AI Warfare | Tech fascism meets State power

On February 28, a missile strike by the United States-Israel alliance destroyed the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls' elementary school in Minab, in southern Iran, killing over 150 people, mostly girls aged between seven and 12. Early news reports were quick to blame artificial intelligence (AI), including Claude, a chatbot made by Anthropic, which had apparently mistaken a school for a military target.

The truth, however, was even more troubling. The strike relied on Project Maven, an AI-assisted targeting system developed by the Pentagon along with other companies such as Palantir, that processes vast intelligence data at tremendous speed. As no one had updated the database, the autonomous target system had presumed the portion of the building was a military facility that had, in fact, been converted into a school almost a decade ago. The system did what it was designed to do — to act quickly to focus on the existing data, and to compress the ‘kill chain’.

In modern-day technology-driven warfare, the value of human life is no longer determined solely by human judgement, but increasingly by data points and algorithmic outputs, often with deadly consequences. This is where Palantir Technologies, a Denver-based technology company, comes into the picture. Recently, its CEO, Alex Karp, argued that tech companies should move past “ethical hesitation” and align openly with national security goals. In his view, if democracies need AI for war or surveillance, companies should build it — without apology.

From innovation to State power

Karp’s radical ideas — critics call them ‘tech fascism’ — to many may sound pragmatic in a world of rising geopolitical tensions; but they collapse the subtle boundary between technological capability and State power. Karp has tried to justify that Silicon Valley can no longer remain borderless, idealistic, and driven solely by consumer innovation; but rather that technology firms should openly choose political alignment — in his worldview where technological leadership is inseparable from national strength.

Palantir represents a new model of techno-political engagement, where companies do not merely supply tools, but actively shape how governments think and act. In doing so, it forces a broader reckoning with the role of private firms in the exercise of public power. These tools do not just process information — they shape decisions on the ground. This points to a new kind of technology-security complex. Unlike the old military-industrial model, it runs on data and algorithms, making it less visible and harder to regulate.

The real risk is not just the capability, but the possibility of State-backed surveillance. Tools built for war or counterterrorism have already entered everyday governance. As algorithmic decisions become harder to question, governments can no longer remain accountable.

Despite controversies and criticism, Palantir’s platforms are embedded in defence, intelligence, and policing systems, combining satellite data, signals intelligence, and real-time analytics — not just for the US, but also for allies such as the United Kingdom and Germany. Palantir has also partnered extensively with the Israeli military and remained unfazed and unapologetic amid global criticism for allegedly designing ‘kill lists’ for the IDF during the 2024 Gaza conflict. Human rights groups have accused Palantir of aiding Israel’s genocide in Gaza, but the company was unapologetic in its statement that it ‘believe[s] in supporting the West and its allies—and Israel is an important ally of the West.’

No longer science fiction

Evidence raised before the United Nations by advocacy groups, such as the Stop Killer Robots campaign, points to the real-world use of AI-enabled targeting systems. AI-enabled targeting is no longer a speculative risk but an operational reality, with incidents like those in Iran illustrating how algorithmic systems can be used to identify and prioritise targets in ways that are difficult to audit after the act.

What is striking is not only the compression of the ‘kill chain’, but also the diffusion of responsibility it creates: when decisions emerge from complex data pipelines rather than clearly attributable human judgment, accountability becomes obscured. This is precisely the concern raised by advocates calling for limits on autonomous weapons — that the integration of AI into targeting systems risks normalising a form of warfare where speed and scale outpace legal and ethical scrutiny. Companies like Palantir are not merely enabling State capacity; they are actively shaping the conditions under which future conflicts are conducted, raising urgent questions about whether existing democratic oversight mechanisms are equipped to govern technologies whose consequences are both immediate and opaque.

Can India ignore the global AI warfare race?

The geopolitical dimension adds another layer of complexity. Palantir’s manifesto frames global competition in civilisational terms, suggesting that democratic societies must assert technological superiority to preserve their values. While this resonates with policymakers wary of China’s rapid advances in AI and surveillance systems, it also risks legitimising a race to the bottom — where ethical constraints are seen as strategic liabilities, something a democratic country such as India cannot afford to ignore.

This convergence of State and corporate power is not unprecedented. If the 20th century witnessed the rise of the military-industrial complex, in which defence contractors became integral to national security, what we are now seeing may be its evolution into a ‘technology-security complex,’ driven not by factories and hardware alone, but by data, algorithms, and software ecosystems. Products are no longer designed solely for efficiency or market demand, but for surveillance capability, predictive accuracy, and operational dominance. Over time, such priorities risk normalising intrusive technologies within everyday governance.

India's dilemma?

For large democracies such as India, this presents a dilemma. On the one hand, refusing to engage with such technologies may lead to strategic vulnerability. Our neighbour, China, has explicitly integrated AI into its military doctrine, pursuing what it calls ‘intelligent warfare’. Our allies and defence partners, such as Russia and Israel, also continue to invest heavily in autonomous warfare.

On the other, embracing them without robust safeguards can erode the very freedoms they are meant to protect. India sits squarely within this growing dilemma. As a country facing complex security challenges, it cannot afford to lag in AI and defence technologies. Initiatives such as the National AI Mission and increased investment in defence-tech startups signal a recognition of this reality.

However, the temptation to replicate models like Palantir’s without adaptation would be misplaced. India’s institutional framework, constitutional commitments, and socio-political diversity demand a more calibrated approach. The deployment of AI in policing, welfare delivery, and national security must remain subject to transparency, accountability, and legal oversight. Overdependence on foreign technology platforms — whether from the US or elsewhere — can create strategic vulnerabilities and limit policy autonomy.

The challenge, therefore, is not to choose between capability and ethics, but to build both simultaneously. This requires more than policy declarations. It calls for investment in indigenous research, clear regulatory frameworks for AI use, and mechanisms for democratic oversight that keep pace with technological change. Adopting a model that sidelines ethical restraint in favour of capability would be risky in India’s context. With its deep social diversity and uneven institutional capacity, such systems can amplify existing inequalities rather than solve them.

The greater danger is not visible militarisation, but the silent expansion — the gradual embedding of these tools into everyday governance without transparency or debate. India does not have to choose between innovation and accountability; it must build both. That means stronger parliamentary oversight of AI in security and governance, independent audits of algorithmic systems, and clearer legal limits on surveillance. It also means investing in domestic technology.

India’s choice is not between ethics and capability. It is whether democracy itself can survive the age of algorithmic warfare.

Abhishek Patni is a New Delhi-based senior journalist. X: @Abhishek_Patni

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.