<p>As India approaches its declared deadline of March 31, 2026, the country stands on the verge of closing a chapter that has shaped its internal security landscape for over five decades. </p><p>The near eradication of Left-Wing Externalism (LWE), once spread over large swathes of our country, marks the consolation of the new model of governance.</p><p>Under the leadership of Narendra Modi and the direction of Union Home Minister Amit Shah, India’s approach to Naxalism has undergone a decisive shift. This transition reflects a conscious reworking of the state’s counterinsurgency playbook.</p><p>From its origins in the 1967 uprising in Naxalbari, Naxalism evolved into India’s longest-running internal security challenge, once spanning nearly 200 districts across states such as Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh. </p><p>Sustained for decades by governance gaps, tribal marginalisation, deep developmental deficits, economic precarity and state absence, it proved to be one of the most complex tests of the Indian state. </p><p>And for years India’s response has oscillated between reactive actions and uneven interventions, allowing the insurgency to persist.</p><p>However, under the regime of the current home minister it has changed into an outcome oriented strategy. This shift has imposed administrative discipline, sharpened co-ordination and aligned state capacity towards a singular objective.</p><p>The results, by most official measures, are striking. The number of LWE-affected districts has declined from 126 in 2014 to just 11 in 2025, with the most affected districts now reduced to three - Bijjapur, Sukma, Naryanapur in Chhattisgarh. But the numbers alone do not explain the scale of this shift.</p><p>At the heart of this transformation is what can be described as the “Shah Strategy”, a two-step approach that begins with systematically weakening LWE and follows through with the expansion of the state’s presence on the ground. Intelligence-led operations such as Octopus, Double Bull, Chakrabandha, and Operation Black Forest have focused on dismantling the Maoist leadership from the top-down, targeting key decision makers and disrupting command structures. In 2024-25 alone, there were nearly 2900 surrenders and over 1900 arrests and more than 600 neutralisations. </p><p>The elimination of figures such as CPI (Maoist) general secretary Namabla Keshav Rao, alias Basavaraju, has fractured organisational coherence and weakened the group’s ability to recruit and sustain operations. </p><p>The removal of senior leaders, including Central Committee member Patiram Manjhi, and others like Ganesh Uike, has significantly weakened the insurgency's internal confidence.</p><p>Bihar and Madhya Pradesh have declared themselves Naxal free following the surrender of remaining armed carders in Munger and Balaghat, respectively. In Telangana, the surrender of senior leader Devuji has precipitated a near collapse of Maoist Networks.</p><p>Continued surrenders across key operational belts in Chhattisgarh further indicate sustained pressure on ground. Simultaneously, the state has moved to fill the vacuum it has created. Infrastructure has been central to this effort. </p><p>The expansion of 12,000 km of road networks, installation of over 6,500 mobile towers, and expansion of banking infrastructure through 1,800+ branches and thousands of access points in previously inaccessible regions has extendedthe physical and administrative reach of the state. </p><p>Developmental schemes such as the Security Related Expenditure (SRE), Special Central Assistance (SCA), Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS), CivicAction Programme (CAP), Media Plan, Road Requirement Plan (RRP-I), and Road Connectivity Project for LWE Areas (RCPLWE) to strengthen</p><p>infrastructure, policing, and governance in LWE regions, financial inclusion initiatives along with skill development, and the Aspirational Districts Programme in tribal areas have sought to address the socio-economic conditions that sustained the insurgency for decades.</p><p>Skill development and education initiatives, along with schemes such as the Dharti Aaba Janjatiya Gram Utkarsh Abhiyan covering over 63,000 villages and benefiting more than five crore people, have addressed root causes of extremism.</p><p>Taken together these developments point to a breakdown of command networks, a loss of recruitment capacity and a growing acceptance of surrender and rehabilitation pathways, underscoring the strategic clarity with which Amit Shah has pursued the end of naxalism.</p><p>Today with the insurgency reduced to a handful of districts and its leadership structures significantly weakened, India stands at the cusp of ending a conflict that defined generations. </p><p>From a red corridor to what is increasingly framed as a developmental corridor, this marks one of the most significant internal security achievements in independent India.</p><p><em><strong>Dr Sanchita Bhattacharya, the author is a Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Managemen</strong></em>t</p><p><strong>(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.)</strong></p>
<p>As India approaches its declared deadline of March 31, 2026, the country stands on the verge of closing a chapter that has shaped its internal security landscape for over five decades. </p><p>The near eradication of Left-Wing Externalism (LWE), once spread over large swathes of our country, marks the consolation of the new model of governance.</p><p>Under the leadership of Narendra Modi and the direction of Union Home Minister Amit Shah, India’s approach to Naxalism has undergone a decisive shift. This transition reflects a conscious reworking of the state’s counterinsurgency playbook.</p><p>From its origins in the 1967 uprising in Naxalbari, Naxalism evolved into India’s longest-running internal security challenge, once spanning nearly 200 districts across states such as Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh. </p><p>Sustained for decades by governance gaps, tribal marginalisation, deep developmental deficits, economic precarity and state absence, it proved to be one of the most complex tests of the Indian state. </p><p>And for years India’s response has oscillated between reactive actions and uneven interventions, allowing the insurgency to persist.</p><p>However, under the regime of the current home minister it has changed into an outcome oriented strategy. This shift has imposed administrative discipline, sharpened co-ordination and aligned state capacity towards a singular objective.</p><p>The results, by most official measures, are striking. The number of LWE-affected districts has declined from 126 in 2014 to just 11 in 2025, with the most affected districts now reduced to three - Bijjapur, Sukma, Naryanapur in Chhattisgarh. But the numbers alone do not explain the scale of this shift.</p><p>At the heart of this transformation is what can be described as the “Shah Strategy”, a two-step approach that begins with systematically weakening LWE and follows through with the expansion of the state’s presence on the ground. Intelligence-led operations such as Octopus, Double Bull, Chakrabandha, and Operation Black Forest have focused on dismantling the Maoist leadership from the top-down, targeting key decision makers and disrupting command structures. In 2024-25 alone, there were nearly 2900 surrenders and over 1900 arrests and more than 600 neutralisations. </p><p>The elimination of figures such as CPI (Maoist) general secretary Namabla Keshav Rao, alias Basavaraju, has fractured organisational coherence and weakened the group’s ability to recruit and sustain operations. </p><p>The removal of senior leaders, including Central Committee member Patiram Manjhi, and others like Ganesh Uike, has significantly weakened the insurgency's internal confidence.</p><p>Bihar and Madhya Pradesh have declared themselves Naxal free following the surrender of remaining armed carders in Munger and Balaghat, respectively. In Telangana, the surrender of senior leader Devuji has precipitated a near collapse of Maoist Networks.</p><p>Continued surrenders across key operational belts in Chhattisgarh further indicate sustained pressure on ground. Simultaneously, the state has moved to fill the vacuum it has created. Infrastructure has been central to this effort. </p><p>The expansion of 12,000 km of road networks, installation of over 6,500 mobile towers, and expansion of banking infrastructure through 1,800+ branches and thousands of access points in previously inaccessible regions has extendedthe physical and administrative reach of the state. </p><p>Developmental schemes such as the Security Related Expenditure (SRE), Special Central Assistance (SCA), Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS), CivicAction Programme (CAP), Media Plan, Road Requirement Plan (RRP-I), and Road Connectivity Project for LWE Areas (RCPLWE) to strengthen</p><p>infrastructure, policing, and governance in LWE regions, financial inclusion initiatives along with skill development, and the Aspirational Districts Programme in tribal areas have sought to address the socio-economic conditions that sustained the insurgency for decades.</p><p>Skill development and education initiatives, along with schemes such as the Dharti Aaba Janjatiya Gram Utkarsh Abhiyan covering over 63,000 villages and benefiting more than five crore people, have addressed root causes of extremism.</p><p>Taken together these developments point to a breakdown of command networks, a loss of recruitment capacity and a growing acceptance of surrender and rehabilitation pathways, underscoring the strategic clarity with which Amit Shah has pursued the end of naxalism.</p><p>Today with the insurgency reduced to a handful of districts and its leadership structures significantly weakened, India stands at the cusp of ending a conflict that defined generations. </p><p>From a red corridor to what is increasingly framed as a developmental corridor, this marks one of the most significant internal security achievements in independent India.</p><p><em><strong>Dr Sanchita Bhattacharya, the author is a Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Managemen</strong></em>t</p><p><strong>(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.)</strong></p>