing countries on this count.
Religious and tribal fundamentalisms of various shades have shaken the foundations of the post-colonial State in Africa. The State in South Asia today is no different. The contagion of fundamentalism is spreading competitively in all directions. The South Asian post-colonial State today is in a crisis. Its core values are shaken and the State is increasingly becoming beholden to fanatics. This is true of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. The secular credentials of the post-colonial State are in tatters.
Thus, the post-colonial State, which began its trajectory as a ‘Bonapartist’ State — a ‘relatively autonomous’ State that stood above class structures and guided the society to greater heights in economic development, poverty alleviation and societal enlightenment — now finds itself in crisis.
Either it is moving in the direction of an East-Asian developmental State, which guarantees economic growth but not political rights, or it is moving in the direction of fundamentalist collapse as in the case of many African States.
The relative autonomy of the State is increasingly eroded by its capitulation to big national and international businesses; its State organisation is being hollowed out owing to new public management governance reforms; and its moral stature is being hollowed out owing to its increasing capitulation to religious fundamentalism. The latter is a contagion that spreads on competitive terms.
The Bonapartist State becomes a class State; the secular State becomes a theocratic State; the public organisation of the State apparatus becomes a private appurtenance; and citizens become consumers of services of that private State.
What does one call it if not a State in crisis? The State is now increasingly at odds with its own stated goals and increasingly astray from its own origins.
Lastly, it is true that it is difficult to speak of the post-colonial State as it was possible to speak in the days immediately in the aftermath of decolonisation. Now, there is an increasing differentiation among developing countries.
In the promise of the post-colonial State lies the lives of millions of poor and ordinary people. With the metamorphosis of the State into either a ‘developmental’ or ‘fundamentalist’ State, or both at once, the lives of millions of poor in the developing world will be affected drastically in the future.
(The author is a professor of political science at the Centre for Political Institutions, Governance and Development, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bengaluru)