<p>The development of strategic infrastructure is the key to building India’s deterrent posture and the assertion of its territorial and sovereign rights. India’s northern borders have posed a challenge to its quest for achieving the desired levels of infrastructural connectivity, both for its people and its military. Several organs of the State have worked diligently to build the infrastructural network in the remote areas, but have failed to match up to the Chinese efforts in Tibet and Xinjiang, particularly the road and rail connectivity at the last mile.</p><p>There are several reasons ascribed to this differential. Prominent amongst these have been our proclivity to tread with caution along the border areas, the paucity of resources and technology to cut through difficult geological formations, and environmental concerns about the fragility of the Indian Himalayan Region (IMR). The concerns were valid at a time, but this must change now. The policy choices are stark and clear – ramp up the infrastructural deficit before it is too late to convincingly secure our borders and deter China from taking advantage of the differential. </p>.Rails to the Edge: Laying tracks to frontiers. <p>There are a few aspects that inhibit us from gathering momentum to build a comparable posture along the Himalayas. First, India’s policy makers need to ascertain the precise infrastructural differential vis-à-vis China along our northern borders. Only a fair assessment can help draw clarity on the magnitude and statement of the problem. Second, infrastructure development has to be multidimensional and multimodal these days. Road, air and rail links, communication and electricity nodes, water and oil pipelines, meteorological and space earth stations, and warehousing and billeting capacity – all of which can sustain acute weather conditions – fit into this definition. This requires a comprehensive State policy and agency to drive outcomes collaboratively. And third, it also necessitates looking beyond a BRO-centric approach, by allowing participation of private players, to usher in new ideas, technology and agile work practices. </p><p>For sure, India needs to take a cue from Chinese efforts in taming the Tibetan massif. Tibet’s rail network today stands at 4,100 kilometres, while its road network is approximately 120,000 kilometres. China recently announced the construction of a railway line between Hotan and Shigatse, spanning the northern edge of the Himalayas, which will serve only half a million people. The project, estimated at RMB 400 billion, far exceeds the annual GDP of Tibet. While some might call it wasteful expenditure, it advances a few Chinese strategic objectives: it unlocks Tibet’s vast mineral wealth, currently hindered by transportation costs, while binding Tibet deeply into its mainland economy. More importantly, however, it impacts India’s security calculus and revives the salience of land power strategy.</p><p>Suffice to say, building border infrastructure in a quieter, more efficient, and more intelligent way is the key to strategic deterrence. While there is a proactive effort on the part of India’s policymakers, there have been considerable time overruns on key strategic projects. Creating a National Strategic Infrastructure Development Board, along the lines of the National Highway Authority of India, can help streamline the planning, resourcing, and implementation of multimodal projects along our sensitive northern borders, cutting across ministries, departments, and State jurisdictions. Functioning as an independent authority under the National Security Advisor’s office, it could help steer myriad infrastructure projects, besides contributing to a rethink of the idea of strategic infrastructure as it continues to evolve, to tilt the balance of strategic deterrence in India’s favour.</p>.<p> [The writer served as Director (Operational Logistics and Strategic Movement) in the Indian Army]</p>
<p>The development of strategic infrastructure is the key to building India’s deterrent posture and the assertion of its territorial and sovereign rights. India’s northern borders have posed a challenge to its quest for achieving the desired levels of infrastructural connectivity, both for its people and its military. Several organs of the State have worked diligently to build the infrastructural network in the remote areas, but have failed to match up to the Chinese efforts in Tibet and Xinjiang, particularly the road and rail connectivity at the last mile.</p><p>There are several reasons ascribed to this differential. Prominent amongst these have been our proclivity to tread with caution along the border areas, the paucity of resources and technology to cut through difficult geological formations, and environmental concerns about the fragility of the Indian Himalayan Region (IMR). The concerns were valid at a time, but this must change now. The policy choices are stark and clear – ramp up the infrastructural deficit before it is too late to convincingly secure our borders and deter China from taking advantage of the differential. </p>.Rails to the Edge: Laying tracks to frontiers. <p>There are a few aspects that inhibit us from gathering momentum to build a comparable posture along the Himalayas. First, India’s policy makers need to ascertain the precise infrastructural differential vis-à-vis China along our northern borders. Only a fair assessment can help draw clarity on the magnitude and statement of the problem. Second, infrastructure development has to be multidimensional and multimodal these days. Road, air and rail links, communication and electricity nodes, water and oil pipelines, meteorological and space earth stations, and warehousing and billeting capacity – all of which can sustain acute weather conditions – fit into this definition. This requires a comprehensive State policy and agency to drive outcomes collaboratively. And third, it also necessitates looking beyond a BRO-centric approach, by allowing participation of private players, to usher in new ideas, technology and agile work practices. </p><p>For sure, India needs to take a cue from Chinese efforts in taming the Tibetan massif. Tibet’s rail network today stands at 4,100 kilometres, while its road network is approximately 120,000 kilometres. China recently announced the construction of a railway line between Hotan and Shigatse, spanning the northern edge of the Himalayas, which will serve only half a million people. The project, estimated at RMB 400 billion, far exceeds the annual GDP of Tibet. While some might call it wasteful expenditure, it advances a few Chinese strategic objectives: it unlocks Tibet’s vast mineral wealth, currently hindered by transportation costs, while binding Tibet deeply into its mainland economy. More importantly, however, it impacts India’s security calculus and revives the salience of land power strategy.</p><p>Suffice to say, building border infrastructure in a quieter, more efficient, and more intelligent way is the key to strategic deterrence. While there is a proactive effort on the part of India’s policymakers, there have been considerable time overruns on key strategic projects. Creating a National Strategic Infrastructure Development Board, along the lines of the National Highway Authority of India, can help streamline the planning, resourcing, and implementation of multimodal projects along our sensitive northern borders, cutting across ministries, departments, and State jurisdictions. Functioning as an independent authority under the National Security Advisor’s office, it could help steer myriad infrastructure projects, besides contributing to a rethink of the idea of strategic infrastructure as it continues to evolve, to tilt the balance of strategic deterrence in India’s favour.</p>.<p> [The writer served as Director (Operational Logistics and Strategic Movement) in the Indian Army]</p>