Govt-NSCN peace pact: Another accord of discord?

On August 3, 2015, the signing of a historic peace accord between the Union government and Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) took almost everyone by surprise. We know four things about this accord, whose details have not been disclosed: it is a Framework Agreement that provides the broad contours of an acceptable solution, it does not entail a change in Nagaland’s map, it involves only the Isak-Muivah faction of the NSCN, and it is not the first “historic peace accord” signed by a Naga organisation.

Three past agreements – Nine Point Agreement (1947), Sixteen Point Agreement (1960), and Shillong Accord (1975) – failed to resolve the Naga political problem. It is too early to conclude if this latest accord/framework agreement, a product of nearly a hundred rounds of negotiations, will resolve the six-decade old insurgency.

In addition to the NSCN-IM, there are about eleven active and inactive Naga insurgent/“underground” groups in Nagaland and Manipur that are not party to the framework agreement. A number of these groups have a history of discord with the NSCN-IM and also differ ethnically from the latter (the rise of the NSCN-IM as first among equals is a story for another day). In the run-up to the accord, the NSCN-Khaplang led by a Burmese Naga abrogated a longstanding ceasefire and attacked the armed forces. Khaplang also launched a platform to bring together north eastern insurgent groups.

The NSCN-Khole Kitovi, a Nagaland-based faction, is indifferent to the “undignified peace accord” and has warned that the insurgency “would not end through a photo session with the leadership of one group.” While it favours “socio-cultural, spiritual and emotional integration” of Nagas and does not want to alienate Nagaland’s neighbours by claiming their territory, it is opposed to sacrificing the interests of Nagas of Nagaland to fulfil aspirations of others, an allusion to the NSCN-IM’s subservience to the Tangkhul tribe of Manipur.

The over-ground situation is not encouraging either. The divide between Nagas of Nagaland and Manipur has grown over the years. The bitter territorial dispute between Maos of Manipur and (Southern) Angamis of Nagaland, the opposition to the recognition of Rongmeis, originally from Manipur, as a tribe in Nagaland that entitles them to claim quota benefits in government jobs, and the growing opposition to a memorial in Kohima dedicated to Rani Gaidinliu, a Rongmei from Manipur, are the latest reminders of the divide. More generally, the Nagas of Nagaland are challenging pan-Naga organisations dominated by tribes of Manipur, particularly, Tangkhuls.
In light of the above, a number of issues need attention. The structure of the
supra-state Pan-Naga Hoho for the Naga tribes of the North East which, according to the NSCN-IM “would be almost an independent entity – a statutory body with executive authority, separate budget and negotiating power”, is likely to prove the most divisive of them all. The allocation of the seats of this Hoho and its relationship with state legislative assemblies need careful consideration.

Provincial boundaries
If the present Naga Hoho is going to serve as the template for the Pan-Naga Hoho, then Nagaland’s tribes might be reluctant to join the latter. Six tribes led by the Eastern Nagaland Peoples’ Organisation (ENPO) have left the Naga Hoho, while sections of eight other tribes have launched the Nagaland Tribes Council (NTC) to challenge the Naga Hoho.

The second set of issues is related to the government’s purported willingness to form a supra-state body to bring together the Nagas divided by provincial boundaries. Has the government accepted supra-state bodies in principle? Will the principle be applied throughout the country to, say, Kacharis of Assam and Nagaland, Kukis of Assam, Manipur, and Nagaland, and tribes of Central India?

Will the principle also apply to individual Naga tribes such as Rengmas of Nagaland and Assam and Zeliangrongs of Assam, Manipur and Nagaland? What will be the constitutional status of such supra-state bodies? Does the government have numbers to amend the Constitution?

Amendment to the Article 371A, which accords a special constitutional position to Nagaland, is the third important issue. Tuensang (presently divided into four districts) enjoys a special status within Nagaland in so far as the constitution provides for a separate regional council for it and entrusts the governor to protect its interests within the state. This arrangement was abolished in 1974, without a constitutional amendment. The NSCN-IM wants amendments to Article 371A. The Eastern Nagas of Tuensang, who are demanding a separate Frontier Nagaland state, need to be taken into confidence.

Three other issues need to be discussed before the final agreement is signed. The government can and must give amnesty to the NSCN-IM and other groups that join the final agreement, with regard to their role in attacks on the armed forces and civilian administration. But how should the law and order machinery respond if comm-unities such as Kukis and Nagas, whose loved ones were killed by one or the other faction, seek justice from the government?

Also, will the government repeal Armed Forces (Special Powers) Acts (AFSPA) and allow the law to take its course in cases related to armed forces? The second issue relates to the impact of the agreement on the three-decade old Assam-Nagaland border dispute case that is pending in the Supreme Court. Will the Centre ask Assam to withdraw the case? Last, but not the least, is the issue of lack of involvement of Nagaland’s indigenous non-Naga tribal minorities – Kukis and Kacharis – in the peace process. When will the Centre reach out to them?

To conclude, contrary to our Twitter-happy prime minister’s hope, the latest accord does not yet resemble the much awaited “beginning of a new future.”

(The writer teaches at Azim Premji University, Bengaluru)