HC Registrar General has no power to suo motu initiate action against judicial officers: Supreme Court

New Delhi: The Supreme Court has ruled that the Registrar General of a High Court has absolutely no authority to independently initiate disciplinary proceedings against any judicial officer, either under the constitutional framework or service rules.

A bench of Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi observed that the power of control over district courts and subordinate judiciary under Article 235 of the Constitution vests exclusively with the “High Court”, meaning the Chief Justice and companion Judges.

The Registrar General can only act as per directions or authorisation from the Chief Justice or a committee of judges.

The apex court made these observations on May 18, 2026 while dismissing an appeal filed by the Uttarakhand High Court challenging the reinstatement of judicial officer Deepali Sharma.

In its judgment on January 6, 2026, a division bench of the Uttarakhand High Court had set aside disciplinary proceedings against Sharma, holding that the inquiry was void from the very beginning as it was initiated suo motu by the Registrar General without any authorisation from the Chief Justice or a judges’ committee.

The Supreme Court upheld this view, declaring the entire disciplinary action “non-est in law” and “void ab initio”.

“The Registrar General of the High Court has absolutely no authority... to suo motu initiate disciplinary action against any judicial officer. He can only act on behalf of the Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Court,” the bench emphasised.

The court noted with concern that the Registrar General, who initiated the inquiry, was not even examined during the proceedings, and no material was produced to show that he had obtained any order from the Chief Justice or a disciplinary committee.

While acknowledging the serious nature of the allegations against Sharma — who was accused of mistreating a minor girl kept as domestic help — the court said the fundamental procedural lapse rendered the entire inquiry unsustainable.

“We may observe that in a departmental inquiry held in accordance with law... if such kind of allegations are proved, there can be no exception but to approve the imposition of major punishment,” the bench remarked.

However, it added that the inquiry in this case suffered from a fatal jurisdictional defect. The court clarified that it was not going into the merits of the charges or the evidence, as the very initiation of the proceedings was invalid.

Sharma, who was appointed as a judicial officer in 2008, has already been reinstated following the High Court’s order.

Taking into account the totality of circumstances, including her claim of being a victim of harassment by senior officers, the court declined to interfere with her reinstatement.

The court, however, made it clear that it was setting aside the disciplinary action on a pure question of law and not on the facts of the case.