No cognisable offence made out against Anurag Thakur, Parvesh Verma: Supreme Court on hate speech row

New Delhi: The Supreme Court has found that no cognisable offence was made out against BJP leaders Anurag Thakur and Parvesh Verma for their alleged hate speeches over the anti-CAA protest in Delhi in 2020.

BJP MP Thakur is a former union minister and Verma, a minister in the current Delhi government.

In its April 29, 2026 judgment on a batch of pleas concerning hate speeches, a bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta also dealt with the petition filed by CPI(M) leaders Brinda Karat and K M Tiwari who challenged the June 2022 verdict of the Delhi High Court.

The court affirmed the Delhi High Court's findings, which stated the BJP leaders' remarks did not incite communal violence or public disorder.

On a careful consideration of the materials placed on record, including the alleged speeches, the status report of February 26, 2020, the court said it is in agreement with the conclusion that no cognisable offence was made out.

A trial court on August 26, 2020, dismissed the complaint against Verma and Thakur, holding that the same was not maintainable in law in the absence of prior sanction from the competent authority to prosecute the named accused.

The high court on June 13, 2022, rejected the pleas of Karat and Tiwari for registering FIRs against them for hate speech, observing that “the statements were not directed against any specific community nor did they incite violence or public disorder.”

The high court said that for offences falling within the ambit of Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the power under Section 156(3) of CrPC to direct the registration of an FIR and investigation could not be exercised without prior sanction.

In its judgment, the apex court clarified the requirement of prior sanction arises only at the stage of the magistrate taking cognisance, not before.

“The scheme of CrPC does not contemplate any embargo on the direction for registration of an FIR or the conduct of investigation at the pre-cognisance stage. To hold otherwise would amount to introducing a restriction not envisaged by the legislature,” the bench said.

The court emphasised the requirement of sanction is a condition precedent only for taking cognisance and not for the registration of an FIR or for the conduct of investigation.

“Any interpretation that makes the registration of an FIR contingent upon prior sanction would invert this statutory scheme and render the provisions relating to investigation unworkable,” the bench said.

The court said the position of law is unequivocal.

"Where information discloses the commission of a cognisable offence, registration of an FIR is mandatory. The police, in such circumstances, have no discretion in the matter, either under the statutory scheme or by way of interpretative latitude,” the bench said.

The court said investigating agencies, being creatures of statute, are bound by the duties and obligations cast upon them under the law.

“They cannot evade or dilute these statutory obligations by resorting to provisions which are inapplicable at the stage of investigation. Any such approach undermines the rule of law and erodes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice,” the bench said.

While the requirement of sanction serves as a safeguard against frivolous or vexatious prosecution at the stage of cognisance, it cannot be permitted to operate as a shield to prevent the very initiation of the investigative process where a cognisable offence is disclosed, the court said.

The court also said that failure on the part of the authorities to perform their statutory duties at the threshold stage not only defeats the legislative intent but also places the ordinary citizen in a position of vulnerability against institutional inaction.