<p><em>Lt Gen Harinder Singh (retd).</em></p><p>No two wars are similar, and drawing comparisons can be facile. However, some inferences can be drawn from the Ukraine-Russia war and the Iran versus Israel-US conflict. In Ukraine, the war of manoeuvre has been reduced to a war of attrition. In Iran, while the initial air strikes were successful, they have not translated into a decisive victory. The war has expanded into other benign economies and geographies. The question then is how India should deduce the changes in warfare to recalibrate its military strategy and develop useful military capacity.</p><p><strong>New contexts in warfare</strong></p><p>In this age of disruptive warfare, war fighting is no longer about military metrics and technological superiority, but how superior tactics can compensate for lack of capacity; how disruptive methods can stall a stronger adversary; how no single military service can be decisive in battle; how innovation brings advantage on the battlefield; how resilience underpins military power; and how faulty assumptions can deny victory to a stronger adversary in war. Therefore, caution must be exercised when debates on warfare become overly technology-centric.</p><p>A few aspects stand out. First, there are limits to the use of airpower. While air strikes can cause significant damage, they cannot deliver military victory. In Ukraine, the use of airpower has been rather muted. In Iran, the US strikes were possible only due to the lack of any meaningful air defence. In the May 2025 conflict, the Indian Air Force was inhibited from effectively using its assets to constrain Pakistan. Clearly, air superiority, as a fundamental tenet of airpower, is under stress. Where air superiority is achieved, the ground forces gain the freedom for manoeuvre. When absent, the character of war changes dramatically.</p>.<p>Second, the defence of the airspace is not a reassuring concept. Flooding the skies with drones is the new tactic. Some estimates suggest that for every dollar spent on drones, at least ten times as much is spent to shoot them down. Making low-cost interceptors – based on laser and microwave technology, a re-usable capability – could be the next big thing.</p><p>Besides, radars have been foundational to air defence. Long-range, high-value radars have been the choice for long. But the drone war has spurred demand for shorter-range radars, as standard systems struggle to detect small, low-flying drones, pushing efforts to develop cheaper last-mile solutions.</p><p>Third, the importance of mechanised warfare is coming under intense debate. With unmanned aerial systems and munitions inhibiting the use of tanks and ICVs (Infantry Combat Vehicles), analysts are drawing divergent conclusions. In Ukraine, these platforms have rarely produced any breakthroughs. Would that make these platforms obsolete or dependent on a new set of operational conditions that could help exploit this force? Smaller modular units could be one way of rethinking this force. In India’s context, the mechanised forces still matter to secure our contested borders or make quick gains on a static battlefield.</p><p><strong>The basics don’t change</strong></p><p>A few aspects, however, never change. First, disruptive technologies can create a spectre of military success, but they cannot help win wars. They can cause intense death and destruction, but not destroy the will of a resilient adversary. Militaries need the real tools of war – tanks, guns, ships and aircraft – to provide the staying power and prevail in war. These platforms matter for India as its external security threats are rooted in a troubled history with China and Pakistan.</p><p>Second, wars can escalate in several unexpected ways. When the shooting match starts, all military planning for decisive strikes and escalation dominance or control fails. As strategic mistakes compound, the political leadership is left with no choice but to accept failure or escalate by adding newer dimensions to the war – the ground or naval forces. Then comes a stage when efforts to reinforce this stalemate spiral out of control, and the conflict expands. In Iran, the US has been clearly pushed into this trap.</p><p>Third, national resilience is the key to fighting a stronger adversary. A country is a resilient power if it can yield sufficient intrinsic capacities to meet the demands of its national security for indefinite periods of time. Resilience is both the will and the ability to resist pressure, protect the populace and infrastructure, and continue to fight. Preparing societies for protracted conflict and maintaining the credibility of national narratives and societal cohesion must be an integral part of the national security planning, not a secondary consideration. Both Ukraine and Iran have amply proved it.</p><p><strong>Building a future force</strong></p><p>What India can learn from these wars is important. What capabilities are useful and what is not is India’s planning dilemma. This muddies the debate on its choice of future war-fighting platforms – traditional or asymmetric. Traditional platforms – tanks, guns and aircraft – help to defend the home country, while the asymmetric – cyber, space, electronic warfare, etc. – help disrupt an adversary’s capacity. Finding the right balance is the puzzle that India’s military planners need to resolve.</p><p>India’s recent promulgation of the Defence Vision 2047 is a step in the right direction. The vision document aims at addressing the dissonance in its defence policies at three levels – in terms of aligning its technology, doctrine and structure – to build the future multi-domain force. While multi-domain operations look good in theory, they are difficult to resource and operationalise. More powerful nations, like the US and China, can indulge, but countries like India that lack the techno-industrial heft can find it difficult to field such a capability.</p><p>For India, focusing on creating the right operating layers – ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), C2 (Command and Control), long-range precision strikes, close-contact battle, logistics, infrastructure, etc. – can help optimise the limited resources to build a useful deterrent. Understanding the new contexts in warfare can help decide what suits us – a multi-domain force that takes years to build and optimise, or a layered capability that is efficient, affordable and quick to field. The latter seems to be a prudent choice, especially in light of India’s recurring military tensions with Pakistan and China.</p><p>As a case in point, Ukraine and Iran have done well to build precise, affordable layers to stalemate a superior adversary.</p><p><em>(The writer is a former corps commander of the Indian Army and also headed the Indian Military Academy)</em></p>
<p><em>Lt Gen Harinder Singh (retd).</em></p><p>No two wars are similar, and drawing comparisons can be facile. However, some inferences can be drawn from the Ukraine-Russia war and the Iran versus Israel-US conflict. In Ukraine, the war of manoeuvre has been reduced to a war of attrition. In Iran, while the initial air strikes were successful, they have not translated into a decisive victory. The war has expanded into other benign economies and geographies. The question then is how India should deduce the changes in warfare to recalibrate its military strategy and develop useful military capacity.</p><p><strong>New contexts in warfare</strong></p><p>In this age of disruptive warfare, war fighting is no longer about military metrics and technological superiority, but how superior tactics can compensate for lack of capacity; how disruptive methods can stall a stronger adversary; how no single military service can be decisive in battle; how innovation brings advantage on the battlefield; how resilience underpins military power; and how faulty assumptions can deny victory to a stronger adversary in war. Therefore, caution must be exercised when debates on warfare become overly technology-centric.</p><p>A few aspects stand out. First, there are limits to the use of airpower. While air strikes can cause significant damage, they cannot deliver military victory. In Ukraine, the use of airpower has been rather muted. In Iran, the US strikes were possible only due to the lack of any meaningful air defence. In the May 2025 conflict, the Indian Air Force was inhibited from effectively using its assets to constrain Pakistan. Clearly, air superiority, as a fundamental tenet of airpower, is under stress. Where air superiority is achieved, the ground forces gain the freedom for manoeuvre. When absent, the character of war changes dramatically.</p>.<p>Second, the defence of the airspace is not a reassuring concept. Flooding the skies with drones is the new tactic. Some estimates suggest that for every dollar spent on drones, at least ten times as much is spent to shoot them down. Making low-cost interceptors – based on laser and microwave technology, a re-usable capability – could be the next big thing.</p><p>Besides, radars have been foundational to air defence. Long-range, high-value radars have been the choice for long. But the drone war has spurred demand for shorter-range radars, as standard systems struggle to detect small, low-flying drones, pushing efforts to develop cheaper last-mile solutions.</p><p>Third, the importance of mechanised warfare is coming under intense debate. With unmanned aerial systems and munitions inhibiting the use of tanks and ICVs (Infantry Combat Vehicles), analysts are drawing divergent conclusions. In Ukraine, these platforms have rarely produced any breakthroughs. Would that make these platforms obsolete or dependent on a new set of operational conditions that could help exploit this force? Smaller modular units could be one way of rethinking this force. In India’s context, the mechanised forces still matter to secure our contested borders or make quick gains on a static battlefield.</p><p><strong>The basics don’t change</strong></p><p>A few aspects, however, never change. First, disruptive technologies can create a spectre of military success, but they cannot help win wars. They can cause intense death and destruction, but not destroy the will of a resilient adversary. Militaries need the real tools of war – tanks, guns, ships and aircraft – to provide the staying power and prevail in war. These platforms matter for India as its external security threats are rooted in a troubled history with China and Pakistan.</p><p>Second, wars can escalate in several unexpected ways. When the shooting match starts, all military planning for decisive strikes and escalation dominance or control fails. As strategic mistakes compound, the political leadership is left with no choice but to accept failure or escalate by adding newer dimensions to the war – the ground or naval forces. Then comes a stage when efforts to reinforce this stalemate spiral out of control, and the conflict expands. In Iran, the US has been clearly pushed into this trap.</p><p>Third, national resilience is the key to fighting a stronger adversary. A country is a resilient power if it can yield sufficient intrinsic capacities to meet the demands of its national security for indefinite periods of time. Resilience is both the will and the ability to resist pressure, protect the populace and infrastructure, and continue to fight. Preparing societies for protracted conflict and maintaining the credibility of national narratives and societal cohesion must be an integral part of the national security planning, not a secondary consideration. Both Ukraine and Iran have amply proved it.</p><p><strong>Building a future force</strong></p><p>What India can learn from these wars is important. What capabilities are useful and what is not is India’s planning dilemma. This muddies the debate on its choice of future war-fighting platforms – traditional or asymmetric. Traditional platforms – tanks, guns and aircraft – help to defend the home country, while the asymmetric – cyber, space, electronic warfare, etc. – help disrupt an adversary’s capacity. Finding the right balance is the puzzle that India’s military planners need to resolve.</p><p>India’s recent promulgation of the Defence Vision 2047 is a step in the right direction. The vision document aims at addressing the dissonance in its defence policies at three levels – in terms of aligning its technology, doctrine and structure – to build the future multi-domain force. While multi-domain operations look good in theory, they are difficult to resource and operationalise. More powerful nations, like the US and China, can indulge, but countries like India that lack the techno-industrial heft can find it difficult to field such a capability.</p><p>For India, focusing on creating the right operating layers – ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), C2 (Command and Control), long-range precision strikes, close-contact battle, logistics, infrastructure, etc. – can help optimise the limited resources to build a useful deterrent. Understanding the new contexts in warfare can help decide what suits us – a multi-domain force that takes years to build and optimise, or a layered capability that is efficient, affordable and quick to field. The latter seems to be a prudent choice, especially in light of India’s recurring military tensions with Pakistan and China.</p><p>As a case in point, Ukraine and Iran have done well to build precise, affordable layers to stalemate a superior adversary.</p><p><em>(The writer is a former corps commander of the Indian Army and also headed the Indian Military Academy)</em></p>
