In the Valley of resentment

Kashmir is normal, in the sense that there are no stone-throwing incidents. Militancy, too, is on its last leg. Yet, the Valley is seething with discontent. You can taste it once you land there. It is difficult to ascribe a single reason. Many factors are responsible for it. The most important one is the general feeling that India is all over, whereas Kashmir had given it control only over three subjects – defence, foreign affairs and communications – according to the 1952 Delhi Agreement.

The complaint is justified because it is for a unit to surrender as much sovereignty as it likes. The federation cannot usurp more subjects on its own. But New Delhi has done precisely that. This is what came in the way of then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Shiekh Abdullah, who were close friends. The Sheikh spent almost 12 years in confinement. Nehru realised his mistake and had the Sheikh stay at the prime minister’s house to make amends.
A similar problem plagues relations between New Delhi and Srinagar. How does a chief minister stay in the good books of the Centre and give the Valley a feeling of independent identity? This is the thought that worries the political parties of the state all the time.
Those who consider Kashmir India’s unalienable part and want to undo Article 370 – which confers a special status on it – are betraying the Constitution on the one hand and the confidence of Kashmiris on the other. Unfortunately, the ruling BJP has a different point of view. Although Prime Minister Narendra Modi has not done anything which would whittle down Kashmir’s autonomy, the fear pervades in the Valley.
This is the main reason why accession to India has come to be questioned seriously. Those who seldom received any response to their slogans of independent Kashmir in the past have many ears to listen today. And, not surprisingly, their number is increasing day by day.  
What New Delhi has to appreciate is that the Kashmiris’ desire to distance themselves from India may not be considered in any meaningful transfer of power from New Delhi to Srinagar. Yet, the impression that the Kashmiris rule themselves has to be sustained. The National Conference waged a long war to get rid of Maharaja Hari Singh and brought to power an icon like Sheikh Abdullah to provide a secular and democratic rule to the state. But the party suffered defeat in the Assembly polls as it was seen too close to New Delhi.
The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) won because its founder, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, kept distance from New Delhi, without alienating it. The Kashmiris voted for him because he gave them a feeling of defiance. Omar Farooq Abdullah, however, had to pay the price of National Conference’s image of being pro-Delhi. Kashmir’s link with India is too close to be able challenge it beyond a point. Still, the opposition, however small, gives the Kashmiris a vicarious satisfaction of defying New Delhi.
Lord Cyril Radcliffe did not attach any importance to Kashmir. He was a judge in London who drew the line between India and Pakistan to establish two separate countries. He told me many years later, during an interview, that he never imagined that Kashmir would assume so much importance as it did.
I recalled this instance when I was in Srinagar a couple of weeks ago to preside over the first anniversary of an Urdu magazine. Urdu has been unceremoniously ousted from all the states, including Punjab where it was the main language until some years ago. In fact, the language lost its importance in India soon after Pakistan made it as its national language.
Kashmir feels strongly about New Delhi’s step-motherly treatment meted out to the language. And, it is generally believed that the region is languishing in neglect because Urdu is considered the language of Muslims. If New Delhi were to own and encourage Urdu, the Kashmiris would have at least one reason less to feel aggrieved.
Plagued by alienation
People are generally poor there like in the rest of India and they want jobs, which they realise will come only through development, including tourism. But they are not themselves picking up the gun or any other weapon to drive militants out.
One, they are afraid of them and, two, there is a feeling that what the militants are trying to do is to give them an identity. Therefore, the criticism that there is no resistance to the militants from within the Valley should be understandable because it is part of the alienation.
It is unfortunate that New Delhi did not give the package which it had announced after the devastation by the Kashmir floods. There was no criticism by the media of not honouring the promise. No Indian leader, too, pointed out to New Delhi that it has reneged from the promise. All these are interpreted in Kashmir as a deliberate sign of cursory attitude.
I still believe that the 1952 agreement can improve part of the situation in the state. The Kashmiri youth, who are angry over the state’s status as well the situation, can be won over by the assurance that the entire Indian market is available to them for business or service.
But this alone may not do. New Delhi will have to withdraw all the Acts relating to the fields other than defence, foreign affairs and communications. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act which was promulgated some 25 years ago to meet the extraordinary situation in the state is still in operation. Were the government to withdraw the act, it would not only placate the Kashmirs, but would also make the security forces more responsible.
Normalcy is also a state of mind. The Kashmiris must themselves feel that their identity is not under attack and that New Delhi realises the importance of what the Kashmiris desire. The restoration of the 1953 agreement giving New Delhi the control of only 3 subjects may control the situation which, however, if not attended to, may deteriorate.