The Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) has introduced and is expected to soon pass a budget without a single elected corporator, for the second time since its creation in 1889. Likewise, Bengaluru’s Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) was dissolved in 2020, and elections have been postponed multiple times.
Considering that Mumbai and Bangalore are among Asia’s richest municipalities and have annual budgets larger than those of several Indian states, the situation raises important questions about electoral politics and local governments.
The cause lies in the asymmetrical power structure between local governments and the state and Union governments, which makes it possible for state governments to override the rights of local citizens and dictate spending in Urban Local Bodies (ULBs).
A combination of limited fiscal powers, political interference, and voter apathy, which form a vicious circle, lead to the curtailment of ULB autonomy and embolden state governments to exert control. The fiscal and political powers of ULBs should not be dependent on the passage of laws by the state government or tied to grants from the Union. This is the ideal, albeit difficult to reinstate, but one that retains the spirit of the Constitution.
India’s freedom struggle was a grassroots movement that mobilised all sections of society across religion, caste, class, and region. Politics in India has remained centralised at the Union and state levels 76 years after independence, rather than allowing citizens to directly interact with the State. An attempt at bringing government to the grassroots was made 30 years ago with the passage of the 74th Amendment, which, by recognising a third tier of government, brought self-determination and self-governance to citizens. Since then, urban India may have expanded to include more than half of India’s residents, but neither ULBs have been strengthened nor have their powers been enhanced to address this surge.
The BMC’s budget was introduced in the absence of a single elected corporator because the state government had appointed an administrator to take over the corporation’s functioning until elections occurred. Such a move undermines the right of every city resident to avail themselves of the near-direct democracy that the 74th Amendment mandates.
It is not surprising that state governments have an incentive to control ULBs since they are major generators of tax revenue and GDP. Simultaneously, ULBs are fiscally dependent on higher tiers of government for funding, hampering their ability to provide for citizens. Municipal revenues and expenditures have stayed constant at around 1 per cent of national GDP since the early 2000s. Similarly, at the state level, many states are dependent on Union transfers for nearly 50 per cent of their budgets.
This fiscal control is mirrored in the political setup of most urban bodies. Unelected bureaucrats, who are appointed by the state government, are vested with administrative control, while an elected mayor holds limited, ceremonial powers. This structure incentivises city agents to favour the state government and political parties, not ULB residents. A system of directly elected mayors may help promote accountability in city governments.
Elected corporators have limited powers in assigning city officials and can scrutinise government spending rather than drafting legislation. Even these basic functions can be curtailed if municipal elections are postponed, as in Bengaluru and Mumbai. Voter turnout in ULB elections averages at 45 per cent, far lower than turnouts for state and parliamentary elections, signalling to political leaders that power over government policy and expenditure, and the negotiations over accountability, reside with higher levels of government.
A new approach to local politics would prioritise a fixed schedule for ULB elections while also ensuring that any delays could only be enacted in extenuating circumstances with a provision for untied funding. The system of directly electing mayors has proven its merit across the world by making city administrators fully accountable to local citizens and also empowering cities to adapt to crises, from Manchester to New York.
If the freedom struggle was a movement to create direct democracy, it could be argued that the 74th Amendment was meant to complete this exercise. However, by placing the onus of decentralisation on the Union and states, compounded by the skewed incentive structure that exists today, an unproductive equilibrium persists, making the current
situation in Mumbai and Bengaluru inevitable.
ULBs are supposed to deliver basic services, safeguard public health, and enable economic productivity. Their performance must be measured through non-political indicators to be effective and not partisan. Codifying fixed terms for elections with high thresholds to justify any postponements, improving voter turnout by building trust through feedback loops and participatory governance, and holding competitive elections are all possible solutions. They can reinvigorate local democracy, improve service delivery,
and enhance the financial performance of local governments at a crucial juncture in India’s history.
(The writer is a researcher at Artha Global)
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